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Motivation
In 1950, Alan Turing published a paper to suggest a game, the “imitation game”. 
This paper provided an objective measure of how the question of “can machines 
think?” could be addressed (Turing, 1950). This was, in a way, the beginning of 
artificial intelligence, although the term was invented in 1956, two years after 
Turing’s untimely and sad death. 
Just a few months before that, John Cade, an Australian psychiatrist, serendipitously 
discovered the sedating effects of lithium carbonate in controlling psychotic 
excitement (Cade, 1949). This was the beginning of a decade of success for psychiatry 
in which new medications for several psychiatric disorders were discovered. 
65 years later, building on recent developments in artificial intelligence, computational 
neuroscientists and computer scientists have joined the efforts of psychiatrists to 
understand mental disorders. Consequently, new questions are arising: can machines 
simulate mental disorders? If they can, can we discover new treatments for mental 
disorders by simulating their effects on those machines? 
Background
This thesis aims to enhance our understanding of the neural implementation of 
the computations underlying learning and decision making in the human brain. 
This effort is part of the emerging field of computational psychiatry (Maia and 
Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 2012; Friston et al., 2014). 
This thesis is grounded in three research domains. First, there are systems 
neuroscience studies of frontostriatal circuitry indicating that information 
processing in this circuitry is hierarchically organized within anatomically 
segregated corticostriatal loops (Alexander et al., 1986; Middleton and Strick, 
2002; Draganski et al., 2008a), linked by a spiraling dopaminergic circuitry 
connecting midbrain and the striatum (Haber et al., 2000; Ikemoto, 2007). Second, 
this thesis is grounded in cognitive neuroscience studies of Pavlovian/ instrumental 
conditioning and associative learning (Pavlov, 1927; Mackintosh, 1974; Adams, 
1982). That literature deals with mechanisms underlying prediction of rewards 
contingent on some stimuli or actions. Different cortical and striatal regions, 
within the segregated anatomical corticostriatal loops, have been shown to be 
implicated in different forms of conditioning (Balleine et al., 2007; Graybiel, 2008). 
Third, this thesis is grounded in computational neuroscience of  reinforcement 
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learning and Bayesian learning models (Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Chater and 
Oaksford, 2008), a literature which is closely linked to conditioning by constructing 
computational models of learning and choice (Barto and Sutton, 1982; Barto, 1995). 
These models are also linked to neuroscience primarily through seminal works of 
Schultz and others indicating that midbrain dopamine neurons encode reward 
prediction errors in terms of reinforcement learning models (Montague et al., 
1996; Schultz et al., 1997). Several studies in humans and animals have further 
strengthened the link between these models and neural activity within the 
cortico striatal circuitry (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Daw et al., 
2006; Schönberg et al., 2007; Steinberg et al., 2013).
Additional notions derived from systems- and cognitive- neuroscience literatures 
will be discussed in the next four experimental chapters. In this chapter, I provide 
an overview of the theoretical notions relevant to this thesis, as derived from 
computational neuroscience. I wish here to give a general theoretical framework 
unifying different modeling approaches used in this thesis, and articulate the 
contributions of this thesis to the emerging field of computational psychiatry. This 
contribution is theoretically embedded within Bayesian learning theory. This 
theory provides a powerful and general ground for understanding contemporary 
attempts in modeling brain functions and its disorders. Note that although 
computational models used in the next experimental chapters (chapters 2-5) are 
instances of this general framework, the level of mathematical treatments in each 
chapter is sufficient for that particular chapter. Here, I wish to clarify the theoretical 
ground and the implicit assumptions of the experimental chapters.
On computational psychiatry
Psychiatry is at a crossroads (Insel et al., 2010; Sahakian et al., 2010; Hyman, 2012; 
Robbins et al., 2012). Patients are typically diagnosed in late phases of their illness, 
when diseases are already chronic and relapsing. Diagnosis based on descriptive 
symptoms is often challenging due to complexity and heterogeneity of the 
psychiatric symptoms and the high chance of co-morbidity among disorders 
(McHugh, 2005). Consequently, often there are neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions for defining a particular disease (Robbins et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
most available medications lack proper biological bases and might have severe side 
effects (Insel et al., 2010). In the last two decade, cognitive and systems neurosciences 
have advanced our understanding of neurobiological bases of brain disorders 
using state of the art neuroimaging and preclinical tools. This approach can help 
psychiatry to go beyond descriptive subjective symptoms reported by patients and 
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define “objective” cognitive and neural markers of psychiatric disorders (Robbins 
et al., 2012). Computational psychiatry promises to go further than that, by 
constructing computational models of brain and behavior to help prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric disorders, and thus bridging the gap 
between neural and behavioral markers of brain disorders (Maia and Frank, 2011; 
Montague et al., 2012; Friston et al., 2014; Stephan et al., 2015a, 2015b). 
In this chapter, I identify three distinct levels, each with different goals, critical 
for being able to computationally model brain disorders of learning and choice. 
The first level is concerned with constructing computational models of the healthy 
brain, as any useful theory of brain disorders needs to be based on understanding 
the healthy brain. The second level is concerned with discovering mappings 
between endophenotypes and psychological traits. The latter are indexed through 
parameters (or priors, in a Bayesian sense) of the computational model, thereby 
“individualizing” the computational model. The basic insight is that individual 
differences are modeled as differences in parameters modeling individuals. The 
third level is concerned with computational models of brain disorders. This level 
provides a computational understanding of how a general functional computational 
model could go awry when individualized models interact with a particular context. 
1. Computational modeling of learning and choice
Computational neuroscience has successfully provided formal theories to explain 
behavior and brain functions. There are several approaches, at different levels of 
explanation, and with different assumptions. One influential approach is concerned 
with system-level computational explanation of brain and behavior assuming that 
there are computable functions (in computer science sense (Turing, 1937)) between 
brain states and behavior (Montague et al., 2012). This approach is the core of 
computational psychiatry. There are two comprehensive computational frameworks 
of learning and choice: Bayesian decision theory encompassing reinforcement 
learning (Körding, 2007; Dayan and Daw, 2008) and active inference framework 
(Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston, 2010). Here, I give an overview of each theory.
Bayesian decision theory
It is an intuitive idea that animals make choices to maximize their utility. This is 
the basis of Bayesian decision theory, which specifies that animals should make 
choices to maximize their expected utility, averaging over all their uncertainties 
(Dayan and Daw, 2008). The term “uncertainty” plays a critical role in this 
formulation, as real-world situations are rife with different types of uncertainties. 
In a simple case, consider the reinforcement learning problem of learning the 
value of different states in the environment, where each state of the world 
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corresponds to some (probabilistic) reward. The animal makes choices and each 
choice changes the state of the world and results in another reward. The value of 
the current state could be defined as cumulative expected future reward 
discounted over time. However, in the real-world problem, there are uncertainties 
in reward and in transitions between states. Reinforcement learning theory 
provides real-time approximations of the subjective value of each state-action pair, 
V(s,a), given learning parameters such as learning rate specifying the speed of 
learning value by each reward experience and discount factor specifying the cost 
of delay in collecting reward (Sutton and Barto, 1998). 
In the real-world situations, however, it is often the case that the state of the world 
is uncertain. More specifically, there are perceptual uncertainties and animals 
should make choices taking into account these uncertainties (Körding, 2007; 
Dayan and Daw, 2008). In other words, animals have only access to their own 
actions and sensory observations, which are caused by the state of the world 
(Dayan et al., 1995). In a probabilistic setting, this means that the state of the world is 
a latent variable and an animal has an internal probabilistic model of its own 
sensory observations given the world (latent) state and its action, p(o | s,a), where o 
denotes sensory observations. To make choices, the animal needs to solve an 
inverse problem, which is inferring the state of the world according to sensory 
observations, p(s | o,a). This could be computed using the Bayes rule:
Equation 1
where p(s | a) is the prior belief, before making sensory observations, about the 
state of the world given the action. Computing the normalizing term, p(o | a), is 
possible by marginalizing over latent state:
Equation 2
where p(o | a) is called marginal distribution and could be conceived as a measure 
of how well the animal could predict its own sensory observations given its action. 
This is because the integral in this equation is indeed a weighted average of 
the predicted probability of the animal’s sensory observations p(o | s,a) over all 
possible states (causes) weighted by the a priori belief that that state be the true 
state of the world. The value-based decision system should take into account the 
uncertainty in animal’s knowledge about the state of the world by computing an 
expected value of action:
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Equation 3
where V^(a) is the expected value of action under the perceptual belief about the 
state of the world. The integral in this equation could be seen as a way to weight a 
value computed using a particular world state with the belief that that state is the 
true state given sensory observations. 
Equations 1 and 2 construct perception, i.e. inferring the state of the world given 
observations, and equation 3 is the basis for choice. In practice, however, there is a 
critical issue as both integrals in Equations 2 and 3 are often intractable. Similar 
issue arises for dealing with other forms of uncertainty, for example uncertainties 
in motor implementation of actions. This requires some forms of approximation. 
A class of approximations, called variational inference, turns out to be useful for 
solving these issues (Hinton and Zemel, 1994; MacKay, 1995; Jordan et al., 1999). 
The basic idea is to approximate the posterior distribution with a parametric 
“variational” distribution, such as Gaussian, and optimize the parameters of the 
variational distribution to make it more similar to the posterior. In addition, this 
method provides a good lower bound of the marginal distribution, p(o). If q(s) is 
the variational distribution over the latent state of the world, it can be shown that: 
Equation 4
where F(q(s),a) is called variational bound or free energy that depends on the 
variational distribution and actions and D(q(s), p(s | o,a)) is called Kullback-Leibler 
divergence that could be understood as a measure of dissimilarity between q(s) 
and p(s | o,a). The mathematical definitions of these quantities are not important 
here (see Supplementary equations). However, there are three key features about this 
equation and these quantities, which should be highlighted. First, whereas calculating 
the free energy requires to have the internal model, p(o | s,a), calculating 
D(q(s), p(s | o,a)) needs the posterior, p(s | o,a) (see Supplementary equations). 
Therefore, working with free energy is possible without solving the integral 
in Equation 2. Second, since divergence (like other dissimilarity measures) is 
always positive, negative free energy provides an approximation (more precisely 
a lower bound) of log p(o | a). Indeed these two quantities are equal if 
D(q(s), p(s | o,a)) = 0, which only happens if q(s) is equal to the posterior probability 
of the state of the world, p(s | o,a). Third, while both the negative free energy 
and divergence are functions of the variational distribution, q(s), their sum is 
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independent of the variational distribution. Therefore, any change in the negative 
free energy with respect to the variational distribution necessarily reflects a 
similar change in the divergence in opposite direction as their sum is independent 
of changes in the variational distribution. 
From these three features, we conclude that the negative free energy can be 
maximized with respect to parameters of the variational distribution, q(s), which 
necessarily reduces the divergence (as their sum is independent of q(s)) and 
provides an approximation for the posterior, p(s | o,a). Therefore, by choosing 
“appropriate” variational distributions, the animal can solve the perception 
problem (inferring environmental state based on sensory observations). 
This variational approximation also provides a promising approach to efficiently 
approximate the intractable integral in Equation 3, arising in computing expected 
value of state-action pairs. Specifically, by replacing p(s | o,a) with q(s) in Equation 3, 
one could compute an approximate expected value. The limitations is that the 
variational distribution, q(s), should be chosen in a way to also simplify computing 
the integral in Equation 3 given the form of value function, V(s,a).  
Active inference framework
The active inference framework extends the variational treatment of perception to 
the domain of action selection (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston, 2013). To 
explain this framework, we should see the whole process of perception and action 
in an iterative manner: animals infer the state of the world based on their sensory 
input (perception) and sample the world (i.e. change their sensory observations) 
given the inferred state of the world (action). Therefore, every action is followed by 
a perception process because the sensory observations have been changed. For 
example, eye movements sample the environment and thereby change the visual 
inputs, which then could change our perception of the world. From this perspective, 
action is intimately linked with perception. 
Now suppose that the animal has approximated the current state of the world 
by evaluating the variational distribution, q(s). We already mentioned that 
– F (q(s),a) is an approximation of (log-) sensory evidence, p(o | a), which is the 
animal’s ability to predict its own sensory inputs given the action. If we assume 
that a goal of the animal is to be able to better predict its own sensory observations, 
then one way to change the sensory input is to make actions that increase p(o | a). 
Since free energy is a tractable approximation of this quantity, animal could 
minimize the free energy with respect to action, a, which necessarily maximizes 
predictability of sensory observations, p(o | a). 
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We have conceptualized the free energy as an approximation strategy that animals 
or brains could use to simplify computations related to perception and action. 
Friston goes beyond this conceptualization and proposes that free energy 
minimization is the underlying principle of brain computations. He has put 
forward the hypothesis that computations in the brain minimize time average of 
free energy (Friston, 2013). This unifying proposal is based on the intuition that 
biological systems are evolved to live within a bound and any surprising sensory 
state, those states that are a priori unlikely, should be avoided (Friston and Stephan, 
2007). Based on this principle, Friston rejects the notion of extrinsic value and 
suggest that expected value of action (cf. Equation 3) is only the negative expected 
surprise of sensory observations under approximate perceptual distribution 
(Friston et al., 2009). 
Bayesian decision theory and active inference theory are often treated as 
inconsistent viewpoints. We showed that these concepts are deeply related, 
although we admit that there are important conflicting aspects. The relation 
comes from the practical fact that both theories, like any other Bayesian 
framework, take into account uncertainties and, consequently, should deal with 
some generally intractable integrals, which makes approximations necessary. 
From this perspective, both theories view the brain as an approximate 
Bayes-optimal. These approximations usually map a difficult inference problem 
(i.e. computing intractable expectations) to a supposedly easier optimization 
problem typically with respect to dynamic variables of some tractable distributions 
such as Gaussian. The dynamic variables, such as the mean and variance of 
Gaussian, are dependent on some parameters. Here, the difference between 
dynamic variables and parameters is in the temporal scale of their change. 
Dynamic variables tend to change rapidly, for example during one task, while 
parameters tend to change slowly, e.g. during development. The parameters might 
be defined as constant parameters, or as some prior probability distributions in 
the Bayesian sense. Since constant parameters are a special case of probability 
distribution, I refer to parameters and/or their prior generally as priors. In the 
next section, I discuss the role of these priors in brain computations. 
2. Computing vulnerability: mapping traits to priors
Most psychiatric disorders show high heritability (Meyer-Lindenberg and 
Weinberger, 2006). Yet, we know very little about the mechanisms through which 
risks for psychiatric disorders might be inherited. In psychiatry, the concept of 
endophenotypes has been introduced as a mediating factor between predisposing 
genes and clinical symptoms (Gottesman and Shields, 1973; Gottesman and Gould, 
2003). Recently, the concept of cognitive endophenotypes has been suggested as 
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quantitative and objective neuro-cognitive traits predisposing brain disorders 
(Robbins et al., 2012). I believe that an important challenge for computational 
psychiatry is to formally define cognitive endophenotypes in terms of 
“computational traits”, using (generative) computational models of brain and 
behavior. It has been generally assumed that such a mapping is possible and initial 
attempts for finding the map, especially in patients (Brodersen et al., 2014), have 
already been started. Here, I wish to give a theoretical flavor of assumptions behind 
this approach, as mapping cognitive and neuroanatomical traits into elements of 
computational models is central to this thesis. 
One fundamental powerful feature of Bayesian systems is that they could accumulate 
knowledge in the form of priors. Regarding the brain, some parts of this knowledge 
are accumulated through interaction with the world, either through natural 
selection across generations, or by individual learning. A Bayesian perspective 
suggests that priors are optimized in relation to environmental possible states. 
In other words, we can regard priors in the brain as “good” priors given the 
environment generating data.
It is intuitive that good priors are both informative and sufficiently flexible, 
enabling new data to change the posterior. This corresponds to the concept of 
Bayesian model evidence, which has a built-in tradeoffs between fit to the data (e.g. 
sensory observation, rewarding outcomes etc.) and model complexity (MacKay, 
2003). We can obtain some insights into the concept of model evidence in a simple 
situation, when prior distribution is a uniform within a bound, so that: p(w) = 1/w0. 
Then, it is easy to show that for a Gaussian posterior distribution with uncertainty, 
w, (log-model) evidence is:
Evidence = fit – complexity
where complexity = log(w0 / w) (MacKay, 2003). Note that complexity is always 
positive because w0 > w, as one cannot be less certain about a random variable 
after observing some samples of. Also it could be easily seen that the complexity 
term is higher for models with larger a priori uncertainty, w0. It is because a 
higher prior uncertainty corresponds to wider prior distribution, which is capable 
of making lots of predictions but necessarily with lower probability (Figure 1).
This simple situation can give us some hints about how priors might corrupt 
inference. Given a fixed internal model, inference can be corrupted due to “bad” 
priors in two ways: 1) The prior is too wide resulting in a too complex model that 
is able to make a wide variety of predictions. Such a model is probably too slow and 
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effortful to be adjusted. 2) The prior is too narrow resulting in a simple, fast and 
easy-to-be-adjusted model. Such a model is probably too rigid and fails to learn a 
wide range of data. Speculative examples of bad priors are given by Parkinson’s 
disease and by behavioral addictions. Whereas behavioral addictions are associated 
with excessive habitual control of action (Everitt et al., 2008), Parkinson’s disease 
might force patients towards a progressive and excessive reliance on goal-directed 
control of actions (Redgrave et al., 2010). It seems that both disorders correspond to 
the same prior, probably in the domain of action and motor control. Behavioral 
addictions might have excessively narrow priors, resulting in maladaptive rigidity 
of actions. Parkinson’s disease might have excessively wide priors, resulting in 
slow and effortful actions. Interestingly, physiologically and psychologically, these 
brain disorders show opposite properties. While Parkinson’s disease is the 
pathological state of loss of striatal dopamine, addiction is generally associated 
with excessive striatal dopamine. Psychologically, it has been reported that 
non-medicated Parkinson’s disease patients’ typically do not engage in impulsive 
or addictive behaviors and tend to not smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol (Dagher 
and Robbins, 2009).
Figure 1 A)  Three prior distributions over one parameter, w, corresponding to three models 
with the same internal structure and different priors. Larger prior width corresponds to a 
more complex model. B) In addition to the priors in panel A, the likelihood function for two 
observed datasets, D1 and D2, is depicted. Model M1, associated with the red prior, predicts 
D1 well but fails to predict D2. Model M3, associated with the blue prior, predicts both D1 and 
D2 equally well but with low evidence, as this model a priori predicts that a wide range of 
parameters, w, might be responisble for generation of data. Model M2 is the best model, which 
fits to both dataset well and has lower complexity than M3.
p(w|M1)
w
p(w|M2)
w
p(w|M3)
p(D1|w)
p(D2|w)
A B
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Therefore, if priors are optimized during evolution according to probable world 
states, then it makes sense to regard heritable traits as priors. This view essentially 
models individual differences as differences in priors modeling individuals. This 
perspective also highlights the role of “environment” in development of psychiatric 
disorders, as trait priors implicitly reflect (evolutionarily-learnt) expectations 
about the world, and they become suboptimal only in contexts violating those 
expectations. Note that this perspective assumes that two other components of 
approximate-Bayesian inference, the internal (generative) model and approximations, 
are the same across individuals. Although untested, this is a general assumption 
shared by all available computational frameworks of brain and behavior. 
3. Modeling disorders of brain 
An approximate-Bayesian system relies on three major components, namely 
priors, generative model of the world and approximations. It has been discussed 
extensively how these components can model maladaptive behaviors in the 
context of Bayesian decision-theoretic systems (Huys et al., 2015). Here, I focus on 
two ways to model pathological computations in a Bayesian model of brain. 
The first way is to assume that implementation of the generative model or its 
approximations is corrupted in some situations. A good example of this view is 
Redish (2004) model of drug addiction. In this model, drugs are assumed to hijack 
the reward system by adding a non-compensable drug-induced term to reward 
prediction errors presumably signaled by dopamine after drug taking (Redish, 
2004). Therefore, the value of drug taking action grows and ultimately cancels out 
any potential cost associated with drug taking. Although such models could be 
computationally and mechanistically useful, they do not link endophenotypes 
with possible pathological computational processes and have limited diagnostic 
value. 
Another possibility through which a computational system can go awry is that 
some individuals with specific priors act (or perceive) maladaptively in some 
environmental contexts. Although this is unlikely to result in a chronic 
pathological condition, a severe problem might arise when the consequences of 
those maladaptive actions exacerbate the same priors leading to them. In the 
language of control theory, this is a positive feedback loop. Therefore, this approach 
is grounded in potential endophenotypes associated with a specific mental 
disorder. We exploit findings from the literature of drug addiction and obesity to 
give an example. Preclinical animal models of cocaine addiction have shown that 
animals with low density of D2 dopamine receptors in the ventral striatum before 
drug exposure are highly impulsive (Dalley et al., 2007), escalate their cocaine 
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intake after drug exposure (Dalley et al., 2007) and are more vulnerable to develop 
compulsive addiction-like cocaine seeking (Belin et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
knockdown of striatal D2 receptors in rats induced compulsive eating in obese rats 
(Johnson and Kenny, 2010). Additionally, it has been repeatedly observed that drug 
abuse and obesity progressively reduce striatal D2 receptors (Porrino et al., 2004a, 
2004b; Volkow et al., 2008). Therefore, ventral striatal D2 receptors provide a basis 
for modeling individual vulnerability to addiction. 
Building on these findings, we have previously proposed a reinforcement learning 
model of addiction, where addiction arises due to an imbalance between a ventral 
striatal system computing prediction errors and a dorsal striatal system 
implementing action valuation and selection. Specifically, we have assumed that 
there is a biological bound (prior) on the ability of D2 receptors in one region to 
tolerate dopaminergic stimulation and overstimulation of these receptors further 
reduces their density. Thus, those individuals with lower amount of D2 receptors 
have lower bound and are vulnerable to excessive dopamine release by highly 
palatable drugs or foods. By assuming that dopamine receptors modulate learning 
rate based on observations in humans (Frank et al., 2004, 2007b) and monkeys 
(Groman et al., 2011; but see Piray, 2011), we showed that an imbalance arises 
between updating of stimulus values responsible for learning and action values 
responsible for action selection.
This example provides some insights into how a biological system modeling ap-
proximate-Bayesian system might go awry. Indeed, interaction between appropriate 
contexts and bad priors might violate assumptions behind the approximations. In 
this example, the prior assumptions about maximum amount of prediction error 
are systematically violated by highly rewarding substances and the violation itself 
increased the chance of occurrences of more violations. Similar problems could 
arise in the context of variational approximation. 
Conclusion
In this work, I have highlighted three distinct levels within the computational 
psychiatry program emphasizing how Bayesian approaches enable us to model 
cognitive and neural markers predisposing organisms for brain disorders. 
Specifically, mapping cognitive and neuronal traits into parameters and priors of 
learning models enable us to construct “computational traits” with potential 
diagnostic value. Furthermore, combining priors with internal model enables us 
to investigate the effects of parameters on learning and choice, which is necessary 
for understanding pathological computational processes. 
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Outline of the thesis
In this thesis, I employ computational models, structural and functional neuro - 
imaging tools, and pharmacological interventions, in both healthy and altered 
human brains, to investigate fronto-striatal circuits. The goal is to understand the 
computations implemented by different elements of those circuits. This thesis is a 
step within a long-term research program aimed at defining the cognitive and 
neural mechanisms that might predispose individuals towards impulsive and 
compulsive disorders, i.e. disorders known to arise from alterations in fronto-stri-
atal circuits. Dysfunction of elements of those circuits is also associated with 
disorders such as depression, Parkinson’s disease, and schizophrenia.
The primary neural alteration in drug/behavioral addictions is within the 
mesostriatal dopaminergic system. Importantly, only a small subset of people tend 
to develop compulsive behaviors, even among those repeatedly exposed to drugs 
(O’Brien et al., 1986; Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004; Everitt et al., 2008). Evidence 
from work with behaving rodents indicates that rats with lower dopamine D2 
density in the ventral striatum are impulsive and vulnerable to develop compulsive 
drug seeking behaviors (Dalley et al., 2007; Belin et al., 2008), which depends on 
dopaminergic spiraling connections between the striatum and the midbrain 
(Haber et al., 2000; Belin and Everitt, 2008). Trait impulsivity is hypothesized as a 
cognitive endophenotype predisposing compulsive drug seeking (Robbins et al., 
2012). In chapter 2, we focus on the architecture of the human striatum, its 
D2-dependent dopaminergic modulations and its relation to trait impulsivity in 
healthy human participants. 
Parkinson’s disease is a degenerative neural disorder primarily affecting the motor 
system. Although Parkinson’s disease is physiologically and psychologically 
opposite to behavioral addictions (Dagher and Robbins, 2009), a subpopulation of 
patients may become addicted to their own medications or exhibit impulse control 
disorders, such as pathological gambling, binge eating, excessive shopping and 
hypersexuality (Voon et al., 2007). In chapter 3, we study maladaptive learning 
processes in Parkinson’s disease patients with impulse control disorders. 
Modern systems- and cognitive- neuroscience theories of addiction indicate that 
addiction arises as a progressive transition from goal-directed voluntary drug- 
seeking to maladaptive habitual drug-taking behavior (Everitt et al., 2008). In terms 
of neural control, there is a corresponding transition from the affective and 
cognitive loops of corticostriatal circuitry to the sensorimotor corticostriatal loop. 
This transition is mediated by dopaminergic spiraling connections between the 
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striatum and midbrain (Everitt et al., 2008). Goal-directed and habitual modes of 
action selection have been hypothesized to reflect model-based and model-free 
 reinforcement-learning computations in the brain, respectively (Daw et al., 2005, 
2011). In chapter 4, we investigate the components of corticostriatal circuitry 
predicting individual differences in exerting model-based and model-free control 
on actions. 
Maladaptive emotion processing and emotion regulation are strongly linked to 
drug and behavioral addictions especially in initiation of drug use and in relapse 
(Khantzian, 1997). Emotions are hypothesized to modulate learning and choice, by 
modulating the saliency of cues predicting reward or punishment (Pearce and 
Hall, 1980; Phelps et al., 2014). Bayesian and reinforcement learning theories 
predict that emotions might modulate learning rate (Li et al., 2011b), which 
changes beliefs about action-outcome contingencies in volatile environments 
(Behrens et al., 2007b). In chapter 5, we investigate the behavioral and neural 
mechanisms by which emotions modulate associative learning in humans. 
In chapter 6, I summarize findings and discuss future works. 
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Supplementary equations
The free energy and divergence quantities in Equation 4 are:
It could be seen that whereas the posterior, p(s | o,a), is needed for calculating the 
divergence, D, the free energy, F, could be computed based on the prior, p(s | a), and 
the internal model, p(o | s,a). 
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Abstract
Interactions between motivational, cognitive and motor regions of the striatum 
are crucial for implementing behavioural control. Work with experimental 
animals indicates that such interactions are sensitive to modulation by dopamine. 
Using systematic pharmacological manipulation of dopamine D2 receptors and 
resting-state functional imaging, we defined the functional architecture of the 
human striatum and quantified the effects of dopaminergic drugs on intrinsic 
effective connectivity between striatal subregions. We found that dopamine 
modulates interactions between motivational and cognitive regions, as well 
cognitive and motor regions of the striatum. Stimulation and blockade of the 
dopamine D2 receptor had opposite (increasing and decreasing) effects on the 
efficacy of those interactions. Furthermore, trait impulsivity was specifically 
associated with dopaminergic modulation of ventral-to-dorsal striatal connectivity. 
Individuals with high trait impulsivity exhibited greater drug-induced increases 
(after stimulation) and decreases (after blockade) of ventral-to-dorsal striatal 
connectivity than individuals with low trait impulsivity. These observations 
establish a key link between dopamine, intrinsic effective connectivity between 
striatal subregions, and trait impulsivity.
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Introduction
The striatum subserves many functions, ranging from incentive motivation to 
goal-directed action selection and habitual response control, and is implicated in 
a wide range of neuropsychiatric disorders such as addiction, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder and Parkinson’s disease. These various striatal functions 
have long been thought to depend on information processing within relatively 
segregated motivational, cognitive and motor regions of the striatum (Alexander 
et al., 1986). However, recent evidence has highlighted an important functional 
role for interactions between these different regions of the striatum (Haber and 
Knutson, 2010; Aarts et al., 2011). For example, according to current theories of 
addiction, the transition from impulsive to compulsive drug use corresponds to a 
transition from ventral to dorsal striatal control of drug seeking behaviour (Everitt 
et al., 2008). Despite the importance of these hierarchical intra-striatal interactions, 
they have received little attention in human research.
Neuroanatomical data from non-human primates have suggested that the com- 
munication between striatal regions is subserved by a network of spiraling 
connections between the dopaminergic midbrain and the striatum (Haber et al., 
2000). Thus dopamine is ideally suited for mediating information flow along the 
mediolateral striatal gradient through serial reciprocal connections between the 
striatum and the midbrain. This hypothesis concurs with evidence from work 
with behaving rodents indicating that the transition from impulsive to compulsive 
drug use, and the corresponding transition of behavioural control from the ventral 
to the dorsolateral striatum, can be promoted by dopamine (Dalley et al., 2007; 
Belin and Everitt, 2008; Belin et al., 2008). 
Here we aim to assess how dopamine modulates intrinsic human striatal connectivity 
by administering dopaminergic drugs and by exploiting inter-individual 
variability in the direction and extent of dopaminergic drug effects (Cools and 
D’Esposito, 2011). Individual differences in the personality trait of impulsivity 
have been shown to correspond with individual differences in dopamine receptor 
availability (Dalley et al., 2007; Buckholtz et al., 2010) and with the effects of 
dopaminergic drugs on striatal function (Cools et al., 2007b). Specifically, trait 
impulsivity is associated with low D2-receptor density in the ventral striatum 
(Dalley et al., 2007). Moreover, trait impulsivity has been shown to promote the 
transition of control of reward-seeking behaviour from ventral to dorsal striatal 
regions (Belin and Everitt, 2008; Belin et al., 2008). Based on this literature, we 
predict that administration of D2-receptor drugs to healthy volunteers will alter 
the influence of the ventral striatum on the dorsal putamen, through the dorsal 
28
Chapter 2
caudate nucleus, in a manner that depends on trait impulsivity. Following prior 
work (Cools et al., 2007b; Dalley et al., 2007; Clatworthy et al., 2009), we hypothesize 
that dopaminergic drugs would have greater effects in high-impulsive subjects 
(with putatively low D2-receptor density) than in low-impulsive subjects. 
We employed a 2x2 factorial pharmacological design and manipulated dopamine 
receptor stimulation in a group of healthy participants by administration of a 
dopamine D2-receptor agonist (bromocriptine), a dopamine D2-receptor antagonist 
(sulpiride), a combination of the agonist and antagonist, and a placebo, in a 
four-session, within-subject, double-dummy, placebo-controlled cross-over design. 
This factorial pharmacological design allowed us to assess the neurochemical 
specificity of effects. If any effects of the D2-receptor agonist bromocriptine depend 
on dopamine’s action on D2-receptors, then they should be blocked by pretreatment 
with sulpiride. 
Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal was measured using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during rest. This approach allowed us to relate 
task-independent features of intrinsic striatal connectivity to trait-related individual 
differences in mesostriatal dopamine systems. We used stochastic dynamic causal 
modeling (DCM) (Friston et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011a; Daunizeau et al., 2012) to 
model interactions between motivational, cognitive and motor portions of the 
striatum and their modulation by dopamine. This method estimates the extent to 
which fluctuations in activity of one region cause fluctuations in another region. 
The results demonstrate that dopamine modulates intra-striatal connectivity and 
that the degree of dopaminergic modulation of dorsomedial striatum (dorsal 
caudate nucleus) by ventral striatum is associated with trait impulsivity.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight participants gave informed consent approved by the local ethical 
committee (“Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek”, Arnhem-Nijmegen, number: 
2008/078). Three participants were excluded from the analysis: two participants 
withdrew before completing all four sessions; one dataset was unusable due to a 
technical problem. The 25 participants included in the analysis were right-handed 
(13 women; mean age 22 years, range 18-30 years), with no relevant medical or 
psychiatric condition 3 years prior to testing. 
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Factorial pharmacological design
We employed a 2x2 factorial pharmacological design (Table 1). The two pharmaco-
logical factors were bromocriptine, a dopamine receptor agonist, and sulpiride, a 
dopamine receptor antagonist. Each of these factors could be ‘ON’ (drug) or ‘OFF’ 
(placebo). Each participant was tested on each cell of this factorial design, receiving 
2 different opaque gelatin capsules on 2 separate time points on each of the four 
testing sessions, corresponding to these two pharmacological factors (double-dummy 
design). Thus, two pharmacological factors could affect mesostriatal system: 
whether sulpiride was ON or OFF, and whether bromocriptine was ON or OFF. 
This design allowed us to quantify not only the main effects of sulpiride and 
bromocriptine, but also their interaction effect. If the effects of bromocriptine are 
mediated by dopaminergic D2 receptors, those should be abolished by co-admini-
stration with sulpiride.
The dose selection of sulpiride (Dogmatil®, Sanofi-aventis, 400 mg) and bromocriptine 
(Parlodel®, Novartis, 1.25 mg) was based on previous studies revealing good 
tolerance (Mehta et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2009; Dodds et al., 2009). Participants 
received the capsule corresponding to the bromocriptine factor 30 minutes after 
receiving the one corresponding to the sulpiride factor. The order of drug 
administration was pseudorandomly assigned and counterbalanced across 
participants. The resting-state functional resonance imaging (fMRI) started 
approximately 2 hours after first drug intake and took 7.5 minutes. Participants 
were instructed to relax and keep their eyes open. The resting-state fMRI data 
reported here were acquired prior to the acquisition of a task-related fMRI session, 
during which participants completed a reversal learning task reported in van der 
Schaaf et al.(van der Schaaf et al., 2014).
Table 1  Factorial pharmacological design. We employed a 2x2 factorial pharmaco-
logical design, where pharmacological factors were bromocriptine,  
a dopamine receptor agonist, and sulpiride, a dopamine receptor antagonist. 
Each of these factors could be ‘ON’ (drug) or ‘OFF’ (placebo).
Session name Placebo Bromocriptine Sulpiride Combined
Factor 1 (Bromocriptine) OFF ON OFF ON
Factor 2 (Sulpiride) OFF OFF ON ON
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The mean time to maximal plasma concentration of sulpiride and bromocriptine 
is approximately 3 and 2.5 hours, respectively, with a plasma half-life of 
approximately 12 and 7 hours, respectively (Deleu et al., 2002; Mehta et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, drug had maximum effects during testing. Subjective mood ratings 
were measured with the Bond and Lader visual analog scales (Bond and Lader, 
1974). Mood measures, blood pressure, and heart rate were taken approximately 30 
minutes before, approximately 2 hours after, and approximately 6 hours after first 
drug intake (reported in van der Schaaf et al. (van der Schaaf et al., 2014)). 
Participants’ general cognitive performance and mood were not different 
following different drug sessions indicating that effects were not due to nonspecific 
drug effects on mood and global cognitive performance. 
Image acquisition and preprocessing
Structural (T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence, time echo/time repetition (TE/TR) = 
3.03/2300 ms, flip angle = 8°, field of view (FOV) = 256 × 256 × 192 mm, voxel size = 
1 mm isotropic, GRAPPA acceleration factor 2) and functional images (whole-brain 
gradient echo planar imaging sequence; TE/TR = 30/1680 ms, flip angle = 70°, FOV = 
224 × 224 × 137 mm, 39 ascending transverse slices; voxel size = 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.0 mm,) 
were collected using a 3-T Siemens MRI scanner with an 8-channel head coil. 
To reduce signal drop-out and geometric distortions, we used a short TE and reduced 
echo train length by means of factor 2 accelerated GRAPPA (Griswold et al., 2002).
Images were preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, 
London, United Kingdom) and MATLAB. The images were realigned, slice-time 
corrected and co-registered to the structural image. Participants’ head motion 
during fMRI acquisition did not differ between experimental sessions, as indexed 
by the session-specific average head translation and tested with a 2-by-2 full-factorial 
ANOVA (factors: sulpiride, bromocriptine; all p> 0.05). The images were then 
smoothed with an isotropic 5 mm full-width half maximum Gaussian kernel. 
Images were low-pass filtered using a fifth order Butterworth filter to retain 
frequencies below 0.1 Hz, because the correlations between intrinsic fluctuations 
are specific to this frequency range (Biswal et al., 1995; Fox and Raichle, 2007). 
The images were also high-pass filtered (0.008 Hz) to remove low-frequency 
confounds. To remove non-neuronal fluctuations from the data, we regressed out 
27 regressors from each timeseries: 3 regressors describing timeseries of average 
signal intensity in white-matter, cerebrospinal fluid and in a blank portion of the 
MR images (out of brain signal) (Helmich et al., 2010); 24 regressors describing 
timeseries of head motion, namely linear and quadratic effects of the 6 parameters 
describing the motion of each fMRI image, as well as the first derivative of those 
effects (to control for spin-history effects) (Lund et al., 2005). 
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The striatal data were extracted using a striatal mask based on Harvard-Oxford 
atlas (Flitney et al., 2007). Non-neuronal fluctuations that might be introduced to 
the data due to individual differences in the striatal size were further controlled 
using linear regression. Thus, for each subject, we considered the first principal 
component across voxels within the striatal mask that fell into either white matter 
or cerebral-spinal fluid (with probability >.99) and regressed out that signal, its 
square and its cube from all striatal voxels signal.
Functional parcellation of the striatum
To ensure a functionally informed parcellation of the striatum, we based our 
segregation on the functional time-series, using clustering analysis of the 
correlations among voxel time-series. Furthermore, to ensure that this parcellation 
scheme was valid at the between-subject level, we performed a stability analysis to 
identify clusters that were conserved over subjects. We used K-means clustering 
algorithm to identify different subdivisions of the striatum. In this algorithm, 
those voxels with higher similarity in correlation pattern of their time-series are 
more likely to be clustered together. The correlation pattern of each voxel in the 
striatum was quantified based on its correlation with all other striatal voxels. 
Therefore, first the correlation matrix for each participant was computed using 
correlation between each striatal voxel with all other striatal voxels. Next, to 
compute correlation matrix across group, the individual correlation matrices 
were Fisher-transformed, averaged and transformed back to correlation space by 
inverse-Fisher transform. We then used a standard K-means clustering algorithm, 
using correlation as distance measure, as implemented in MATLAB kmeans routine 
(Mathwork) to parcellate the striatum. Each clustering analysis was replicated 20 
times with random initial centroids to avoid local extrema. 
K-means clustering operates on a user-defined number of clusters. Since this 
number is unknown, we performed a stability analysis to identify the most 
consistent and coherent number of clusters. Subjects were randomly divided into 
two groups and a series of parcellation into 2 to 8 clusters was carried out separately 
for each group. The clustering solutions based on data of two groups were then 
assessed to examine whether they are matched (see Supplementary Appendix for 
mathematical definition). This procedure was repeated for 100 randomly division 
of subjects to two groups and used to perform a Monte Carlo randomization test 
to obtain the largest K resulting in stable clustering solution across group.  
This analysis ensures us that this parcellation scheme was valid across the group 
and results in clusters that could be reliably identified over group. It is important 
to realize that the goal of functional parcellation and the stability analysis were 
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not to determine the number of striatal subregions. Rather, the goal of this stability 
analysis is to find subregions that 1) are consistent at the group level given 
limitations of fMRI signals; and 2) have distinct pattern of connectivity from the 
point of view of data (Neubert et al., 2014). 
Having established K, we again performed clustering to define the striatal clusters. 
For every participant and every session, the clustering algorithm defined five 
clusters according to striatal connectivity matrix of all other remaining subjects 
in the same session (leave-one-subject-out procedure). The clusters were matched 
very closely across different sessions and across the 25 cross-validation folds. The 
leave-one-subject-out procedure ensures that there is no selection bias in definition 
of regions of interest. 
Following classical models of the striatum and to limit model-space for DCM 
analysis, we considered a 3-nodes architecture for the striatum. Thus, the ventral 
striatum, dorsal caudate nucleus and dorsal-anterior putamen clusters out of the 
clustering solution with K=5 were then chosen as representative of motivational, 
cognitive and premotor striatum, respectively. For each participant, the spatial 
intersection of these three clusters across four sessions were generated and used as 
volume of interests. The first eigenvariate of data in each volume of interest was 
then extracted for every session.
Dynamic causal modeling
We used DCM software implemented in SPM12b (version: 5616). All models were 
inverted using generalized filtering (Friston et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011a) successfully. 
The inversion scheme estimated model evidence and fixed-connections and dopa-
minergic-modulatory parameters (as well as hemodynamic parameters) for each 
model. The estimated model evidence reflects the plausibility of the model taking 
into account both goodness of fit and model complexity. We used random-effects 
Bayesian model comparison to evaluate the plausibility of every model of the model 
space across the population (Stephan et al., 2009) and report the results in terms of 
protected exceedance probabilities (Rigoux et al., 2014) throughout the paper.
Results
Resting state data were analyzed from twenty five healthy volunteers who 
participated in a fMRI experiment, in which both resting state as well as 
task-related data were collected (van der Schaaf et al., 2014). We employed a 2x2 
factorial pharmacological design (Table 1). Therefore, each participant was tested 
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on each cell of this factorial design, receiving 2 different opaque gelatin capsules 
on each of the four testing sessions, corresponding to the combinations of the two 
pharmacological factors. Trait impulsivity was indexed with the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) (Patton et al., 1995) (Table S1). Previous work with [11C]
raclopride Positron emission tomography (PET) in healthy volunteers has shown 
that subjects with high BIS scores exhibit lower D2-receptor availability than do 
subjects with low BIS scores (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Moreover, BIS scores have been 
shown to predict the direction of bromocriptine’s effects on striatal BOLD signal 
(Cools et al., 2007b). The BIS was administered in each session approximately 5.5 
hours after first drug intake. The average of the BIS scores across all four sessions 
was used as an index of trait impulsivity1, given the high inter-session correlation 
between those scores (all pair-wise correlations>.9), and the absence of significant 
drug effects on total BIS scores (p>.05 for main effects and interaction, controlled 
for order effect).  
Defining motivational, cognitive and motor striatal nodes
There are no reliable in-vivo structural markers of the boundaries between 
functionally distinct regions of the human striatum (Voorn et al., 2004), namely 
the motivational, cognitive and motor regions. Here, we overcome this obstacle by 
using an unsupervised parcellation scheme based on correlation between 
functional time-series. The parcellation scheme identified 5 clusters reliably at the 
population-level (p<0.05, Monte-Carlo randomization test, see Methods and 
Supplementary Appendix for description, Figure S1A). The clustering solution 
included a ventral striatal region (including nucleus accumbens, ventral caudate 
nucleus and ventral parts of the putamen), a medial caudate region, a dorsal 
caudate nucleus region, a dorsal-anterior putamen region and a dorsal posterior 
putamen region (Figure S1B). The macroanatomical borders of these clusters were 
consistent with connectivity pattern of striatum measured with various techniques 
in different species (Haber et al., 2000; Ikemoto, 2007; Draganski et al., 2008b). 
Although the clustering algorithm was blind to voxel location, there was a very 
high symmetry between two hemispheres as more than 95 percent of symmetric 
voxels assigned to the same clusters.
Following classical models of the striatum based on hypothesized functions of 
striatal regions and its cortical connectivity signature (Alexander et al., 1986; 
Haber et al., 2000) and to limit model-space for DCM analysis, we considered a 
3-nodes architecture for the striatum. Thus, the ventral striatum, dorsal caudate 
1 For one subject, BIS scores were obtained only in two out of the four sessions. For this subject, the 
average across these two sessions was used.
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Figure 1 VOI definition, model definition and model selection. A) Striatal clusters obtained 
using data-driven parcellation of the human striatum in motivational (ventral striatum, VS, in red), 
cognitive (dorsal caudate nucleus, DCN, in green) and motor (dorsal-anterior putamen, DAP, 
in blue) regions. B) Model space of pharmacological input, representing different scenarios 
for the effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine. Dopaminergic drugs have been included as 
extrinsic modulatory pharmacological inputs (PIs). These scenarios differ in how they might 
capture the effects of bromocriptine and sulpiride, namely as only an effect of bromocriptine 
(PI1) or only an effect of sulpiride (PI2), independent effects of both (PI3), independent 
effects of both but a potentially nonlinear (and independently estimated) effect of combined 
adiministration (PI4), or antagonistic and symmetric effects of both (PI5). Thus, the number of 
inputs vary across the different sets of PIs. For example, while PI4 contains three inputs (U1, U2 
and U3), PI5 contains only one input (U1). In PI5, the only input, U1, is +1 in the bromocriptine 
session, -1 in the sulpiride session and zero in the placebo and combined session. Therefore, 
this pharmacological input refers to a situation in which bromocriptine and sulpiride show 
opponent and symmetric effects, such that co-administration of bromocriptine with sulpiride 
abolishes the effects evoked when administred alone. C) Models of intra-striatal connectivity 
that differed in terms of the number and directionality of the connections between the three 
striatal regions (A-matrix). Colors are associated with different intra-striatal connections. The 
table highlights which connections are included in each model. For example, A2 includes 
four connections represented with different colors: magenta (VSàDCN), cyan (DCNàDAP), 
yellow (DCNàVS) and salmon (DAPàDCN). D) Models of dopaminergic modulatory effects 
on striatal connections. Colors are associated with different dopaminergic modulatory 
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nucleus and dorsal-anterior putamen cluster were chosen as representative of 
motivational, cognitive and premotor striatum, respectively (Figure 1A). We focused 
on the dorsal caudate nucleus, given its strong associations with cognitive control 
and associated cortical regions (e.g. the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Haber et al., 
2000; Draganski et al., 2008b)). We focused on the dorsal-anterior putamen because 
it is known to be a target of dopaminergic-mediated connectivity from the dorsal 
caudate nucleus (Haber et al., 2000), while being strongly associated with premotor 
cortex (e.g. the rostral cingulate motor areas) as well as lateral prefrontal cortex 
(Calzavara et al., 2007; Draganski et al., 2008b; Helmich et al., 2010). Note that 
although the rostral cingulate motor area is implicated in premotor functions 
(e.g. by sending direct projections to the spinal cord (He et al., 1995) and primary 
motor cortex (Dum and Strick, 2002)), this area is also associated with negative 
affect, pain and cognitive control (Shackman et al., 2011).
For each participant, the spatial intersection of these three clusters across four 
sessions were generated and used as volume of interests. The first eigenvariate of 
data in each volume of interest was then extracted for every session.
connections (B-matrix). The table in this panel shows which modulatory connections are 
included in each model. The combination of the A-matrix and the B-matrix resulted in 15 
hypothetical mesostriatal architectures (listed in Fig 1F y-axis). For example, for A2, three 
models of dopaminergic modulation are possible: A2B2, A2B1 and A2B0. In A2B2, there 
are four modulatory connections represented with different colors: magenta (modulating 
VSàDCN), cyan (modulating DCNàDAP), yellow (modulating DCNàVS) and salmon 
(modulating DAPàDCN). In A2B1, while A2 contains four links, there are only two modulatory 
connections in B1: magenta (modulating VSàDCN) and cyan (modulating DCNàDAP). 
A2B0 is a null model where there is no modulatory effect of dopamine, as shown in the 
table for B0.  E) Random-effect family Bayesian model comparison results for pharmacological 
input. The pharmacological input with symmetric effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine 
(PI5) best matches the fMRI data, suggesting that sulpiride and bromocriptine affects striatal 
connectivity to the same degree, but in opposite directions and with any possible asymmetric 
effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine being negligible. The x-axis represents the protected 
exeedance probability. F) Random-effect Bayesian model comparison for 15 mesostriatal 
architectures with PI5 as the pharmacological input (models with no modulatory inputs (B0) 
were also included). The model with forward and backward projections between the VS and 
the DCN as well as between the DCN and the DAP, A2B2, is the most plausible model across the 
population. The x-axis is the protected exeedance probability. Inset: The winning mesostriatal 
architecture, A2B2. Abbreviations: VOI, Volume of interest; PI, pharmacological input; DCM, 
dynamic causal modeling; VS, ventral striatum; DCN, dorsal caudate nucleus, DAP, dorsal-
anterior putamen; DA, dopamine; BMC, Bayesian model comparison.
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Dopaminergic drug effects on intra-striatal effective connectivity
We constructed stochastic DCMs to assess dopaminergic drug effects on intra- 
striatal connectivity using the first eigenvariate of each of the three striatal 
regions as a summary time-series, after removal of nuisance-related variance.
DCM enjoys a property of Bayesian schemes, namely the ability to dissociate 
between the goodness of a particular model architecture based on the data, and 
the consistency (nonzero) of experimental effects on the model parameters across 
the population. This property is important for the purpose of this study, given that 
dopaminergic drug effects on the striatum likely vary widely across participants 
(Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). Accordingly, across the whole group, the dopaminergic 
drug effects across the group as a whole on intra-striatal connectivity might 
average around zero. Yet, by using DCM, we could assess the degree to which the 
drug alters intra-striatal connectivity even when the sign of this effect differs 
across participants. Specifically, we included dopaminergic drugs as modulatory 
pharmacological inputs in DCM, and then used Bayesian model comparison to 
assess effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine across the group, independent of the 
sign of their effects between individuals.
Model space
Our model space had three factors. These included the nature of the drug effects 
(i.e. the pharmacological inputs, see Fig 1B), the underlying intra-striatal 
connectivity architecture (Fig 1C), and the modulation of these intra-striatal 
connections by dopamine (Fig 1D). The first factor concerned the effects of the 
pharmacological manipulation, modeled as extrinsic modulatory pharmacological 
input, enabling us to assess both the main and interaction effects of our two 
 pharmacological factors sulpiride and bromocriptine. This resulted in five sets of 
pharmacological input (PI1 to PI5 in Fig 1B). The second factor concerned the 
presence of directed connections among the three striatal nodes, yielding in total 
five types of hypothetical striatal architecture (A1 to A5 in Fig 1C). Finally, the 
effects of dopamine on these five types of intra-striatal architecture were 
investigated by allowing pharmacological (dopaminergic) inputs to modulate the 
intra-striatal architectures in five different ways (B1 to B5 in Fig 1D), in addition to 
a null model with no modulation (B0 in Fig 1D). It should be noted that our model 
space did not include models in which dopamine was allowed to modulate 
non-existent connections, as this was considered biologically implausible (e.g. 
A1B2). In total, we considered 15 different mesostriatal architectures (see the list 
in Fig 1F). Here, 5 models were null models with no modulation but with different 
underlying architectures (i.e. the B0 models). The combination of the other 10 
mesostriatal architectures (B1 to B5) with the 5 sets of pharmacological inputs 
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(PI1 to PI5) resulted in a total of 50 models. Together with the 5 null models, this 
resulted in a final model space of 55 models.
The first factor concerned different scenarios of the effects of pharmacological 
drugs: (i) A main effect of bromocriptine, but no effect of sulpiride. In this model, 
bromocriptine, but not sulpiride, was allowed to change striatal connectivity 
(Figure 1B, PI1); (ii) A main effect of sulpiride, but no effect of bromocriptine. In 
this model, sulpiride, but not bromocriptine, was allowed to change striatal 
connectivity (Figure 1B, PI2); (iii) A main effect of sulpiride, a main effect of 
bromocriptine and no interaction between sulpiride and bromocriptine. In this 
model, both sulpiride and bromocriptine were allowed to change the striatal 
connectivity independently, and the effect of the combined session corresponded 
to the sum of their effect when administered alone (Figure 1B, PI3); (iv) A main 
effect of sulpiride, a main effect of bromocriptine and an interaction effect of 
sulpiride and bromocriptine. In this model, both sulpiride and bromocriptine 
were allowed to change striatal connectivity independently, as well as their 
interaction. Namely, in the combined session, the effects of sulpiride and 
bromocriptine could vary independently of their effects when administered alone 
(Figure 1B, PI4). (v) Symmetric effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine on striatal 
connectivity (Figure 1B, PI5). In this model, the magnitude of the effect of 
bromocriptine was equal to that of sulpiride, but in the opposite direction. 
The second factor concerned intra-striatal connections, independently from the 
dopaminergic modulations (Figure 1C). We created 4 models containing forward 
connections from the ventral striatum to the dorsal caudate nucleus; and from the 
dorsal caudate nucleus to the dorsal-anterior putamen. This feature of the models is 
grounded in neuroanatomical evidence from non-human primates that demonstrate 
the presence of forward information flow along the mediolateral gradient across the 
striatum (Haber et al., 2000). This property, as well as contribution of backwards 
connections, was assessed by constructing four intra-striatal architectures: i) a 
forward connection from the ventral striatum to the dorsal caudate nucleus and 
from the dorsal caudate nucleus to the dorsal- anterior putamen (Figure 1C, A1); ii) 
both forward and backward connections between the ventral striatum and the 
dorsal caudate nucleus and between the dorsal caudate nucleus and the dorsal- 
anterior putamen (Figure 1C, A2); iii) forward connections from the ventral striatum 
to the dorsal caudate nucleus, from the dorsal caudate nucleus to the dorsal-anterior 
putamen and from the ventral striatum to the dorsal-anterior putamen (Figure 1C, 
A3); iv) forward and backward connections between all three subregions (Figure 1C, 
A4). Finally, we included a model with v) two connections, one from the ventral 
striatum to the dorsal caudate nucleus and the other one from the ventral striatum 
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to the dorsal-anterior putamen. This model was created based on data showing that 
the ventral striatum sends tri-synaptic projections to the primary motor cortex and 
to prefrontal cortex (Kelly and Strick, 2004), which could result in modulation of the 
dorsal caudate nucleus and dorsal-anterior putamen by modulating their associated 
cortical areas in the cognitive and motor loops of frontostriatal circuitry.
The third factor concerned the effects of dopamine on intra-striatal connectivity. 
We constructed models that allowed modulatory effects of dopamine on all (Figure 
1D, B4), some (Figure 1D, B1, B2, B3 and B5) or none (Figure 1D, B0) of the striatal 
architectures described above. The effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine were 
assumed to be homogeneous with respect to input type, across the different 
striatal connections. 
Hypotheses
Based on neuroanatomical and neurochemical evidence (Haber et al., 2000; Ikeda 
et al., 2013), we hypothesized that dopaminergic drugs would modulate the flow of 
information in a directional forward fashion along the mediolateral gradient in 
the striatum. Furthermore, previous PET work has shown that impulsivity-depen-
dent dopaminergic effects are mediated by the D2 receptor (Dalley et al., 2007; 
Buckholtz et al., 2010). Accordingly, we anticipated that our data would be best fit 
by model A1B1 and that individual differences in dopaminergic drug effects, as 
indexed by the modulatory B parameters, would depend on trait impulsivity. To 
test this hypothesis we assessed not only the effects of the D2-receptor agonist 
bromocriptine, which also has affinity for the D1-receptor (while also altering 
noradrenalin transmission), but also the effects of sulpiride, a highly selective 
antagonist for the D2-receptor. In addition, we assessed in a combined session 
whether the effects of bromocriptine would be blocked by pretreatment of 
sulpiride. We predicted that the effect of bromocriptine would be opposite to that 
of sulpiride, and that these would not interact. If the effect of bromocriptine would 
be equal in size to that of sulpiride, then the combined administration would be 
indistinguishable from that of placebo. In this case, the data would be best fit by 
input set PI5. However, if the effect of bromocriptine and sulpiride are independent 
but of unequal size, then the data would be best fit by input set PI3.
Model selection
We employed a two-step model selection approach. First, we performed a family- 
wise random-effect Bayesian model comparison to test the pharmacological drug 
effects (Figure 1E) (Penny et al., 2010). Second, we performed random-effect 
Bayesian model comparison to compare different mesostriatal architectures given 
the winner input in the previous step (Figure 1F) (Rigoux et al., 2014).
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First, Bayesian model comparison over the model space of pharmacological input 
revealed very strong evidence in favor of the pharmacological input family with 
opponent, symmetric effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine (PI5, protected 
exceedance probability of 1.00, expected posterior model probability of 0.50; 
Figure 1E). Thus, sulpiride and bromocriptine altered intra-striatal connectivity to 
the same degree, but in opposite directions, consistent with the hypothesis that 
dopaminergic drug effects on mesostriatal connectivity are mediated by the 
D2-receptor. In this winning model, the effects of sulpiride and bromocriptine on 
intra-striatal coupling cancelled each other out, leaving a zero net effect. 
Second, Bayesian model comparison over the model space of mesostriatal architectures 
revealed evidence in favor of the architecture with forward and backward projections 
between the ventral striatum and the dorsal caudate nucleus as well as between 
the dorsal caudate nucleus and the dorsal-anterior putamen (A2B2, protected 
exceedance probability of 0.92, expected posterior model probability of 0.40; 
Figure 1F). In summary, the winning model contains bidirectional connections 
between striatal regions, in a hierarchical fashion, and a modulatory input on 
each of these connections to model the opponent dopaminergic drug effects.
These results were robust to model selection procedures: A one-step random-effect 
Bayesian model comparison among all 55 models revealed that the same model, 
A2B2, best explained our data across the whole model space (protected exceedance 
probability of 0.95, expected posterior model probability of 0.19).
Trait impulsivity and dopaminergic drug effects on intra-striatal 
effective connectivity
Further analysis of the characteristics of the winning model led to an important 
additional insight on how dopamine modulates intra-striatal connectivity. First, 
using one-sample t-tests, we confirmed that each of the 4 parameters quantifying 
intra-striatal connectivity in the winning model were significantly above zero (all 
p <.006, Bonferroni-corrected, Table S2). This observation is consistent with the 
expectation that the three striatal subregions are strongly connected. Second, the 
same statistical procedure revealed that none of the 4 parameters quantifying 
dopaminergic modulation of intra-striatal connectivity was significantly different 
from zero (all p>0.006, Bonferroni-corrected, Table S2). This null-effect persisted 
even when the statistical threshold was relaxed to 0.05 uncorrected for multiple 
comparisons (Table S2). This null-effect might seem to contradict the model- 
selection results. In fact, these observations indicate that dopaminergic modulatory 
inputs explain significant variance in the fMRI timeseries, despite the fact that the 
sign of the modulatory effect is inconsistent across subjects. The latter finding fits 
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with the known inter-individual variability in the direction and extent of 
dopaminergic drug effects (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). Strong dopaminergic drug 
effects in individual participants often add to zero when averaged across a group 
(Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). Given that individual differences in dopaminergic 
drug effects on striatal activity have been shown to depend on trait impulsivity 
according to D2-receptor density (Cools et al., 2007b; Dalley et al., 2007; Buckholtz 
et al., 2010), we hypothesized that effects of D2-receptor agents on intra-striatal 
connectivity is associated with trait impulsivity. Therefore, we tested whether 
modulatory input parameters of the winning model are associated with trait 
impulsivity. This analysis was implemented through a repeated measures ANOVA, 
assessing individual modulatory parameters as a function of connection direction 
(forward versus backward), striatal pair (ventral striatum-dorsal caudate nucleus 
or dorsal caudate nucleus- dorsal-anterior putamen) and trait impulsivity (BIS 
scores). This analysis revealed a significant positive association between impulsivity 
and connection strength (F(1,23)=4.52, p=0.044). Crucially, there was a significant 
three-way interaction between trait impulsivity, striatal pair, and connection 
direction (F(1,23)=4.71, p = .041). Post-hoc correlation analyses revealed that the 
three-way interaction was due to a highly significant positive correlation between 
trait impulsivity and the drug effects on the forward connection from the ventral 
striatum to the dorsal caudate nucleus (r = 0.53, p= 0.007, Figure 2B). Trait 
impulsivity did not correlate with drug effects on the other connections (p > 0.05, 
Table S3). These results indicate that trait impulsivity is associated with the 
increasing and decreasing effects of respectively bromocriptine and sulpiride on 
the forward connection from the ventral striatum to the dorsal caudate nucleus, 
but not on the other connections. Thus, trait impulsivity is associated with 
increased dorsal caudate nucleus drive from ventral striatum by stimulation of 
D2-receptors, and a decreased dorsal caudate nucleus drive from ventral striatum 
by blockade of D2 receptors. 
We also performed two control analysis regarding association of impulsivity with 
connectivity between ventral striatum and dorsal caudate nucleus. First, we 
conducted a control analysis using BIS scores in the placebo session, instead of the 
original analysis with mean across all four sessions, as the index of trait impulsivity. 
The results of this control analysis were consistent with those of main analysis (SI 
text). Second, we conducted a relatively model-free analysis (linear regression) to 
confirm our findings regarding association of impulsivity with the connectivity 
between ventral striatum and dorsal caudate nucleus, independent of the 
estimated effective connectivity strengths in the winning mesostriatal 
architecture from DCM (SI text). The results of this analysis were consistent with 
those found based on DCM (Figure S2, Table S4).
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Dopamine-mediated connectivity of dorsal-posterior putamen
It is known that selection of the best model among large number of competing 
hypotheses could be fragile, especially if the data of different subjects could be 
fitted by different models (as could happen in a random effect model space) (Penny 
et al., 2010). Therefore, we have tested our a priori hypotheses on striatal 
connectivity on models comprising 3 nodes. This approach generates robust 
inferences, but it also limits the inference of the study to ventral and dorsal- 
anterior portions of the striatum. Here, following a reviewer’s comment, we build 
on those findings and extend the analysis to a more posterior part of the striatum. 
Connectivity-based parcellation of the striatum identified a dorsal posterior 
putamen cluster (Figure 3A), known to be connected to motor cortex and strongly 
implicated in motor control (Draganski et al., 2008b; Helmich et al., 2010) and 
habitual action selection (Wunderlich et al., 2012a). Neuroanatomical evidence in 
Figure 2 The relationship between dopaminergic modulation of striatal ventrodorsal 
connectivity and trait impulsivity. Scatter-plot shows the relationship between trait 
impulsivity and the modulatory parameter encoding dopaminergic modulation of the 
connection from ventral striatum to dorsal caudate nucleus in the winning model. Trait 
impulsivity is associated with drug-induced increases (decreases) by D2 dopamine agonist (D2 
dopamine antagonist) of dorsal caudate nucleus input from VS. Abbreviations: BIS, Barratt 
impulsiveness score; VS, ventral striatum; DCN, dorsal caudate nucleus; Hz, Hertz. 
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non-human primates (Haber et al., 2000; Ikeda et al., 2013) suggests that dopamine 
modulates forward connections along the mediolateral gradient across the 
striatum. Therefore, we extended the intra-striatal architecture by adding forward 
connection from dorsal-anterior putamen to dorsal-posterior putamen (Figure 3B, 
a1). Two models of dopaminergic modulation associated with this architecture 
were tested, where dopamine either modulated or did not modulate this connection 
(Figure 3B, b1 and b0, respectively). A second intra-striatal architecture was created 
by including bidirectional connections between dorsal-anterior putamen and 
dorsal- posterior putamen. Three models of dopaminergic modulation associated 
with this architecture were tested, where dopamine modulated none (Figure 3B, 
b0), the forward connection (Figure 3B, b1) or both connections (Figure 3B, b2) 
Figure 3 Post-hoc analysis of dopamine-mediated connectivity of dorsal-posterior putamen 
(DPP). A) DPP cluster (in brown) obtained using data-driven parcellation of the human striatum. 
B) Three models of intra-striatal connectivity of DPP and four models of its dopaminergic 
modulation were created. The table highlights which connections are included in each model. 
In total, 7 models were tested. Note that the pharmacological input as well as mesostriatal 
connections among other striatal regions are fixed according to the optimal model presented 
in Figure 2. C) Random-effect Bayesian model comparison for 7 mesostriatal architectures with 
DPP. Bayesian model comparison strongly favored a2b2 among all 7 models. D) The winning 
mesostriatal architecture. Striatal areas are bidirectionally connected along a mediolateral 
gradient and dopamine modulates adjacent areas along this gradient. Abreviations: VS, 
ventral striatum; DCN, dorsal caudate nucleus; DAP, dorsal anterior putamen; DPP, dorsal 
posterior putamen; DA, dopamine; BMC, Bayesian model comparison.
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from dorsal-anterior putamen to dorsal-posterior putamen. Finally, we included a 
third intra-striatal architecture where ventral striatum directly modulated dorsal- 
posterior putamen (Figure 3B, a3). This model was created based on data showing 
that the ventral striatum sends tri-synaptic projections to the primary motor 
cortex and to prefrontal cortex (Kelly and Strick, 2004), which could result in a 
ventral- striatal modulation of dorsal-posterior putamen through the motor loop 
of the frontostriatal circuitry. Two models of dopaminergic modulation associated 
with this architecture were tested, where dopamine either modulated (Figure 3B, 
b3) or did not modulate this connection (Figure 3B, b0). 
These models were fitted and compared using random-effects Bayesian model 
comparison. This analysis revealed strong evidence in favor of the mesostriatal 
architecture with forward and backward baseline connections between the dor-
sal-anterior putamen and the dorsal-posterior putamen, where dopamine 
modulated both connections (Figure 3C, protected exceedance probability of 1.00, 
expected posterior model probability of 0.81). These findings extend our prior 
findings to more posterior parts of the striatum. The findings suggest that 
dopamine modulates both forward and backward intra-striatal connections along 
the mediolateral axis of the striatum (Figure 3D). 
Discussion
This pharmacological-fMRI study addresses the functional architecture of the 
human striatum and dopaminergic influences on striatal information processing 
(Cools et al., 2007b; Dalley et al., 2007; Belin et al., 2008). We manipulated the 
connectivity between motivational, cognitive, and motor portions of the striatum 
with dopaminergic drugs, and we exploited inter-individual differences in 
mesostriatal dopamine systems to explain trait-dependent effects of the 
dopaminergic manipulations. Striatal connectivity patterns were quantified with 
stochastic dynamic causal modeling of intrinsic BOLD activity measured in a 
within-subject, double-dummy, placebo-controlled cross-over design. There are 
two main findings. First, Bayesian model comparison indicates that human striatal 
architecture is sparse and largely consistent with neuroanatomical data from 
non-human primates and rodents (Haber et al., 2000). Namely, functional 
interactions between the ventral striatum and the dorsal-anterior putamen are 
mediated by the dorsal caudate nucleus, and the efficacy of those interactions is 
modulated by dopaminergic tone. Second, the magnitude of the dopaminergic 
modulation of a portion of those interactions depends on trait-impulsivity. Namely, 
highly impulsive individuals have increased sensitivity to dopamine-induced 
44
Chapter 2
changes in information flow from the ventral to the dorsomedial striatum. This 
result might explain how, in highly impulsive individuals, cognitive processes 
supported by the dorsomedial striatum can become particularly vulnerable to the 
motivational drive from the ventral striatum (Lawrence and Brooks, 2014).
Intrinsic striatal architecture
This study shows that a model of striatal connectivity without a direct connection 
between the ventral striatum and the dorsal-anterior putamen fitted the data 
significantly better than models with such a connection. This finding suggests 
that communication between those two striatal regions is mediated by the dorsal 
caudate nucleus. In macaques, dopamine mediates information flow along the 
mediolateral pathway through serial reciprocal connections between the striatum 
and the midbrain (Haber et al., 2000). Accordingly, we interpret the effects of 
stimulation and blockade of D2-receptors at the level of the striatum in terms of 
altered midbrain-mediated feedforward information flow from the ventral 
striatum to the dorsal caudate nucleus. However, we cannot exclude concurrent 
actions via modulation of topographically specific, feedforward circuits connecting 
the prefrontal cortex with the striatum (McFarland and Haber, 2002; Honey et al., 
2003; Haber and Knutson, 2010; Cole et al., 2013a, 2013b). 
Impulsivity amplifies dopaminergic modulations of ventrodorsal 
striatal connectivity
Work with behaving rodents indicates that the transition from impulsive to 
compulsive drug use, and the corresponding transition of behavioural control 
from the ventral to the dorsolateral striatum, can be promoted by dopamine 
(Dalley et al., 2007; Belin and Everitt, 2008; Belin et al., 2008). Dalley et al. (Dalley 
et al., 2007) have shown that ventral striatal D2 receptors density predicts 
individual difference in trait impulsivity, which itself predict propensity to 
cocaine seeking (Dalley et al., 2007) and addiction-like behaviour (Belin et al., 
2008). Our findings add to this body of knowledge by showing that trait impulsivity 
is associated with the influences of striatal D2 receptors on how effectively the 
ventral striatum modulates activity in the dorsal caudate nucleus. This effect was 
specific: The dopaminergic drugs were found to modulate connectivity along both 
the ventral striatum to dorsal caudate nucleus and the dorsal caudate nucleus to 
dorsal-anterior putamen pathway, whereas impulsivity was associated with only 
the first part of that pathway. Work with experimental animals (Dalley et al., 2011) 
raises the intriguing possibility that compulsivity might convey vulnerability of 
the connection between dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum to dopaminergic 
drugs.
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Limitations
It can be argued that the current findings are statistical constructs of an 
oversimplified model of intrinsic striatal connectivity. In fact, stochastic DCM 
provides an objective and quantitative procedure for distinguishing between 
explicit models of functional anatomy (Friston et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011a; 
Daunizeau et al., 2012; Kahan et al., 2014). The model space was simplified to the 
core elements relevant to understand how dopamine modulates intrinsic striatal 
connectivity. DCM relies on prior assumptions about the distribution of a number 
of model parameters, but the findings are robust, having being confirmed with 
an independent model-free analysis. 
In this study, we modeled dopaminergic drugs as extrinsic inputs in DCM and 
demonstrated that these inputs modulate striatal connectivity in a specific 
topographic fashion. This modulation could be mediated by different elements of 
mesostriatal circuitry. One possibility is that sulpiride and bromocriptine 
modulate activity of dopamine cells in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and 
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc). Another possibility is that these drugs 
modulate D2 receptors in the striatum directly. In theory, it is possible to dissociate 
between these two possibilities by including VTA and SNc as additional nodes in 
DCM. In practice, it is not possible to get reliable BOLD signals from these regions 
with the standard whole-brain fMRI settings used in this study. Namely, the 
anatomical location of these regions makes their BOLD signals exquisitely sensitive 
to both physiological artifacts and subject motion. The consequences of those 
artifacts are particularly deleterious during resting-state fMRI. Therefore, we have 
not included data from these two regions in this study and focused on their 
downstream effects on the striatum. Note that even if dopaminergic drug effects 
are mediated by modulation of dopamine cells in the midbrain, this does not 
invalidate the current approach. In this case, we can assume that we have modeled 
midbrain as a hidden node in DCM and instead of fitting models to data from this 
region, focused on its downstream effects. This approach has been validated 
previously in the context of DCM for fMRI (David et al., 2011; Moran et al., 2011; 
Marreiros et al., 2013; Kahan et al., 2014).
To define regions of interest for DCM, the striatum was parcellated into functionally 
homogeneous regions using a data-driven method. This connectivity-based 
parcellation approach overcomes the known difficulty of defining boundaries 
between functionally distinct regions of the human striatum. For instance, 
the ventral striatal cluster extended beyond the nucleus accumbens, including 
the ventromedial caudate nucleus and the rostroventral putamen, in line with 
neurophysiological studies (Voorn et al., 2004). More generally, our data-driven 
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mediolateral parcellation of the striatum corresponds closely with regions 
identified on the basis of neurophysiological data, and follows the pattern of 
excitatory cortical, thalamic and amygdaloid inputs to the striatum (Alexander et 
al., 1986; Voorn et al., 2004; Draganski et al., 2008b; Haber and Knutson, 2010). We 
limited the main analyses to three regions that could be linked to the known 
mediolateral organization of the striatum and that have been previously shown to 
be implicated in motivational, cognitive and premotor circuits (Alexander et al., 
1986; Haber et al., 2000; Draganski et al., 2008b). A restricted model space generates 
statistically robust inferences (Penny et al., 2010), but it also limits the inference of 
this study to ventral and dorsal-anterior portions of the striatum. A post-hoc 
extension of the analyses to motor striatum, the dorsal-posterior putamen, 
connections provides strong evidence in favor of a mesostriatal architecture with 
forward and backward baseline connections between the dorsal-anterior putamen 
and the dorsal-posterior putamen, with dopamine modulating both connections. 
These data suggest that dopamine modulate both forward and backward 
intra-striatal connections along the mediolateral axis of the striatum. 
We found evidence that dopamine modulates striatal connectivity not only along 
the ventral to dorsal pathway, but also along the dorsal to ventral pathway. At first 
glance, this finding cannot be reconciled with the model of nigro-striato-nigral 
connectivity observed in macaques (Haber et al., 2000), which is known to be 
unidirectional. However, model connections between two nodes are not limited to 
anatomical monosynaptic connections. Accordingly, it is possible that the dorsal 
striatum might affect the ventral striatum through its connection with the 
prefrontal cortex. There is neuroanatomical evidence in nonhuman primates that 
motivational and cognitive areas of the striatum show converging cortical inputs 
(Haber et al., 2006). Another possibility is that dorsal striatum affects ventral and 
medial striatum indirectly through its connection via the mediodorsal thalamus, 
which itself projects to the caudate nucleus (McFarland and Haber, 2001, 2002). 
Indeed, dopaminergic stimulation and blockade of D2 receptors could modulate 
the thalamus via inhibitory projections from the dorsal striatum to the thalamus, 
thereby affecting thalamic input of the caudate nucleus.  
Conclusion
Building on recent anatomical work (Haber et al., 2000), this study provides 
empirical evidence for a hierarchical architecture in the flow of information 
within the human striatum. Communication between the ventral and the dorsal 
putamen is mediated by the dorsal caudate nucleus. This architecture points to 
structured interactions between frontostriatal loops that have long been 
considered to have limited anatomical convergence (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 
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1985; Alexander et al., 1986). Furthermore, this study shows how those interactions 
are modulated by dopaminergic tone. State-related effects, induced by pharmaco-
logical interventions, influenced the striatal circuitry along the mediolateral 
pathway. These effects are consistent with a midbrain-mediated dopaminergic 
influence on striatal connectivity (Haber et al., 2000). Trait-related effects, indexed 
by the interaction between impulsivity and pharmacological interventions, 
influenced connectivity between the ventral and the dorsal caudate nucleus. This 
effect is consistent with the notion that impulsivity marks a stronger dopamine-de-
pendent influence of the ventral onto the dorsomedial striatum. One implication 
of this finding is that, in highly impulsive individuals, early drug-intake episodes 
could quickly lead to goal-directed drug-intake (Corbit et al., 2012).
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Supplementary data
Supplementary Appendix
To ensure that the parcellation scheme is valid at the between-subject level, we 
performed a stability analysis to identify the largest number of clusters resulting 
in a clustering solution conserved over subjects. To achieve this, we assessed 
whether two clustering solutions calculated based on two independent datasets 
(e.g. by diving subjects randomly to two groups) were matched. Here, we provide a 
mathematical explanation of our approach.
Two sets of clusters (A and B, each with K clusters) were defined as matched based 
on the following criteria: First, for every cluster in A and every cluster in B, an 
overlap index was defined, which corresponds to the number of voxels that overlap 
between the two clusters. Specifically, for every cluster ai in A and every cluster bj 
in B, the overlap index was defined as Ni,j/min(Ni ,Nj), where Ni, Nj and Ni,j are the 
number of voxels in ai, bj and their intersection, respectively. Next, for every cluster 
a i in A, bj in B was defined as matched if it had the largest overlap index with ai. 
Finally, A and B were considered as matched if each cluster in A was matched with 
one and only one cluster in B; and vice versa if each cluster in B was matched with 
one and only one cluster in A. This procedure also gives a one-to-one mapping 
between “labels” of clusters in A and B, regardless of anatomical location of voxels. 
Control analysis with Barratt impulsiveness scale (BIS) in the placebo session as  
the index of trait impulsivity
We conducted a control analysis using BIS scores in the placebo session (instead of 
the mean across all four sessions presented in the main text) as the index of trait 
impulsivity. The results of this control analysis were consistent with those of main 
analysis. 
Similar to the main analysis, a repeated measures ANOVA was employed to assess 
individual modulatory parameters as a function of connection direction (forward 
versus backward), striatal pair (ventral striatum and dorsal caudate nucleus or 
dorsal caudate nucleus and dorsal-anterior putamen) and trait impulsivity (BIS 
score obtained in the placebo session). Please note that for one of the subjects, BIS 
was not administered in the placebo session; so data from other subjects were 
analyzed here. This analysis revealed a significant interaction between trait 
impulsivity, striatal pair and connection direction (F(1,22)=4.43, p = .047). Post-hoc 
correlation analyses revealed that the three-way interaction was due to a highly 
significant positive correlation between trait impulsivity and the drug effects on 
the forward connection from the ventral striatum to the dorsal caudate nucleus (r 
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= 0.51, p= 0.01). Trait impulsivity did not correlate with drug effects on the other 
connections (p > 0.05).  
Model-free analysis of trait impulsivity and dopaminergic drug effects on intra- 
striatal functional connectivity 
We conducted a control analysis regarding association of impulsivity with 
functional connectivity between ventral striatum and dorsal caudate nucleus, 
which did not depend on the mesostriatal architecture selected from DCM 
analysis.
Similar to the dynamic causal modeling analysis, the first eigenvariates extracted 
from the ventral striatum, dorsal caudate nucleus and dorsal-anterior putamen 
clusters (Figure 1A) were used for analysis. These time-series were employed to 
compute functional connectivity (correlation) between the striatal regions for 
each session. First, to quantify the strength of the intra-striatal connections, we 
computed the average connectivity across the four sessions for each subject and 
each pair of striatal regions. Next, to quantify the dopaminergic drug effect, we 
computed the difference in functional connectivity (for each pair of striatal 
regions) between the bromocriptine and sulpiride sessions (bromocriptine minus 
sulpiride). A regression analysis was conducted with the three connections and the 
three dopaminergic drug effects (on those connections) as predictors (as well as an 
intercept) and with trait impulsivity as dependent variable (Figure S2A). This 
analysis investigates the (partial) correlation between each regressor and trait 
impulsivity while controlling for the variance explained by the other regressors. It 
revealed that impulsivity was selectively associated with dopaminergic drug 
effects on the connectivity between ventral striatum and dorsal caudate nucleus 
(p=0.027, Figure S2B, Table S4). The average strength of connections (across drug 
sessions) did not vary with trait impulsivity, and there was no significant 
association between impulsivity and drug effects on the two other connections 
(all p > .05, Table S4).
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Figure S1 Parcellation of human striatum based on functional connectivity. A) Stability 
index as a function of number of clusters, K. The 5-clusters solution is the largest K resulting 
in stable solution across participants. B) The 5-clusters solution shown in several coronal 
and axial slices. The clustering solution included a ventral striatal region (including nucleus 
accumbens, ventral caudate nucleus and ventral parts of the putamen; in red), a medial 
caudate region (in yellow), a dorsal caudate nucleus region (in green), a dorsal-anterior 
putamen region (in blue) and a dorsal posterior putamen region (in magenta).
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Figure S2 The association between trait impulsivity and dopamine-mediated changes in 
striatal connectivity obtained from the model-free analysis. A) To quantify the strength of 
the intra-striatal connections, the functional connectivity between the three striatal regions 
quantified as the mean correlation across all sessions. The difference in functional connectivity 
(correlation) between bromocriptine and sulpiride session was used as the dopaminergic drug 
effects on intra-striatal connectivity. A regression analysis with these six regressors (as well 
as an intercept) conducted to examine their relationship with trait impulsivity. B) Scatter-
plot of the relationship between trait impulsivity (BIS scores) and the dopamine-mediated 
changes on the coupling between ventral striatum and dorsal caudate nucleus. The values 
in the x-axis are the differences in the connectivity between bromocriptine and sulpiride 
sessions (bromocriptine minus sulpiride). The values in the x-axis are adjusted for other 
regressors. Abbreviations: VS, ventral striatum; DCN, dorsal caudate nucleus; DAP, dorsal-
anterior putamen; DA, dopamine; BIS, Barratt impulsiveness scale.
VS
DCN
DAP
DA
A B
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Table S1   Barratt impulsiveness scale (BIS) in each session. Means are shown  
with standard errors in parentheses.
Placebo Sulpiride Bromocriptine Combined
BIS 63.7   (1.9) 62.6 (1.8) 63.8 (1.9) 64.2 (1.9)
Table S2   Fixed-connection parameters values (A) representing intra-striatal 
connectivity and dopaminergic-modulatory parameters values  
(B) of those connections in the winning model, A2B2. Means are shown  
with standard errors in parentheses. 
VS->DCN DCN->DAP DCN->VS DAP->DCN
A (Hz) 0.1269 (0.018) 0.0820 (0.008) 0.0621 (0.062) 0.1377 (0.138)
B (Hz) 0.0086 (0.0066) 0.0036 (0.0059) 0.0068 (0.0048) 0.0057 (0.0081)
Abbreviations: VS, ventral striatum; DCN, dorsal caudate nucleus; DAP, dorsal-anterior putamen;  
DA, dopamine; BIS, Barratt impulsiveness scale.
Table S3   Correlation of dopaminergic-modulatory parameters values in the 
winning model with Barratt impulsiveness scale (BIS). Effect size is  
the r-value. 
VS->DCN DCN->DAP DCN->VS DAP->DCN
Effect-size 0.53 0.09 0.37 0.31
p-value 0.007 0.670 0.067 0.138
Table S4   Model-free analysis of relationship between trait impulsivity and 
mesostriatal connectivity. Regression coefficients are shown with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
VS-DCN DCN-DAP DCN-DAP
Dopamine-mediated changes in connectivity 21.80 (9.08)* -14.91 (8.09) 6.86 (13.88)
Baseline intra-striatal connectivity 0.06 (18.09) 37.98 (21.55) -14.61 (15.67)
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Impulse control disorders  
in Parkinson’s disease are associated 
with dysfunction in stimulus valuation 
but not action valuation
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Abstract
A substantial subset of Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients suffers from impulse 
control disorders (ICDs), which are side effects of dopaminergic medication. 
Dopamine plays a key role in reinforcement learning processes. One class of 
reinforcement learning models, known as the actor-critic model, suggests that 
two components are involved in these reinforcement learning processes: a critic, 
which estimates values of stimuli and calculates prediction errors, and an actor, 
which estimates values of potential actions. To understand the information 
processing mechanism underlying impulsive behavior, we investigated stimulus 
and action value learning from reward and punishment in four groups of 
participants: on-medication PD patients with ICD, on-medication PD patients 
without ICD, off-medication PD patients without ICD, and healthy controls. 
Analysis of responses suggested that participants used an actor-critic learning 
strategy and computed prediction errors based on stimulus values rather than 
action values. Quantitative model fits also revealed that an actor-critic model of 
the basal ganglia with different learning rates for positive and negative prediction 
errors best matched the choice data. Moreover, whereas ICDs were associated with 
model parameters related to stimulus valuation (critic), PD was associated with 
parameters related to action valuation (actor). Specifically, PD patients with ICD 
exhibited lower learning from negative prediction errors in the critic, resulting in 
an underestimation of adverse consequences associated with stimuli. These 
findings offer a specific neurocomputational account of the nature of compulsive 
behaviors induced by dopaminergic drugs.
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Introduction
Dopaminergic medications, especially D2 agonist drugs, trigger impulse control 
disorders (ICDs) such as hypersexuality, binge eating, and pathological gambling 
in a subset of Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients (Voon et al., 2007). Although PD is 
primarily associated with dopamine depletion in the substantia nigra and dorsal 
striatum (Kish et al., 1988), the underlying neural substrates of ICD in PD are 
mostly the ventral regions of the striatum and their dopaminergic innervations 
from the ventral tegmental area (Dagher and Robbins, 2009; Voon et al., 2010). 
Therefore, dopamine neurons projecting to the ventral striatum are relatively 
intact in PD patients (Kish et al., 1988). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the 
restoration of dopamine transmission in the dorsal striatum may lead to excessive 
dopamine receptor stimulation in the ventral striatum (Swainson et al., 2000; 
Cools et al., 2001), thus inducing ICD in some patients (Cools et al., 2003; Dagher 
and Robbins, 2009).
Overwhelming evidence has shown that dopamine neurons encode prediction 
error (PE) signaling, which guides stimulus and action value learning in 
reinforcement learning (RL) models (Schultz et al., 1997; Bayer and Glimcher, 
2005; Pessiglione et al., 2006). It has also been shown that a popular RL model, 
known as Q-learning (QL), is useful for understanding the mechanistic differences 
in learning between on- and off-medication PD patients (Frank et al., 2007a; 
Rutledge et al., 2009). Although it has been hypothesized that the functional 
dissociation of striatal subregions is critical to understanding the underlying 
mechanism of compulsive behaviors in both the general population (Everitt and 
Robbins, 2005; Belin et al., 2013) and PD patients (Cools et al., 2007a; Dagher and 
Robbins, 2009), previous RL models of PD have not addressed the different roles of 
the ventral and dorsal striatum in the development of ICD in PD. A well known RL 
framework that models the different roles of the dorsal (motor) and ventral (limbic) 
striatum is the actor-critic (AC) framework (Barto, 1995; Dayan and Balleine, 2002). 
This framework has two modules, known as the critic and the actor, where the 
former is responsible for PE computations and stimulus value learning and the 
latter is responsible for action valuation and selection. Empirical studies suggest 
that the ventral and the dorsal striatum play different roles in decision making, 
with the former corresponding to the critic and the latter corresponding to the 
actor (Cardinal et al., 2002; Packard and Knowlton, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004). 
Based on these neuroanatomical data and a prior AC model of addiction (Piray et 
al., 2010), we here hypothesize that, whereas PD is associated with the actor (i.e., 
action valuation and selection), ICDs in PD are associated with the critic (i.e., 
stimulus valuation and PE computations). Therefore, we provide a novel modeling 
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approach that combines the concept of separate roles for positive and negative PEs 
in learning (Frank et al., 2007a) with the AC framework to test this hypothesis. 
Methods
Participants
This study was part of a larger project conducted at Ain Shams University Hospital, 
Cairo, Egypt. Participants were asked whether they were willing to participate in 
the short or long version of the project. In the short version, participants completed 
80 trials of a probabilistic learning task compared to 160 trials for the long version. 
95 participants were recruited, 79 of which participated in the long version of the 
project. For this report, we only included those subjects that participated in the 
long version of the task (with 160 trials). We did not include the data of subjects 
who participated in the short version of the task in order to have the same number 
of data points across all subjects for estimating the parameters of computational 
models. This is because, in principle, (within subject) variance of parameters 
estimated based on 80 trials is larger than those estimated based on 160 trials and 
this could inflate statistical comparisons between groups.
Data from 3 participants was discarded from the analysis because these participants 
had failed to respond in at least 20% of trials. Thus, 4 groups were included in the 
analyses: 1) PD patients without ICD tested off medication (PD-OFF, n=25, 6 females); 
2) PD patients without ICD tested on medication (PD-ON, n=15, 3 females); 3) PD 
patients with ICD tested on medication (PD-ON-ICD , n=16, 2 females) and 4) healthy 
controls (n = 20, 7 females). The healthy control participants did not have any history 
of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All participants gave written informed 
consent and the study was approved by ethical board of Ain Shams University. 
The Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) was used to measure the 
severity of PD (Lang and Fahn, 1989). The UPDRS for all patients, including PD-OFF, 
was measured prior to the testing session when all PD patients were on medication. 
There was no difference in UPDRS between the three patient groups (F(2,53)=0.29, 
p=0.75). 
The PD-OFF group was withdrawn from medications for a period of at least 18 
hours. The majority of on medication patients were taking dopamine precursors 
(levodopa-containing medications) and D2 receptor agonists. Specifically, all 
participants in the PD-ON-ICD group and 14 participants in the PD-ON group were 
taking D2 agonist medications (either Requip® or Mirapex®). In addition to D2 
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agonist medications, 10 patients in the PD-ON-ICD group and 11 patients in the 
PD-ON group were taking levodopa medications. 
All participants were screened for intact cognitive function and absence of dementia 
with the Mini-Mental Status Exam (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975). Participants 
required a score of at least 26 to be considered for the study. All groups were 
matched for age and education. In addition, we found no difference between the 
groups on the: North American Adult Reading Test (Uttl, 2002), Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck et al., 1987) , Mini-Mental Status Exam, forward and backward 
digit span tasks (all p-values >0.05, one-way ANOVA). All scales were administered 
by trained experts (Table 1).
The diagnosis of ICD was assessed with interviews conducted by neurologists at 
Ain Shams University Hospital and associated clinics. ICDs reported included 
compulsive shopping (10 patients), hypersexuality (9 patients), gambling (6 
patients) and binge eating (4 patients). The majority of participants had more than 
one type of ICD (4 patients with only one type of ICD, 11 patients with two ICDs 
and 1 patient with 3 ICDs). The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) was administered 
to measure trait impulsivity in all groups. There was a highly significant difference 
in BIS scores between the groups (F(3,72)=8.76, p<0.001). A post-hoc t-test revealed 
Table 1   Demographic data. Means are shown with standard deviations in 
parentheses.
Healthy PD-OFF PD-ON PD-ON-ICD
Age 66.45(4.70) 63.92(3.99) 63.33(3.98) 64.38(3.32)
Disease Duration NA 9.72(2.64) 8.87(3.14) 9.63(2.45)
HYS NA 2.54(0.61) 2.40(0.57) 2.47(0.50)
UPDRS NA 20.36(5.49) 19.60(6.42) 19.00(5.32)
NAART 36.25(9.15) 34.64(10.80) 35.60(12.93) 38.00 (6.32)
MMSE 27.65(1.18) 27.48(0.96) 27.00(0.93) 27.19(1.11)
Forward DS 6.25(1.65) 6.80(1.66) 6.53(2.13) 6.75(1.69)
Backward DS 6.25(1.59) 6.32(1.80) 6.47(2.17) 7.00(1.37)
BDI 7.75(1.97) 6.92(1.32) 8.00(1.69) 6.75(1.57)
BIS* 54.15(4.51) 56.80(4.74) 57.67(4.18) 61.88(4.56)
Abbreviations: HYS: Hoehn–Yahr scale; NA: not applicable; UPDRS: Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating 
Scale; NAART: North American Adult Reading Test; MMSE: Mini-Mental Status Exam; DS: Digit Span; BDI: 
Beck Depression Inventory; BIS: Barratt impulsiveness scale. Asterisks indicate p<0.001.
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that the effect was mainly driven by a higher impulsivity in the PD-ON-ICD group. 
BIS scores for this group were significantly higher than those for the other three 
groups (p<0.02 for all three tests, two-tailed t-test). We also found a significantly 
higher BIS scores in the PD-ON group compared with the healthy group (p<0.05, 
two-tailed t-test).
Task
All participants were administered a probabilistic reward and punishment 
learning task (Figure 1A) (Bódi et al., 2009). On each trial, participants viewed one 
of four different stimuli (S1, S2, S3 and S4), and were asked to decide whether the 
stimulus belonged to category A or B. Two stimuli (S1 and S2) were used in the 
 reward-learning trials (win or no-win) and the other two stimuli (S3 and S4) were 
used in the punishment-learning trials (lose or no-lose). Participants received an 
outcome after making their choices. There was an optimal choice for each stimulus, 
which predominately resulted in obtaining reward or avoiding punishment 
(positive feedback, Figure 1B). Thus, in reward trials, an optimal choice resulted in 
+25 points 80% of the time and resulted in no reward for 20% of trials. In contrast, 
a nonoptimal response resulted in +25 points 20% of the time and otherwise resulted 
in no reward. In punishment trials, an optimal response resulted in -25 points 
with 20% probability and otherwise resulted in no punishment. In contrast, a non - 
optimal response resulted in -25 points 80% of the time and otherwise resulted 
in no punishment. The task had 160 trials and the order in which stimuli were 
presented was pseudo-randomized in blocks of 40 trials. For every block, each 
stimulus was randomly presented in 10 trials.
Theoretical framework
We used computational modeling to investigate the mechanistic differences in 
learning between participant groups. We fitted different RL models to each 
participant’s choice data. These models were variants of either the Q-learning 
or the actor-critic framework. Notably, Q-learning and actor-critic frameworks 
employ different strategies to calculate the PE, the pivotal signal in learning 
within both frameworks. While the Q-learning framework computes the PE signal 
based on the estimated value of stimulus-action pairs, the actor-critic framework 
computes the PE based on the estimated value of stimuli, regardless of the action 
taken. The different claims of PE computations in these two frameworks can be 
examined in a relatively theory-neutral manner through model-independent 
estimation of PE. We also fitted different models to participants’ choices and 
compared them using Bayesian model comparison. All models use the sequence 
of choices and feedbacks for every participant in order to estimate the probability 
of action taken on every trial.
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Reinforcement learning models
The first model is the Q-learning model with different learning rates for positive 
and negative PEs (dual-α QL, Figure 2A). This model learns the value associated 
with each stimulus-action pair, Qt (st , at), using a PE signal, which is the discrepancy 
between the outcome (reward or punishment) and Qt (st , at):
where ot is the outcome on trial t. The model then updates the current estimated 
value with the PE:
where α+ and α – are the learning rates for positive and negative PEs, respectively. 
These learning rates determine the degree that recent PEs affect the estimated 
value. If α+ > α –, the effect of positive PEs on learned values is larger than that of 
Figure 1 Probabilistic learning task. A) On each trial, one of four stimuli is presented and 
participant is asked to choose whether the stimulus belongs to category A or B to avoid 
punishment or obtain reward. B) Structure of the task. For each stimulus, one of the choices 
(the optimal action) predominantly (80% of the time) results in a positive feedback (either 
through obtaining a reward or avoiding punishment). The other choice (the nonoptimal 
action) predominantly results in a negative feedback.
A B
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negative PEs, and vice versa if α+ < α –. The effect of positive and negative PE is 
equal for α+ = α –. Frank et al. (2004) hypothesized that different types of dopamine 
receptors within the striatum mediate the ability to learn from positive and 
negative PEs via modulation of dopamine activity in the direct and indirect corti-
co-striato-thalamic pathways, respectively. According to Frank et al. (2004), the 
positive PE increases phasic dopamine release resulting in learning through D1 
receptors. The negative PE, on the other hand, causes a dopamine dip below 
baseline resulting in learning through D2 receptors (also see Moustafa et al. (2013))
The probability of choosing each action is computed using the soft-max equation:
where p (ct = A | st) and p (ct = B | st) are the probability of choosing A and B, 
respectively. β is the inverse-temperature parameter, which encodes decision 
noise. Ct (st , A) 
and Ct (st , B) represents the choice of A and B on the last 
presentation of St, respectively (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Rutledge et al., 2009). 
Thus, Ct (st , A) = 1 and Ct (st , B) = 0 if A has been chosen in the previous 
presentation of St before trial t, but if B has been chosen, Ct (st , A) = 0 and 
Ct (st , B) = 1. Therefore, ϕ determines the extent to which the previous choice, 
independent of reward history, affects the current choice. While positive values of 
ϕ represent a tendency to perseverate on previous choices, negative values represent 
a tendency to switch more frequently between available options. 
The second model is the actor-critic  model (standard AC, Figure 2B), which assigns 
learning and action selection to two different modules. The PE signal in this model 
is computed based on stimulus values, regardless of the action taken:
where Vt (st) is the current critic’s value for st. The critic’s value is then updated 
using the PE:
where αc is the critic’s learning rate. The PE is also conveyed to the actor in order 
to update the action value of the selected action in the actor:
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where αa is the actor’s learning rate. Here, if αc > αa then the effect of PEs on the 
critic is larger than that of actor, and vice versa if αc < αa. Note that this is common 
practice in machine learning that the update of the actor is slower than that of the 
critic to ensure that the critic has sufficient time to evaluate the current policy 
(Grondman et al., 2012). However, we enforce no constraints on the critic’s and 
actor’s learning rates. If participants employed an actor-critic strategy, we would 
expect that the fitted parameters satisfy this condition for the majority of 
participants. The probability of each action is computed according to the actor’s 
action values. A similar soft-max equation as the previous model, dual-α QL, is 
used to generate the probability of actions based on actor’s action values and 
choice perseveration. 
The third model is the dual-α AC model, which is very similar to the standard AC 
model (Figure 2C). The difference between these two models is how they update 
stimulus and action values. The dual-α AC model updates stimulus values through 
two different learning rates, one for positive PEs and one for negative PEs:
If αc+ > αc–, then the effect of positive PEs on the stimulus value is larger than that 
of negative PEs, and vice versa if αc+ < αc–. The actor’s action value is also updated 
through the two different learning rates for positive and negative PEs:
Here, if αa+ > αa– the effect of positive PEs on the actor’s action value is larger than 
that of  negative PEs, and vice versa if αa+ < αa–. The values for all models were 
initiated at zero.
Model-independent estimation of prediction error
In this section, we derive a model-independent estimator of PE. This estimator 
could then be used to assess learning strategies employed by participants in a 
theory-neutral manner.
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Figure 2 The diagram of the three reinforcement learning models. The environment 
provides three signals for each model: s, indicating the current stimulus, A, indicating the 
set of available actions, and o, indicating the outcome after receiving the selected action, 
a, from the model. Every model learns appropriate actions by computing a PE signal (indicated 
by PE block in the diagram) and selects appropriate actions using estimated Q-values of the 
available set of actions, A. A) The dual-α Q-learning model: this model calculates PEs based on 
the estimated value of stimulus-selected action pair, Q(s,a). Q-values are updated through two 
different learning rates, α+ and α –, for positive and negative PEs, respectively. B) The standard 
actor-critic framework: the critic calculates the PE, δ, based on the stimulus value, V(s), 
independently from the selected action, a. The actor computes action values, Q, and selects 
appropriate action, a, from a set of available action, A, using actor’s Q-values. Both stimulus 
and action values are updated using the same PE. C) The dual-α actor-critic model: this model 
has critical features of the previous models. Similar to the standard actor-critic model, the 
PE is computed based on stimulus values, V(s), independently from the action, a, selected by 
the actor. Similar to the dual-α Q-learning model, this model updates both the critic’s stimulus 
values, V, and the actor’s action values, Q, through two different learning rates for positive 
and negative PEs in the critic, αc+ and αc– and in the actor, αa+ and αa–. 
A
C
B
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RL models often assume that choices are generated using a soft-max equation of 
action values:
where a and a' are two available choices and β is the inverse-temperature parameter. 
Qt (a) is the action value for a on trial t, which could be generated by either an 
actor-critic model or by a Q-learning model. Note that Qt is also a function of state 
(stimulus) in all the models. For simplicity (without loss of generality), we focus on 
sequence of choices related to one state and omit state in the notation in this 
section. The probability of taking action a′ on trial t is computed using a similar 
equation. Therefore:
Equation 1
Without loss of generality, we suppose that a is taken at t. Then, the action value of 
a should be updated using the PE, δt:
where α is the learning rate. There is no change in the action value of the other 
action: Qt+1 (a′) = Qt (a′). Therefore:
Equation 2
By subtracting the logarithm of Equation 1 from the logarithm of Equation 2, we 
obtain:
Equation 3
We define nt (a) as the number of times that a has been chosen in trials t′ ≤ t. 
Similarly, nt (a′) is defined as the number of times that a' has been chosen in trials 
t′ ≤ t. The probability of each choice can be estimated using these variables:
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Accordingly, if  nt (a′) ≠ 0, Equation 3 can be estimated as:
where a is the action taken at t and εt is the estimator of the PE, which is a quantity 
that is independent of any specific learning strategy and is purely based on the 
sequence of choices. Note that the predictions of this estimator match well with 
the concept of PE. First, if a is chosen in trials t and t+1, εt is positive, suggesting 
that choosing a resulted in a positive feedback and increased the probability of 
choosing a for subsequent trials. If a is chosen at t, but not at t+1, εt is negative, 
suggesting that choosing a resulted in a negative feedback and a reduced the 
probability of choosing a for future trials. Also, the magnitude of εt is smaller 
for larger amounts of nt (a), which is consistent with the idea that the magnitude 
of PEs should decrease over time. 
Subjective utility and non-learning models
We also fitted four additional models to participants’ choices in order to investigate 
whether nonlinearity in subjective values of different outcomes, or some non- 
learning strategies, could explain data better than the previously mentioned RL 
models.
Utility models. We considered two utility models. These models test the hypothesis 
that participants’ choices can be explained by nonlinearity in subjective value of 
outcomes. For the probabilistic learning task used in our study, the subjective 
value refers to the different subjective utilities for reward and punishment.
The first model is the utility QL model as implemented by Niv et al (2012). In this 
model, the PE is computed based on a nonlinear function of the outcomes:
where U (ot) is the subjective utility of outcome at time t. The action value is then 
updated using this PE:
As similar to Niv et al. (2012), to model the subjective utility of the outcome, we 
assumed (without loss of generality) that U(0)=0, U(-25)=-25 and U(+25)=25u, where u 
is a free parameter that determines the subjective utility of outcome. Values of 
u that are smaller than 1 are consistent with hypersensitivity to punishment, 
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whereas values of u that are larger than 1 are consistent with hypersensitivity to 
reward. Note that reward and punishment are different from positive and negative 
PEs that could occur in both reward and punishment trials. This model computes 
the probability of each action in the same way as the dual-α QL model.
It is also possible to define a subjective utility version of the actor-critic model 
(utility AC). In this model, the PE is:
This PE would then be used by the critic and the actor to update stimulus and 
action values, respectively. Again, we assumed that U(0)=0, U(-25)=-25 and 
U(+25)=25u, where u is a free parameter that determines the subjective utility of 
outcome. Similar to the standard AC, two different learning rates are used to 
update the critic’s stimulus values and the actor’s action values. This model 
computes the probability of each action in the same way as the standard AC.
Win-stay lose-shift model. We also considered a model that implemented a win-stay, 
lose-shift (WSLS) strategy. This model selects actions based only on the most recent 
outcome. The WSLS strategy selects the same action that led to success on the next 
trial or chooses a different option on the next trial when an action did not lead to 
a success. This strategy can be stochastically modeled using a sigmoid function:
where a is the chosen action in the previous presentation of st and β > 0 encodes 
decision noise. To model the WSLS strategy, we assumed (without loss of generality) 
that wt = –1 if the previous presentation of st was a lose trial and wt = W if it was 
a win trial. W>0 is the parameter that determines the weight of win compared to 
loss. If W>1, the effect of win on the subsequent choice is larger than that of loss, and 
vice versa if W<1. The effect of win and loss on subsequent choices is symmetric if 
W=1. For all positive values of W, the probability of choosing the same action as the 
previous trial is more than the alternative action if the previous trial was a win 
trial and less than the alternative action if the previous trial was a loss trial. 
Note that in our probabilistic learning task, win trials were those that resulted in 
obtaining a reward in reward trials or avoiding a punishment in punishment 
trials. We fitted two WSLS models to participants’ choices. For the first model we 
assumed both β and W were free, and in the second one we fixed W at 1. The values 
for all models were initiated at zero.
68
Chapter 3
Model fitting procedure
We used a hierarchical Bayesian procedure for fitting models to participants’ 
choices as described in Huys et al. (2011a, 2012). All parameters of the models are 
assumed to be free (see Table 2 for the number of free parameters in each model) 
except for β in the three actor-critic models (standard AC, dual-α AC and utility 
AC), which was fixed at 1. This is because the probabilities of choices for these 
models are affected by the product of the learning rate parameter of the actor and 
β and this is the only way that these parameters affect the likelihood function. 
These two variables are indeed co-linear. To show that fixing β at 1 is statistically 
justified, we also fitted these models with β as a free parameter and used the 
likelihood ratio test to examine whether these models fit significantly better 
than the same models with β fixed at 1. For all three models, the fits were not 
significantly improved by having β as a free parameter (p>0.9 for all groups, 
likelihood ratio test). Accordingly, the standard AC, dual-α AC and utility AC 
models have 3, 5 and 4 free parameters, respectively. 
In the hierarchical Bayesian procedure, the parameters of an a priori distribution 
for individual parameters were estimated using participants’ choices through the 
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977). This algorithm 
is a well-known method for finding maximum a posteriori, which alternates between 
an expectation step and a maximization step. We used Laplace approximation 
(MacKay, 2003) for the expectation step on each iteration. Assuming a normal 
distribution for individual parameters, Ө i for ith participant, this method 
estimates the mean and the variance of the distributions across the whole group, 
Θ, which serves as an a priori distribution for finding the maximum a posteriori 
on the next iteration. For example, for the dual-α AC model, the group parameters 
are:
where μ and v indicate the mean and deviance of the corresponding parameter, 
respectively. The group mean and variance were estimated separately for each 
group and were used to define an a priori Gaussian distribution for individual 
parameters. Thus, four sets of parameters, associated with four groups, were 
estimated. For the details of the hierarchical fitting procedure please refer to Huys 
et al. (2012).
Bayesian model selection
We employed a Bayesian model selection approach to assess which model better 
captures participants’ choices. This approach selects the most parsimonious model 
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by balancing between model fits and different levels of complexity of the models 
(Kass and Raftery, 1995; MacKay, 2003).
We computed approximate model evidence, P (D | M), which is the probability of 
participants’ choices, D, given the model M. We approximated P (D | M) (in log- 
space) using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC): 
where D is the set of all participants’ choices in the group, |D| is the number of 
choices for the whole group and |Θ| is the number of group parameters. ΘML is 
obtained using maximum likelihood:
Since ΘML determines an a priori distribution for individual parameters, we can 
obtain P (D | M, ΘML) using the Laplace approximation:
where Di is the set of ith subject’s choices, |Ө i| is the number of free parameters in 
the model for ith subject, |H i| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix for ith 
subject at Ө iMAP, and Ө iMAP is the maximum a posteriori of parameters for the 
ith subject: 
Model selection using cross-validation
We also performed a cross-validation analysis as a control analysis for model 
selection. Parameters of the models were fitted based on a subset of choices and 
generalization of models were assessed by quantifying the prediction probability 
of the models on a different subset of choices that was not used for fitting (see Daw 
(2011) for shortcomings of this method in learning studies). Similar to Camerer 
and Ho (1999), the parameters of models were estimated based on the first 
two-thirds of trials using the hierarchical Bayesian fitting procedure. Next, the 
negative log-likelihood of the prediction probability of choices on the remaining 
one-third of trials was computed and reported. 
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Statistical analyses 
Due to non-Gaussian statistics (since some parameters are expected to lie in the 
unit range), we used the nonparametric Wilcoxon test for parameter comparison 
between groups. To ensure that between-group differences were not dependent on 
parameter regularization used in the hierarchical Bayesian procedure (Wunderlich 
et al., 2012b), we employed a permutation test approach as a control analysis. For 
each significant between-group difference, the labels of the groups were randomly 
permuted 200 times across the participants of both groups. The parameters for 
these two pseudo random groups were then found using the hierarchical Bayesian 
procedure. We then tested whether the effect-size in the real data (assessed by the 
difference in the median of two groups’ parameters) was more than the effect-size 
for the pseudo random groups. 
We also examined between-group differences in stimulus values for both reward 
and punishment trials. Each subject’s fitted parameter values were used to 
estimate the value of stimuli. The nonparametric Wilcoxon test was used to test 
between-group differences. A similar control analysis was also conducted to 
ensure that the results were not dependent on parameter regularization. Since it 
is not possible to test between-group differences in stimulus values using the 
permutation test (due to the dependency of stimulus values in the last presentation 
of each stimulus on both fitted parameters and sequence of outcomes received), 
we re-fitted the dual-α AC model to participants’ choices using the hierarchical 
Bayesian procedure but with only one a priori distribution defined across all 
participants. Since individual parameters were obtained using the same a priori, 
the between-group differences cannot be attributed to parameter regularization. 
Results
Behavioral data
The probability of optimal responses made by participants was analyzed using an 
ANOVA with group (4 levels: PD-OFF, PD-ON, PD-ON-ICD and healthy controls) as a 
between-subject factor and valence (reward or punishment) as a within-subject 
factor (Figure 3). This analysis revealed a highly significant interaction between 
group and valence (F(3.0,72.0)=15.81, p<0.001), as well as a significant main effect 
of group (F(3.0,72.0)=3.79, p<0.05), but no significant main effects of valence 
(F(1.0,72.0)=2.23, p=0.14). Further analyses with the additional factor block (2 levels: 
the first half and the second half of the 160 trials) were conducted to assess learning 
effects. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of block (F(1.0,72.0)=14.25, 
p<0.001), but no interaction between block and other factors (refer to Figure 4 for 
learning curve). 
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Figure 3  Performance of the four groups on the probabilistic learning task. A) Mean performance 
in reward trials and B) mean performance in punishment trials. For reward trials, the PD-ON group 
performed better than the PD-OFF group, but worse than the PD-ON-ICD group. The opposite 
pattern of performance was observed in punishment trials. Error-bars reflect standard error.
A B
Figure 4  Learning curve for A) reward and B) punishment trials. The 160 trials are divided in 
4 blocks. Each block contains 20 reward and 20 punishment trials. Error-bars reflect standard 
error.
A B
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Next we broke down the significant group by valence interaction into simple main 
effects of group for the reward and punishment trials separately. All p-values are 
from two-tailed t-test. Thus, reward learning was impaired in the PD-OFF group 
relative to the other three groups (healthy controls, PD-ON and PD-ON-ICD groups: 
p<0.001, p<0.01 and p<0.001, respectively). Conversely, the PD-ON-ICD group showed 
better reward learning than the other three groups (with healthy controls: p=0.015; 
with PD-ON: p=0.016). 
The opposite pattern of performance was observed for punishment learning. 
The PD-OFF group exhibited better punishment learning than the PD-ON-ICD 
(p=0.003) and PD-ON groups (p=0.046), although there was no significant difference 
in punishment learning between PD-OFF and healthy participants (p=0.43). 
Moreover, punishment learning was impaired in the PD-ON-ICD group relative to 
the healthy control group (p=0.028), although not relative to the PD-ON group 
(p=0.41).
Model-independent evaluation of learning strategy 
Two different strategies could be used to compute the learning signal in the 
probabilistic learning task. First, the PE could be computed based on the outcome 
received, regardless of which action was taken. This strategy is used by the 
actor-critic framework. The second strategy is to compute the PE based on the 
value of the action taken. This strategy is used by the Q-learning framework. The 
probabilistic learning task allowed us to distinguish between these two learning 
strategies. For example, if the percentage of optimal responses is 70%, the critic’s 
stimulus value is affected by the outcomes of both actions; and its value (after 
sufficient trials) is in the middle of two actions’ values estimated by the Q-learning 
framework. For a rewarding stimulus such as S1, the Q-learning value of action A 
(optimal action), the Q-learning value of action B and actor-critic stimulus values 
are around 20, 5 and 15.5, respectively. Thus, if taking an action results in a 
positive feedback (an outcome of 25 points), the PE computed by actor-critic is 9.5, 
but the PE by Q-learning is either 5 or 20, depending on which action is taken. 
Also, if taking an action results in a negative feedback (an outcome of 0 points), the 
PE computed by the actor-critic is -15.5, but the PE computed by Q-learning is 
either -20 or -5, depending on the action selected. Therefore, two key events may 
influence learning signal in this task: whether feedback was positive or negative, 
and whether the action taken was optimal or nonoptimal. 
Figure 5A and Figure 5B illustrate the simulated learning signal predicted by the 
Q-learning and actor-critic frameworks, respectively. As these figures show, while 
both strategies predict a main effect of the feedback, the predictions of the two 
73
Learning in PD Patients with Impulse Control Disorders
3
frameworks are different in terms of the action. While the actor-critic framework 
predicts no main effect of action, the Q-learning framework predicts the opposite. 
To assess learning strategies employed by participants in a relatively theory-neutral 
manner, we directly assessed the effects of feedback and action on the model-
independent estimated PEs across participants (see Methods), a quantity that is 
Figure 5 Factorial analysis of model-independent estimates of the learning signal. A) Q-learning 
framework computes the learning signal based on action values and predicts that this signal 
depends on whether optimal action or nonoptimal action is taken; B) Actor-critic framework 
computes the learning signal based on the stimulus value, regardless of which action is 
taken. C) Model-independent estimated learning signal based on the data, averaged across 
participants, is consistent with the prediction of the actor-critic framework. Both models 
were simulated with learning rates, α, of 0.05 and β inverse-temperature of 0.1. The learning 
signal for both models, ε, was defined as βαδt, where δt is the PE computed by the model at 
trial t. See Methods for on the definition of the model-independent estimates of learning 
signal. Error-bars reflect standard error. 
A
C
B
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purely based on the sequence of choices for each stimulus. We analysed the model-
independent estimated PEs using an ANOVA with feedback and action as 
within-subject factors and with group as a between-subject factor. This analysis 
revealed a highly significant main effect of feedback (F(1.0,70.0)=38.5, p<0.001), 
consistent with the prediction of both Q-learning and actor-critic frameworks. 
However, there was no main effect of action (F(1.0,70.0)=0.37, p=0.55), suggesting 
that the learning strategy employed by participants is consistent with the 
actor-critic learning strategy, but not with that of the Q-learning. As predicted by 
both learning strategies, no interaction between feedback and action was observed 
(F(1.0,70.0)=1.29, p=0.26). Also, no main effect of group, as well as no two- or 
three-way interactions between group and the other factors were observed (p>0.5), 
suggesting that all groups employed the same learning strategy. Therefore, we 
plotted model-independent estimated learning signal across participants in all 
groups in Figure 5C. 
We further studied the effects of feedback and action separately for each group 
using an ANOVA with feedback and action as within-subject factors. Consistent 
with the previous analysis, there was a main effect of feedback in all four groups 
(all p-values<0.02). No main effect of action and no interaction were observed for 
any of the groups (all p-values>0.16). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
that the learning strategy in all groups is consistent with the predictions by the 
actor-critic framework. 
Note that this analysis holds for the different variants of Q-learning and actor-critic 
frameworks. Specifically, while the dual-α AC model predicts no main effect of 
action on the learning signal, the dual-α QL model predicts a main effect of action. 
Also, both models predict a main effect of feedback and neither predicts an 
interaction between these factors. Therefore, the results of the analysis of model-
independent estimated PEs are consistent with dual-α AC claims about PEs, but not 
with those of the dual-α QL model.
Model comparison
Motivated by these results, we examined the full fit of the models to participants’ 
choices. First, we verified that the models fit significantly better than chance; they 
did so at p<0.001 for all four groups (likelihood ratio tests). Then, Bayesian model 
comparison was conducted to identify the best model in each group (Table 2). As 
Table 2 shows, the negative log-model evidence is lower (with log-Bayes factor of at 
least 9.5) for the dual-α AC than for the other models for all groups, providing 
compelling support that the dual-α AC model best captures participants’ choices. 
In the Bayesian model comparison literature, a log-Bayes factor of more than three 
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is taken as strong evidence (cf. the p<0.05 criterion often employed in classical 
statistics) (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Daw, 2011). As Table 2 shows, the smallest 
difference in log-evidence between the best (dual-α AC) and the second best model 
(dual-α QL) is the one for the PD-ON-ICD group. Because this group is the critical 
group in this study, we also employed a cross-validation approach as a control 
analysis to compare the plausibility of these two models for this group. Thus, 
parameters were fitted based on the first two-thirds of trials and performance of 
the models quantified on the remaining unseen one-third of trials (Camerer and 
Ho, 1999). The negative log-likelihood for the dual-α AC and the dual-α QL on the 
testing dataset were 478.4 and 536.6, respectively. Therefore, the results of 
cross-validation model selection are consistent with those of the Bayesian model 
selection, demonstrating strong evidence in favor of the dual-α AC model.
Subsequently, we simulated choices by the best model, the dual-α AC model, using 
the fitted parameters in order to verify that the dual-α AC model simulates a 
similar pattern of between-group differences in optimal responses as observed in 
the behavioral data (plotted in Figure 3). These simulated choices were then subject to 
the same two-tailed t-test comparisons employed in the analyses of between-group 
differences in behavioral performance. Overall, this simulation analysis replicated 
similar between-group differences as those observed in the empirical data. The 
performance of the PD-ON-ICD group in reward trials was significantly better 
than the other groups (p<0.01). In punishment trials, the PD-OFF group performed 
significantly better than the PD-ON-ICD group (p=0.025), but not when compared 
Table 2   Bayesian model selection.
No.  
parameters
Healthy PD-OFF PD-ON PD-ON-ICD
Standard AC 3 1653.7 2195.8 1217.5 1344.3
Dual-α QL 4 1660.9 2208.9 1212.8 1299.2
Dual-α AC 5 1587.9 2091.6 1171.4 1289.7
Utility QL 4 1687.5 2182.9 1239.8 1306.7
Utility AC 4 1657.4 2180.1 1212.8 1303.6
WSLS 2 1893.8 2499.9 1414.3 1531.1
WSLS (fixed W) 1 2124.0 2742.6 1587.1 1683.5
These numbers represent the negative log-likelihood of data in the corresponding group given the 
associated model. The Bayesian model selection takes into account both the goodness of fit and the 
generalizability of the models. Lower values are associated with better fits. The dual-α AC model fits 
better than other models for all four groups. Abbreviations: Q-learning (QL); actor-critic (AC); win-stay 
lose-shift (WSLS).
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to the other two groups (p>0.5). Also, consistent with the behavioral results, no 
difference was found between the PD-ON-ICD and the PD-OFF groups in 
punishment trials (p=0.24). The simulated choices failed to replicate the findings 
of significant lower performance by PD-OFF compared with healthy controls and 
PD-ON in reward trials (p>0.05), although the mean performance of PD-OFF was 
lower than these groups in reward trials.
Between-group differences in the critic and actor
Next, we assessed between-group differences in parameter values of the best 
model, dual-α AC. Figure 6 shows the learning rates in the critic and actor. As this 
figure shows, the actor’s learning rates are generally lower than the critic’s 
learning rates. This learning rate profile ensures that the critic has sufficient time 
to evaluate the current policy exploited by the actor (Grondman et al., 2012).
First, we studied between-group differences in the critic’s parameters. According 
to our hypothesis, we expected an association between ICD and the critic’s learning 
rates. Although there was no significant difference in αc+ between PD-ON-ICD and 
other groups (p>0.1 for all three tests, Figure 6A), we found a significantly lower 
learning rate from negative PEs in PD-ON-ICD. Indeed, as Figure 6B shows, αc– in 
PD-ON-ICD was less than healthy participants (p=0.002), PD-OFF (p<0.001) and 
PD-ON (p=0.017). No other group differences in αc– were found. 
We also investigated between-group differences in the actor’s learning rates. Based 
on the previous data (Frank et al., 2004) and our hypothesis that PD is associated 
with action valuation deficits, we expected a relatively lower learning rate for the 
positive PE in PD-OFF and a relatively lower learning rate for the negative PE in 
PD-ON. As Figure 6C shows, αa+ was significantly lower in PD-OFF than PD-ON 
(p=0.050). Conversely, αa– was higher in PD-OFF than PD-ON, despite showing only 
a trend towards significance (p=0.058, Figure 6D). Consistent with our hypothesis, 
there was no significant difference between PD-ON-ICD and PD-ON in terms of 
the actor’s parameters (no difference between PD-ON and PD-ON-ICD for either αa+ 
(p=0.35) or αa– (p=0.77)). 
Using the actor-critic framework, it is possible to also evaluate stimulus values. 
Thus, we derived the value of every stimulus at the end of the task (the last 
presentation of the stimulus) for each subject using the subject’s choices and the 
fitted parameters in the dual-α AC model (Figure 7). We then tested between-group 
differences in stimulus value separately in reward and punishment trials. Note 
that two stimuli were only presented in reward trials and two other stimuli were 
only presented in punishment trials. The stimulus value in punishment trials for 
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the PD-ON-ICD group was significantly less negative than those for the PD-OFF 
(p=0.003), PD-ON (p=0.038) and healthy control (p=0.02) group, suggesting that PD 
patients with ICD underestimate the adverse consequences of stimuli associated 
with punishment. No significant difference in the stimulus value in reward trials 
between PD-ON-ICD and PD-ON was found (p=0.35). Consistent with our hypothesis, 
the two groups of PD patients without ICD showed a similar pattern of stimulus 
values in both reward and punishment trials (no difference between PD-OFF and 
Figure 6 Learning rates in the best model, dual-α AC model. The critic’s learning rate for 
A) the positive PE, αc+ and B) the negative PE, αc–. PD-ON-ICD showed lower critic’s learning 
rate for the negative PE compared with other three groups, including PD-ON patients. 
C) The actor’s learning rate for the positive, αa+; and D) the negative PE, αa–. Asterisks indicate 
significant difference (p<0.05). Error-bars reflect standard error.
A
C D
B
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PD-ON for either reward (p=0.74) or punishment (p=0.60) trials), which supports 
the idea that PD is not associated with stimulus valuation deficits.
We should note that our main results are independent of the parameter regularization: 
the critic’s learning rate for the negative PE, αc–, was significantly lower in the 
PD-ON-ICD group than in  other three groups even when using the permutation 
test (p< 0.05, two-tailed test). The control analysis for between-group differences 
in stimulus values also revealed the same significant between-group differences as 
in our original analysis.
Although the dual-α AC model outperformed the dual-α QL model in all four 
groups, we also present the results of the between-group difference tests in 
learning rates for the positive and negative PEs in the dual-α QL model to highlight 
the benefits of AC modeling for ICD. The learning rate for positive PEs, α+, was 
significantly higher in PD-ON compared to healthy control (p=0.002) and 
marginally higher in PD-ON compared to PD-OFF (p=0.07). This parameter was 
also significantly higher in PD-ON-ICD compared to healthy controls (p<0.001). 
However, there was no difference in α+ between PD-ON-ICD and PD-ON (p=0.51). 
There was also no difference between PD-ON-ICD and PD-OFF (p=0.15). No significant 
between-group differences found in the learning rate for negative PEs, α (all 
Figure 7  Stimulus value in reward and punishment trials. The stimulus values were obtained 
using the fitted parameters in the dual-α AC model for the last presentation of each stimulus 
and averaged across participants. PD-ON-ICD patients exhibited significantly less negative 
stimulus value in punishment trials compared with the other groups. Error-bars reflect 
standard error.
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p-values>0.6). Therefore, as these analyses revealed, no difference was found in 
parameter values of the dual-α QL between on medication patients with ICD and 
those without ICD.  
Between-group differences in the perseveration
A recent RL study of PD patients reported that the perseveration parameter is 
 dopamine-dependent. Thus, off medication PD patients exhibited higher perseveration 
than on medication patients (Rutledge et al., 2009). Although it is not the main 
focus of this study, we also examined the effects of the perseveration parameter on 
model fits and between-group differences in φ, the parameter determining the 
degree that perseveration affects choice. To show that including φ in the dual-α AC 
model is statistically justified, we first tested whether the model with the 
perseveration parameter fitted significantly better than the same model without 
the perseveration parameter; it did so for all groups (p<0.001, likelihood ratio test). 
Note that the perseveration parameter encodes the probability of repeating an 
action on the subsequent presentation of a stimulus. An alternative way to define 
perseveration could be to compute the probability of repeating an action on the 
subsequent trial regardless of the stimulus presented. Therefore, we also fitted a 
dual-α AC model with the stimulus-independent perseveration and used model 
selection to test whether the original model outperforms this model; it did so for 
all groups (with log-Bayes factor of more than 6.3). 
As Figure 8 shows, consistent with Rutledge et al. (2009), we found significantly 
higher perseveration values in the PD-OFF group compared with healthy controls 
(p=0.03). Interestingly, we also found significantly lower perseveration in the 
PD-ON-ICD group than in the PD-OFF, PD-ON and healthy control groups (p<0.01 
for all three tests). No significant difference was found between the PD-OFF and 
the PD-ON groups (p=0.08).
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Discussion
Dopaminergic medications trigger ICD in a subset of PD patients. In this study, we 
used a reward and punishment probabilistic learning task and fitted RL models to 
participants’ choices to investigate the mechanistic differences in stimulus valuation 
and action selection in PD patients with and without ICD. The probabilistic 
learning task allowed us to distinguish between different learning strategies used 
by QL and AC frameworks through their different claims about the effects of 
actions taken on learning. We found that model-independent estimates of the 
learning signal are consistent with the hallmark of the AC learning strategy. 
The full fit of models and Bayesian model comparison revealed that an AC model 
(with different learning rates for positive and negative PEs in both the critic and 
the actor) best matches participants’ choices.
We found that PD patients with ICD (on medication) are more sensitive to rewarding 
outcomes. Computational modeling revealed that these patients also underestimate 
adverse consequences of stimuli associated with punishment. We also found 
computational evidence that patients with ICD exhibit reduced ability in updating 
stimulus values by negative PEs. Therefore, our findings suggest that distorted 
stimulus valuation could result in aberrant PE signals, which subsequently affects 
action values. 
Figure 8   Perseveration parameter. This parameter determines the effect of perseveration on 
choice. The perseveration parameter depended on dopaminergic medications. Additionally, 
PD-ON-ICD patients exhibited lower perseveration than all other three groups. Asterisks 
indicate significant difference (p<0.05). Error-bars reflect standard error.
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There is a great deal of evidence that the ventral striatum contributes to decision 
making in a manner consistent with the role of the critic in stimulus valuation 
and PE computations (Cardinal et al., 2002; Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Packard and 
Knowlton, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004). Therefore, our findings are in line with 
previous studies that found dopamine-dependent ventral striatal dysfunction in 
PD patients with ICD symptoms (Cools et al., 2007a; Dagher and Robbins, 2009; 
Steeves et al., 2009; Voon et al., 2010). For example, in a [11C] raclopride positron 
emission tomography study of PD patients with and without pathological 
gambling, Steeves et al. (2009) found greater decreases in binding potential in the 
ventral striatum in on medication PD patients with pathological gambling. In 
addition, Voon et al. (2010) reported impaired PE signaling in the ventral striatum 
of PD patients with ICD. 
We also found that PD (without ICD) is associated with parameters related to action 
valuation, but not with stimulus valuation. Therefore, although PD patients 
without ICD exhibited no deficit in learning stimulus value used for calculating 
PEs, they showed abnormalities in updating action values with the information 
signaled by the critic. Therefore, our findings suggest that PD patients without ICD 
have relatively intact PE computations (in their relatively intact ventral striatum), 
but the effects of PEs on action values are distorted (in their severely depleted 
dorsal striatum). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the dorsal 
striatum, the most affected striatal region in PD, is responsible for action valuation 
and selection. In addition, we also found that the action valuation abnormalities 
in PD patients without ICD interact with dopaminergic medications. Therefore, 
consistent with previous data (Frank et al., 2004; Moustafa et al., 2008, 2013; Bódi 
et al., 2009), we found that whereas off-medication PD patients were better at 
learning from punishment, on-medication PD patients were better at learning 
from reward. Mechanistically, we found that off-medication patients, compared 
with on-medication patients, showed lower action value learning from positive 
PEs and marginally higher action value learning from negative PEs. Notably, 
almost all patients in this study received D2 agonist medications, which stimulate 
D2 dopamine receptors. Therefore, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
of Frank et al. (2004) that different types of dopamine receptors within the 
striatum, especially those in more dorsal regions, mediate the ability to learn 
from positive and negative PEs via modulation of dopamine activity in the direct 
and indirect basal ganglia pathways, respectively (Frank et al., 2004, 2007a; 
O’Reilly et al., 2007). According to this hypothesis, the positive PE increases phasic 
dopamine release, which facilitates learning by acting on D1 receptors. Conversely, 
the negative PE results in a dopamine dip below baseline, which facilitates learning 
by acting on D2 receptors. 
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Although the role of D1 and D2 receptors in the ventral striatal region, especially 
the nucleus accumbens shell, is less clear than in the dorsal striatum (Ikemoto et 
al., 1997; Hopf et al., 2003), there is increasing evidence that the ventral striatal D2 
receptors are also involved in learning from negative PEs. Indeed, the negative PE 
results in dopamine dips below baseline (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Hart et al., 
2014), which can stimulate high-affinity D2 receptors, but not D1 receptors (Frank 
et al., 2004). It has also been suggested that D2, but not D1, receptors are stimulated 
with tonic dopamine release (Grace, 1991). Therefore, as noted by Frank et al. 
(2004), D2 agonist drugs might fill the dips and reduce the ability to learn from 
negative PEs. In rats, nucleus accumbens D2 stimulation with a dopamine agonist 
reduced the ability to learn from negative feedback (Goto and Grace, 2005). In 
addition, Al-carriers of TAQ-1A polymorphism, which is associated with a lower 
density of striatal D2 receptors, showed impaired learning from negative feedbacks 
and aberrant reward-related responses in the ventral striatum (Klein et al., 2007). 
This hypothesis is consistent with data reporting that ICDs are observed more 
often in patients on D2 agonist medications (Weintraub et al., 2006; Voon et al., 
2007). 
An important open question is which individual differences in PD patients with 
ICD interact with D2 agonist medications and induce compulsive behaviors? One 
possible answer is that patients vulnerable to ICD have a lower ventral striatal D2 
receptor density, even before the onset of PD (Dagher and Robbins, 2009). There is 
limited but important evidence from animal models of cocaine addiction that rats 
with lower nucleus accumbens D2 receptor density are more impulsive, even prior 
to cocaine exposure (Dalley et al., 2007), and are more likely to develop compulsive 
drug seeking (Belin et al., 2008). In addition, Weintraub et al. (2006) investigated 
ICD in a large sample of PD patients and reported that those with ICDs were more 
likely to have had ICDs before the onset of PD. Moreover, animal model studies of 
addiction have reported that drug exposure further reduces striatal D2 receptors 
(Nader et al., 2002; Porrino et al., 2004a). Similarly, the overstimulation of the 
ventral striatum in PD patients by D2 agonist medications may further reduce the 
density of ventral striatal D2, making them more susceptible to develop ICD. 
Consistent with these ideas, it has been reported that PD patients with ICD showed 
lower density of D2 receptors in the ventral striatum (Steeves et al., 2009), although 
it is not clear from this particular study that the reduced level of D2 receptors in 
the ventral striatum is a predisposing neurobiological trait and/or a consequence 
of medication. 
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Conclusion
In summary, we found that whereas PD is associated with parameters related to 
action valuation and selection, ICDs in PD are mechanistically associated with 
parameters related to stimulus valuation and PE computations. Specifically, we 
found computational evidence that ICDs in PD are associated with lower learning 
rates from negative feedbacks in the critic. These findings offer a computational 
interpretation of ICDs in PD and highlight the value of computational modeling in 
understanding cognitive deficits associated with psychiatric disorders (Redish 
et al., 2008; Huys et al., 2011b; Maia and Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 2012; 
Monterosso et al., 2012). 

This chapter is adapted from:
Piray P, Toni I, Cools R (2016), Journal of Neuroscience.
Human choice strategy 
varies with anatomical projections  
from ventromedial prefrontal cortex  
to medial striatum
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Abstract
Two distinct systems, goal-directed and habitual, support decision making. It has 
recently been hypothesized that this distinction may arise from two computational 
mechanisms, model-based and model-free reinforcement learning, neuronally 
implemented in frontostriatal circuits involved in learning and behavioral control. 
Here, we test whether the relative strength of anatomical connectivity within 
frontostriatal circuits accounts for variation in human individuals’ reliance on 
model-based and model-free control. This hypothesis was tested by combining 
diffusion tensor imaging with a multistep decision task known to distinguish 
model-based and model-free control in humans. We found large inter-individual 
differences in the degree of model-based control, and those differences are 
predicted by the structural integrity of white-matter tracts from the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex to the medial striatum. Furthermore, an analysis based on 
masking out of bottom-up tracts suggests that this effect is driven by top-down 
influences from ventromedial prefrontal cortex to medial striatum. Our findings 
indicate that individuals with stronger afferences from the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex to the medial striatum are more likely to rely on a model-based 
strategy to control their instrumental actions. These findings suggest a mechanism 
for instrumental action control through which medial striatum determines, 
at least partly, the relative contribution of model-based and model-free systems 
during decision-making according to top-down model-based information from the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These findings have important implications for 
understanding the neural circuitry that might be susceptible to pathological 
computational processes in impulsive/compulsive psychiatric disorders.
87
Frontostriatal Connections Predict Learning
4
Introduction
Instrumental actions are controlled by two distinct strategies, a flexible but 
 c omputationally expensive goal-directed strategy, and a rapid but rigid habitual 
strategy. This distinction has recently been formalized in a normative computational 
account in which two reinforcement learning strategies, a “model-based” and a 
“model-free” system jointly control instrumental actions (Daw et al., 2005). 
The model-free system directly reinforces actions that lead to reward, ignoring 
the probabilistic structure of predictive cues in the environment. The model-based 
system uses an internal model of probabilistic regularities in the environment to 
evaluate candidate actions. 
It is generally assumed that reliance on habitual actions is influenced by state 
factors. For instance, stress, dual-tasking, administration of dopaminergic drugs, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation, and striatal presynaptic dopamine affect the 
relative balance between model-based and model-free control (Wunderlich et al., 
2012b; Otto et al., 2013a, 2013b; Deserno et al., 2015). Those state-dependent effects 
have been indexed by population-level summary parameters, treating inter-indi-
vidual trait variability as noise. In fact, structural differences in the neural circuits 
supporting model-free and model-based control might explain inter-individual 
variability in the relative contribution of those two systems. Accordingly, this 
study considers whether human choice is systematically biased by stable neuro-
anatomical trait factors. 
The available evidence suggests that model-based and model-free control systems 
rely on partly different frontostriatal circuits. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) and the dorsomedial striatum  are implicated in model-based control 
(Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012a; Lee et al., 2014), 
whereas the dorsolateral striatum is implicated in model-free control (Wunderlich 
et al., 2012a). This neuroanatomical segregation of computational functions nicely 
overlaps with the long-standing distinction between goal-directed and habitual 
modes of behavioural control. Works with behaving rodents (Balleine and 
Dickinson, 1998; Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Yin et al., 2005) and healthy humans 
(Valentin et al., 2007; Tanaka et al., 2008; Gläscher et al., 2009) have shown that 
dorsomedial striatum as well as vmPFC are implicated in goal-directed actions. 
On the other hand, dorsolateral striatum has been shown to contribute to habitual 
responses (de Wit et al., 2012). Building on this evidence, in this study we tested 
whether inter-individual variation in the strength of anatomical connectivity 
within those frontostriatal circuits predicts the relative contribution of model-free 
and model-based systems to human choice. We hypothesized that inter-subject 
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variability in the relative balance between model-based and model-free control 
depends on the integrity of anatomical frontostriatal connections, with the vmPFC 
and dorsomedial striatum implicated in model-based control and frontal motor 
areas and dorsolateral striatum implicated in model-free control.
Using probabilistic tractography of diffusion-tensor images (DTI), connectivity- 
based parcellation of the frontal lobe (Beckmann et al., 2009; Mars et al., 2011; 
Neubert et al., 2014), and a computationally-explicit learning model of a multistep 
decision task (Daw et al., 2011), this study mechanistically grounds the balance 
between model-free and model-based control systems into the relative strength of 
different frontostriatal loops. To anticipate the results, we found evidence that the 
structural integrity of white-matter tracts between vmPFC and medial striatum 
predicts individuals’ reliance on model-based control. By masking out bottom-up 
tracts, we found evidence that top-down afferences from the vmPFC to the medial 
striatum determine the relative contribution of model-based control during 
decision- making. 
Methods
Participants
We recruited 33 healthy volunteers. All participants gave informed consent and 
the study was approved by the local ethics committee. All participants underwent 
two separate sessions, a diffusion-weighted magnetic resonance imaging scan; and 
a behavioral session during which subjects were tested on the multistep decision 
task used previously to quantify model-based and model-free components of 
instrumental actions in humans (Daw et al., 2011) (Figure 1A). Two participants 
quit the study after the first session. Thus, data from 31 participants (15 men, 
22.7±2.5 mean age) were analyzed. Participants had no history of neurological and 
psychiatric disorders.
Task
On each trial of the task, subjects first made a choice between two fractal stimuli 
leading to one of the two different second-stage sets represented by different 
colors. Participants then made another choice between two stimuli presented in 
the second-stage set. Each stimulus at the second-stage was associated with a 
specific probability of delivering a monetary reward. Similar to previous studies 
with this task (Daw et al., 2011; Smittenaar et al., 2013), the probabilities of 
delivering reward changed independently and slowly based on a Gaussian random 
walk to motivate participants to continue learning throughout the task. Critically, 
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each choice at the first stage led predominantly (70%) to one of the two sets at the 
second stage (common transition), and less frequently (30%) to the other set (rare 
transition). This feature of the task allowed us to distinguish contribution of 
model-based and model-free in choices. The task consisted of 201 trials.  
Behavioural analysis 
Logistic regression was used to analyze responses at the first level of the task 
independently for each participant. The multistep task has a 2x2 factorial design, 
where the factors are transition (common or rare) and reward delivery on the 
previous trial (rewarded or unrewarded). Thus, first-stage choices, encoded as 
binary stay/switch responses, were regressed against four predictors: main effects 
of the two factors, interaction effect of the two factors and an intercept representing 
the tendency to stay with the same choice regardless of transition and reinforcement 
factors (stickiness). Logistic regression was performed separately for each subject 
using MATLAB Statistics toolbox (glmfit routine). The degree of model-free and 
model-based deployment were quantified as the main effect of reward delivery 
and the interaction effect between reward delivery and transition, respectively.
Computational modelling
We also fitted data to reinforcement learning models previously suggested to 
account for choices in this task (Daw et al., 2011). Thus, we fitted a reinforcement 
learning model-free algorithm, a reinforcement learning model-based algorithm 
and a hybrid account which assumes that choices at the first-level are generated 
based on the weighted combination of values from these two reinforcement 
learning models. 
The task has three distinct states corresponding to the three sets of fractal stimuli: 
the first-stage state, sA, and two second-stage states, sB and sc. On each trial, t, 
subjects see a first-stage state, s1,t (=sA), in which action a1,t is taken. This is followed 
by a second-stage state, s2,t (either sB or sC) in which action a2,t is taken. 
A model-free agent estimates a value function for each state-action pair. Thus, a 
prediction error, δi,t, is computed and used to update value of the corresponding 
state-action: QMF(si,t , ai,t) QMF(si,t , ai,t) + αi δi,t , where δi,t=ri,t+QMF(si+1,t , ai+1,t)- QMF(si,t , ai,t) 
is the prediction error at each stage and αi is the learning rate parameter at either 
stage. Note that for first-stage choices, there is no direct reinforcement (r1,t=0) and 
for the second-stage choice, QMF(s3,t , a3,t)=0, since there is no following state. The first- 
stage state-action value is also updated using an eligibility trace parameter, λ, 
to capture immediate effects of second-stage reinforcement on the first-stage state: 
QMF(s1,t , a1,t) QMF(s1,t , a1,t) + α1 λδ2,t . 
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A model-based agent takes into account transition probabilities to estimate the 
value of actions. Thus, this algorithm calculates the first-stage action based on the 
transition maps. Because the nature of the transition matrix (i.e. existence of rare 
and common transitions) is instructed, similar to Daw et al. (Daw et al., 2011), it is 
assumed that subjects choose between two possibilities: whether sB is the 
second-stage set commonly associated with action aA at first-stage, or vice versa 
that sC is the one commonly associated with action aA at first-stage. Without loss of 
generality, similar to Daw et al. (2011), we assume that probability of common and 
rare transitions are 0.7 and 0.3, respectively; if these are changed, other parameters 
of the model will rescale to give the same likelihood (Daw et al., 2011). Therefore, 
the model-based values of first-stage actions are computed as follows:
Q MB(s A,aj)=P(sB|aj)QMF(sB,a max )+ P(sC|aj)QMF(sC,amax), 
where amax is the action in the corresponding state that maximized QMF at the 
second-stage. Since the second-stage states are terminal states, model-based value 
of actions at the second-stage is assumed to be equal to that of model-free.
Finally, the hybrid account computed a weighted average of action value of 
model-based with that of model-free: Qhybrid=wQ MB+(1-w)Q MF, where 0<w<1 is a 
weight parameter. Higher values of w are associated with higher degree of 
model-based (and lower degree of model-free) influences on choice. For w=0 and w=1, 
the hybrid account is equivalent to pure model-free and pure model-based, 
respectively. A softmax transformation was then used to generate probability of 
choice for all models based on distinct decision noise parameters for each stage, βi, 
and a perseveration parameter, φ, which captures first-stage perseveration or 
switching tendency in choices regardless of action values (Lau and Glimcher, 
2005).
Model fitting and model selection
We estimated parameters of each model separately for each participant using 
non-linear derivative-based optimization algorithm as implemented in fminunc 
tool in MATLAB (©Mathwork). All three models have second-stage learning rate, 
α2, two decision noise parameters, β1 and β2, and the perseveration parameter, φ. 
The model-free and hybrid accounts have two additional parameters for updating 
actions values at the first-stage, α1 and λ. The hybrid model has one key weighting 
parameter, w, for combining action-values of model-based and model-free at 
the first-stage. Four parameters, α1, α2, λ and w are bounded between 0 and 1. 
The decision noise parameters are bounded to positive values. 
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For bounded parameters of each model, we fitted parameters in the infinite 
real-space of Gaussian distribution parameter values and transformed them before 
feeding them into the models using appropriate transformation functions (sigmoid 
for parameters bounded between 0 and 1; exponential for parameters > 0). This 
method enabled us to employ unconstrained optimization techniques that are 
usually more robust than constrained ones. Similar methods have been adopted 
for fitting reinforcement learning models to choice data in this task (e.g. in 
Wunderlich et al., 2012b). A wide Gaussian prior, Normal(0,10), was assumed for all 
parameters (with zero mean and a broad variance of 10). Free parameters of each 
model were estimated to maximize log-likelihood of data plus log-prior (maximum 
a posteriori), where the likelihood is defined across both first-stage and second-stage 
choices, similar to previous works on this task (Daw et al., 2011). The prior 
distributions of parameters used in this study were broader than those of Daw 
et al. (2011).
We computed model-evidence for every model and every subject using Laplace 
approximation (MacKay, 2003), which penalizes complexity of the model by 
integrating out the free parameters. We then used the approximated model 
evidence to perform a random-effect Bayesian model comparison across all 
participants, a procedure which takes the model identity as random-, in contrast 
to fixed-, effect (Rigoux et al., 2014). We also used the approximated model evidence 
to compare models for each subject separately. For this analysis, a log-Bayes- 
factor>3 was considered as significant because the corresponding Bayes factor is 
more than 20 (cf. the classical p<.05 criterion). The log-Bayes-factor>2.3 was also 
considered as trend towards significance because it corresponds to p<0.1.
Data acquisition and image processing
Structural and diffusion images were collected using a 3-Tesla Siemens magnetic 
resonance imaging scanner. T1-weighted high resolution MP-RAGE structural 
image was collected (voxel size =1mm isotropic, GRAPPA acceleration factor 2). DTI 
scanning was performed with the following parameters: 64 slices interleaved 
acquisition mode (TE/TR = 89/6700 ms, flip angle = 90, FOV = 220 mm, voxel size = 
2.2mm isotropic). DTI scans consisted of 7 scans without diffusion weighting 
(b = 0) and 61 scans with diffusion weighting (b = 1000 s/mm2) applied along the 
non-colinear directions.
All DTI preprocessing were conducted using FSL tools. Preprocessing of DTI data 
was performed based on the standard FSL protocol. BET was used to automatically 
extract brains from T1 (Smith, 2002) and images were manually checked for all 
samples and re-extracted if not successful. FNIRT was used for non-linear 
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registration of structural images to standard template (Jenkinson et al., 2012). 
Registered images were manually checked and FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001; 
Jenkinson et al., 2002) was used for registration of structural images in four 
subjects where FNIRT was not successful. FDT was used to correct the DTI data 
for head movement and eddy current correction, brain extraction and tensor 
model fitting. The diffusion parameters were then sampled for each voxel using 
BEDPOSTX (Behrens et al., 2007a). 
Imaging analysis pipeline
The goal of this study was to investigate the relationship between behavioural 
indices of model-based/model-free control quantified by the multistep decision 
task and anatomical circuitry connecting the striatum to the frontal cortex using 
DTI and probabilistic tractography. To quantify frontostriatal structural connectivity, 
we employed a fully automated procedure to compute connectivity maps between 
the striatum and the frontal cortex. To achieve this, we first performed a 
parcellation of frontal cortex based on its connectivity with the striatum. This 
analysis resulted in 5 clusters (see below for details). Next, connectivity between 
each striatal voxel and each of the five frontal clusters was computed. This resulted 
in 5 connectivity images per subject, quantifying connectivity between each 
striatal voxel and the 5 frontal clusters. 
Striatum-based parcellation of frontal cortex
First, we created a striatal mask in MNI space using the Harvard-Oxford subcortical 
atlas. The MNI frontal lobe mask was used for frontal cortex. For computational 
feasibility, the frontal mask was re-sampled to 4mm isotropic voxel size. These 
masks were then transformed to each participant’s native diffusion space using 
registration wrap images and matrices computed during preprocessing. Probabilistic 
tractography was then performed in native diffusion space using PROBTRACX 
(Behrens et al., 2007a), where tracts seeded from every voxel within the frontal 
lobe and its connectivity with all striatal voxels was quantified in each participant 
(Behrens et al., 2007a). This procedure computes a connectivity matrix, which 
characterizes every voxel within the frontal lobe based on its connectivity pattern 
with striatal voxels. The connectivity matrix was used to generate a symmetric 
cross-correlation matrix, which reflects the correlation in connectivity fingerprint 
of frontal voxels. This cross-correlation matrix was then subjected to K-means 
clustering, a well-known algorithm for clustering used previously for parcellation 
of brain regions (Beckmann et al., 2009; Mars et al., 2011; Neubert et al., 2014; 
Piray et al., 2015), to identify voxels sharing similar striatum-connectivity profiles. 
Since the correct number of frontal clusters is unknown, we performed a stability 
analysis to identify the most consistent and coherent number of clusters (see below 
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for mathematical definition). Subjects were randomly divided into two groups and 
a series of parcellation into 2 to 8 clusters was carried out separately for each 
group. The clustering solutions based on data from two groups were then compared 
to examine their consistency as a function of number of clusters. This procedure 
was repeated for 100 randomly division of subjects to two groups and used to 
obtain a stability index.  Tractography was performed separately for the right and 
left hemispheres.
Stability analysis of parcellation solution
To ensure that the parcellation scheme is robust at the between-subject level, we 
performed a stability analysis, which identifies the largest number of clusters 
resulting in a significantly robust clustering solution. To achieve this, we assessed 
whether two clustering solutions calculated based on two independent datasets 
(e.g. by dividing subjects randomly to two groups) were matched. Here, we provide 
a mathematical explanation of our approach (copied from Appendix 1 in Piray 
et al. (2015)):
Two sets of clusters (A and B, each with K clusters) were defined as matched based 
on the following criteria: First, for every cluster in A and every cluster in B, an 
overlap index was defined, which corresponds to the number of voxels that overlap 
between the two clusters. Specifically, for every cluster ai in A and every cluster bj 
in B, the overlap index was defined as Ni,j/min(Ni ,Nj), where Ni, Nj and Ni,j are the 
number of voxels in ai, bj and their intersection, respectively. Next, for every 
cluster a i in A, bj in B was defined as matched if it had the largest overlap index 
with ai. Finally, A and B were considered as matched if each cluster in A was 
matched with one and only one cluster in B; and vice versa if each cluster in B was 
matched with one and only one cluster in A. This procedure also gives a one-to-one 
mapping between “labels” of clusters in A and B, regardless of anatomical location 
of voxels.  
Connectivity maps between the striatum and frontal clusters
Having established the target frontal regions, probabilistic tractography (using 
PROBTRACKX tool in FSL) was seeded from each voxel in the striatum with the five 
identified clusters as targets (using the classification mask option in PROBTRACKX). 
This procedure created five images, one for each frontal target, of probability 
values where each voxel value corresponds to the number of pathways that begins 
at that voxel and ends in the target region. Tractography was performed separately 
for the right and left hemispheres. All maps were smoothed with a 6mm Gaussian 
kernel.
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We also a performed an analysis to make inference on the anatomical directionality 
of tracts, which masks out those tracts passing through the thalamus. For this 
analysis, the JHU atlas was used to create a mask of the anterior limb of the internal 
capsule (Oishi et al., 2010). We used this mask as an exclusion mask and re- 
performed probabilistic tractography analysis to assess connectivity between the 
striatum and the frontal clusters. Therefore, this analysis simulates a lesion in 
anterior limb of the internal capsule, thereby discarding all fibers running from 
the striatum to frontal lobe along the striatal-thalamo-cortical pathway.
Statistical analysis
We then investigated whether behavioral indices of model-based and model-free 
control could be predicted by frontostriatal connectivity maps computed in the 
previous steps. Since tract strength values are non-normally distributed, non- 
parametric analysis (rank correlation) was performed using tools from FSL software 
(FSL Randomize with 5000 permutation tests) (Winkler et al., 2014). Threshold-free 
cluster enhancement (TFCE), as implemented in FSL (Smith and Nichols, 2009), was 
used to boost signal in areas that exhibit spatial clustering (with variance 
smoothing kernel of 6). All resulting statistical maps were corrected (p<.05) at the 
voxel level, separately for the left and right striatum, for family-wise error due to 
multi-voxel comparisons. All reported coordinates are the MNI coordinates. 
Results
Behavioral data
The critical feature of the multistep decision task is the probabilistic nature of the 
transition from the first to the second-stage set. Each first-stage choice led 
predominantly (70%) to one of the two second-stage sets (common transition), and 
less frequently (30%) to the other set (rare transition) (Figure 1A). Model-based and 
model-free accounts make different predictions about participants’ choices in ra-
re-transition trials. A model-based system reinforces the first-stage choice 
predominantly associated with the rewarded second-stage choice, which results in 
decreasing the probability of choosing the first-stage action that is ultimately 
rewarded after rare transitions (Figure 1B, left). In contrast, a model-free system is 
blind to transition probabilities and therefore reinforces those first-stage choices 
ultimately rewarded regardless of the transition (Figure 1B, middle). Therefore, 
one can model the probability of repeating the first stage choice on the subsequent 
trial (stay probability) as a function of two key events on the current trial. The two 
key events are whether or not reward was delivered, and whether or not the 
transition was common or rare. Model-free and model-based components of 
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Figure 1 Task setup, model predictions, and behavioral data. A) Task setup: Participants 
chose between two fractal stimuli, which led probabilistically to one of the two different 
second-stage sets. B) Model predictions and observed behavior. Left: if choice were completely 
controlled by the model-based system, the first-stage choice predominantly associated with 
the rewarded second-stage choice would be reinforced; Middle: if choice were completely 
controlled by the model-free system, then repeating the first-stage choice in the subsequent 
trial (stay-probability) is a function of reward delivery regardless of the transition occurred. 
Right: data averaged over all subjects shows signature of both systems. The analysis of 
stay probability data revealed a significant main effect of reward delivery (i.e. model-free 
signature) as well as an interaction between reward delivery and transition (i.e. model-based 
signature). C) Individual variability in the reliance on the model-based system. Subjects are 
sorted in descending order based on reward-by-transition interaction effect, which is an 
index of model-based control in the task. In half of participants, the hallmark of model-based 
control is clearly observable. However the other half of participants shows no evidence of 
reliance on the model-based strategy. Insets: Mean stay probabilities as a function of reward 
and transition. Bottom left inset plot shows the data from the median-split half of individuals 
with a large reward-by-transition effect; the top right inset plot shows the data from the 
median split half of individuals with a small reward-by-transition effect. Error-bars reflect 
standard error of the mean.
A
B
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behavior could then be quantified as the main effect of reward and the interaction 
effect of reward and transition, respectively. 
Across participants, the presence of reward increased the probability of repeating 
the first-stage choice (main effect of reward, F(1,30)=28.53, p<0.001), an indication 
that model-free control influenced participants’ choices (Figure 1B). Additionally, 
the type of transition also affected first-stage choices (reward-by-transition 
interaction, F(1,30)=8.29, p=0.007), an indication that model-based control also 
influenced participants’ choices (Figure 1B). There was no main effect of transition 
on choice (F(1,30)=0.21, p=0.65), as predicted by both model-based and model-free 
accounts. There was a significant positive intercept (F(1,30)=77.14, p<0.001), 
indicating a tendency to implement the choice made on the previous trial 
regardless of reward delivery and transition (Lau and Glimcher, 2005). Table 1 
summarizes the result of this analysis.
Next, we elaborated on this factorial group-level analysis by considering the whole 
history of rewards obtained prior to a given trial, and by considering individual- 
level data. This was achieved with a Bayesian model selection procedure comparing 
the fit of the behavioral data to the predictions of three different models. The first 
model was a hybrid reinforcement learning model previously used to account for 
Figure 1 Continued.
C
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choices in this task (Daw et al., 2011). The hybrid model combines learned values of 
model-based and model-free strategies on a trial-by-trial basis and employs their 
combination for action selection. The other two models were pure model-free and 
pure model-based accounts. Across the group, random-effect Bayesian model 
selection (Rigoux et al., 2014) indicated that the hybrid account provides the most 
parsimonious model given the population-level data (exeedance probability of 
1.0, expected posterior model probability of 0.94; Table 2). At the individual level, 
pair-wise comparison between the hybrid and model-based accounts revealed 
that the hybrid account significantly outperformed the model-based account in 
31 out of 31 participants (log-Bayes-factor>3.0, Table 2), while a similar pair-wise 
comparison between the hybrid and the model-free account revealed that hybrid 
outperformed model-free account only in 6 out of 31 participants (log-Bayes- 
factor>3.0). The latter finding is not driven by a particular statistical threshold: 
relaxing the log-Bayes-factor to 2.3 (corresponding to p<0.1 in frequentist statistics) 
leads to the hybrid account providing a better fit than the model-free account in 
12 out of 31 participants. The finding is also graphically confirmed by ranking 
participants according to their reward-by-transition interaction effect in the 
factorial analysis: whereas the signature of the model-based strategy was not 
evident in half of subjects, it was clearly seen in the other half (Figure 1C). These 
findings suggest that the participants consistently used model-free control, 
whereas the use of model-based control varied across the sample. 
Table 1   Logistic regression analysis of behavioral data. Mean estimate  
of regression coefficients and their standard error (SE) are shown 
(arbitrary unit).
Effects Estimate (SE) P-value
Reward 0.32 (0.06) <0.001
Transition -0.03 (0.06) 0.65
Reward x transition 0.24 (0.08) 0.007
Intercept 1.31 (0.15) <0.001
P-values of effects across group are reported. This analysis indicates a significant effect of the reward of 
previous trial and an interaction between reward and transition of previous trial on stay probability on 
the current trial.
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Further quantitative analyses confirmed the presence of large individual differences 
in the use of model-based control in this task. Namely, the reward-by-transition 
interaction values are not normally distributed across the sample (p=0.017, 
Lilliefors test), despite its relatively large size (n=31). 
Similar set of analyses revealed individuals exhibit less variability in employing 
model-free control. First, model fits showed that all subjects employed model-free 
strategy, as the hybrid account outperformed pure model-based in all 31 participants 
significantly (Table 2). Furthermore, splitting the sample by the median value of 
reward effect shows that model-free deployment was significantly observable even 
in that half of subjects who employed model-free strategy less than the other 
half (F(1,15)=6.75, p=0.02). Finally, and in contrast to the reward -by-transition 
interaction effect, no evidence in favor of non-normal distribution of reward effect 
was found across the sample (Lilliefors test, p>.05). 
Model-based correlation with striatal anatomical connectivity
DTI data was used to define a connectivity matrix between the striatum and 
frontal cortex in each participant, in order to test whether their structural 
connectivity predicts individual differences in employing model-based control. 
The connectivity matrix was then used to parcellate frontal cortex by identifying 
voxels with a shared profile of connectivity with the striatum (Beckmann et al., 
2009; Mars et al., 2011; Neubert et al., 2014). A stability analysis was performed to 
identify the most consistent and coherent number of clusters. This stability 
analysis revealed that five clusters could be identified reliably at the group level in 
both hemispheres (Monte Carlo randomization test, p<0.001). In addition, although 
this parcellation scheme was blind to voxel location, voxels clustered into five 
Table 2   Bayesian model comparison.
Model No. free 
parameters
Exeedance 
probability
Expected 
posterior
No. favoring 
hybrid with 
LBF>3.0
No. favoring 
hybrid with 
LBF>2.3
Hybrid 7 1.0 0.94 - -
Pure model-free 6 0.0 0.03 6 12
Pure model-based 4 0.0 0.03 31 31
The hybrid model outperforms both pure model-based and pure model-free accounts based on 
random-effects Bayesian model comparison results as shown by both exceedance probability and 
expected posterior probability across models. However, large individual differences in deployment of 
model-based control are evident, as the hybrid account outperformed the pure model-free account only in 6 
subjects with log-Bayes-factor of 3.0 (cf. p<.05). Even for log-Bayes-factor of 2.3 (cf. p<.1), the hybrid model 
outperformed the pure model-free account only in 12 subjects.
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anatomically coherent parcels, which were largely symmetric across both 
hemispheres (Figure 2). There are additional medio-lateral subdivisions within 
each of the five cluster when cytoarchitecture and cortico-cortical connections are 
considered (Beckmann et al., 2009; Sallet et al., 2013; Neubert et al., 2014). However, 
since the parcellation scheme only considered fronto-striatal connectivity, the 
frontal clusters should be interpreted as cortical territories that are homogeneous 
from a striatal point of view, given DTI data. 
Figure 2 Connectivity-based parcellation of frontal cortex resulted in 5 distinct clusters 
consistently identified across participants. These clusters should be interpreted as frontal 
regions segregated according to their striatal connectivity profile. The data-driven parcellation 
(clustering procedure) was blind to the anatomical location of the frontal voxel, yet those 
voxels clustered into five anatomically coherent territories. This procedure resulted in a map 
with anteroventral to posterodorsal gradient organized in accordance with known profiles 
of frontostriatal connectivity (Draganski et al., 2008b). The map consisted of five clusters: 
a precentral cluster (in black); a posterior prefrontal cluster (in brown); a dorsal prefrontal 
cluster (in red); an anterior prefrontal cluster (in orange); and a ventromedial prefrontal cluster 
(in yellow).
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The parcellation procedure resulted in a map with anteroventral to posterodorsal 
gradient organized in accordance with known bands of frontostriatal connectivity 
(Draganski et al., 2008b; Cohen et al., 2009; Haber and Knutson, 2010). The five 
clusters included: i) a precentral cluster overlapping with motor areas of the 
frontal lobe such as frontal operculum cortex and precentral gyrus; ii) a posterior 
prefrontal cluster including pre-supplementary motor area and posterior parts of 
superior- and middle- frontal gyrus; iii) a dorsal prefrontal cluster including a 
large portion of inferior frontal gyrus and anterior parts of middle- and superior- 
frontal gyrus. This dorsal prefrontal cluster also overlapped with posterior parts 
of anterior cingulate gyrus and paracingulate gyrus; iv) an anterior prefrontal 
cluster including the most anterior part of the paracingulate and anterior 
cingulate gyrus as well as dorsal parts of frontal pole; v) a vmPFC cluster including 
frontal orbital cortex and ventral parts of frontal pole. 
The degree of model-based strategy deployment, quantified in each participant as 
the reward-by-transition interaction effect, was significantly associated with the 
strength of connectivity between the vmPFC cluster and the medial striatum 
(p<0.05, FWE corrected; Figure 3A; local maximum within the left striatum x=-20, 
y=6, z=-6, local maximum within the right striatum x=20, y=2, z=-6). Individuals 
relying more on model-based control had stronger structural connectivity between 
the vmPFC cluster and the medial striatum. This effect was anatomically specific: 
No significant correlation was found between model-based control and striatal 
connectivity with the other frontal clusters. Furthermore, the effect was not 
driven by strong between-clusters inhomogeneities in connectivity variance: The 
maximum standard deviations across all striatal voxels for each map were 
comparable, with the anterior prefrontal cluster, the dorsal prefrontal cluster and 
the posterior prefrontal cluster showing larger variability across participants 
than the vmPFC cluster. 
Similar results were obtained when the degree of model-based strategy deployment 
was indexed with the weighting parameter, w, of the hybrid model (Figure 3C). 
Higher values of w, corresponding to higher degree of model-based control, 
are associated with stronger connectivity between vmPFC and medial striatum 
(significant in the left striatum, p<0.05, FWE-corrected; local maximum x=-26, 
y=-8, z=-4). This was expected, as the weighting parameter was strongly correlated 
with the degree of model-based quantified as reward-by-transition interaction 
effect in the factorial model (r=0.64, p=0.0001). 
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DTI does not provide directional information, but the anatomical organization of 
the fronto-striatal circuits allows one to examine whether the effect described 
above is driven by direct projections from vmPFC to medial striatum, or by thalamus- 
mediated connections from medial striatum to vmPFC. Accordingly, we performed 
another tractography analysis, by masking out tracts passing through the 
thalamus, to make inference on the anatomical directionality of the effects. This 
analysis revealed effects similar to those reported above (Figure 3B, p<0.05, FWE 
Figure 3 Individual differences in model-based control were predicted by anatomical 
connectivity strength between the vmPFC cluster and the striatum. Maps represent pseudo 
t-statistics from non-parametric correlation analysis. All maps are thresholded at p<0.05, 
familywise error corrected. A) Connectivity between the vmPFC cluster and the bilateral 
striatum predicts individual differences in model-based control, as indexed by reward-by- 
transition effect shown in Figure 1C. The effects are present in the medial striatum, particularly 
the left medial caudate nucleus and bilateral dorsal anterior putamen. B) The same 
effects are present even when those tracts running from the striatum to the frontal cortex 
through thalamus were discarded, suggesting that effects are, at least partly, driven by top-
down afferences from the vmPFC to the striatum. C) Similar correlation was found when 
we considered the weight parameter, w, of the hybrid model as the degree of model-based 
influences. D) Rank scatter-plot from panel A, separately for the left and right hemisphere 
tracts, averaged over all voxels showing significant correlation.
A
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corrected; local maximum within the left striatum x=-20, y=6, z=-6; local 
maximum within the right striatum x=24, y=2, z=-8), suggesting that those effects 
are largely driven by top-down afferences from the vmPFC to the medial striatum. 
The complementary control analysis, seeding tractography from the anterior limb 
of internal capsule while excluding all striatal voxels, did not reveal significant 
effect even at a very lenient statistical threshold (p<0.1 uncorrected for multiple 
comparisons). This control analysis provides a complementary, although negative 
proof that the effects of cortico-striatal connectivity on model-based control are 
driven by top-down connections from the vmPFC to the striatum.
We also performed a similar analysis to assess whether individual differences in 
model-free deployment, quantified as the main effect of reward in the task, could 
be predicted by the strength of connectivity between the striatum and the 
precentral/posterior prefrontal clusters. There was no significant correlation 
between the magnitude of model-free control and the strength of the connectivity 
between those frontal clusters with the striatum. A post-hoc analysis extending 
this approach to the remaining frontal clusters revealed a significant negative 
correlation between right medial caudate nucleus and the dorsal prefrontal cluster 
(p<.05, FWE-corrected; local maximum x=10, y=8, z=2). Individuals with a higher 
degree of model-free strategy deployment had lower structural connectivity 
between the right dorsal prefrontal and the right medial caudate nucleus. 
Based on animal and human literature on goal-directed and habitual behavioral 
control, we hypothesized that connectivity between the frontal cortex and the 
striatum predicts individual differences in model-based control. However, recent 
studies have suggested that there are other regions implicated in model-based 
control. Specifically, it has been hypothesized that model-based control might 
implicate the amygdala, hippocampus, lateral prefrontal cortex and/or the default 
model network (Doll et al., 2012; Daw and Dayan, 2014; Dayan and Berridge, 2014). 
Therefore, we performed an exploratory analysis to test whether the connectivity 
between the vmPFC cluster and these regions are correlated with the degree of 
model-based control. These regions were defined according to Harvard-Oxford 
atlas, except the lateral prefrontal cortex which is defined according to diffu-
sion-based connectivity-parcellation of human dorsal prefrontal cortex (cluster 6 
in (Sallet et al., 2013). These atlases are available in FSL.
We found marginal effects in a few voxels in the left posterior cingulate cortex, a 
hub of the default mode network. The connectivity between vmPFC and the left 
posterior cingulate was positively associated with the degree of model-based 
control (FWE<0.05; peak at x=-4, y = -41, z= 38, corrected p-value in peak, p=0.048).
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Model-based association with white matter bundles
Probabilistic tractography estimates the probability distribution of the parameters 
of a crossing fiber model of diffusion magnetic resonance imaging data. The tensor 
model is a simpler model of diffusion magnetic resonance imaging (Basser et al., 
1994), which provides a scalar measure, referred to as fractional anisotropy, that 
has been related to white matter microstructure integrity (Song et al., 2003). Here, 
we employ tract-based spatial statistics (Smith et al., 2006) to test whether the 
association between model-based behavior and vmPFC tract strength, as revealed 
by probabilistic tractography, is accompanied by an association between 
model-based behavior and tract integrity, as quantified using fractional anisotropy. 
To this end, we performed voxel-wise correlation analyses of the skeletonised 
fractional anisotropy data, focusing on four major white matter bundles shown to 
carry tracts originating from the vmPFC (Lehman et al., 2011; Jbabdi et al., 2013): 
the uncinate fascicle, the corpus callosum, the superior longitudinal fascicle and 
the cingulum bundle. All these masks were created based on JHU white-matter 
atlases (Wakana et al., 2007; Hua et al., 2008). This analysis revealed a significant 
correlation between tract integrity in the cingulum bundle and the degree of 
model-based control (p<0.05, family-wise error corrected; local maximum x= -19, 
y= -36, z= +34). No significant correlation was found in other masks. 
However, the interpretability of results obtained using the tensor model of 
diffusion data in regions with crossing-fibers has been questioned by many authors 
(Tournier et al., 2004; Parker and Alexander, 2005; Behrens et al., 2007a; Jbabdi et 
al., 2010). One solution to this issue is to use tract-based spatial statistics with 
measurements from models dissociating different fibers in different directions 
(Jbabdi et al., 2010), such as bedpostX (Behrens et al., 2007a). Therefore, we repeated 
the above analysis with partial volume fraction values estimated along with the 
first fiber orientation quantified by bedpostX. We found very similar results, with 
highly significant correlation between tract integrity voxels in the cingulum 
bundle and model-based scores (p<0.05, family-wise error corrected; Figure 4A; 
local maximum x= -7, y= +5, z = +32), but not in other masks. These effects survived 
correction for comparison in multiple masks too. Thus, participants with higher 
tract integrity in the cingulum bundle showed higher degree of model-based 
behavior in the task (Figure 4B). 
One question raised by this analysis is whether the brain-behavior correlation 
with tracts connecting the vmPFC with the striatum (Figure 3) is mediated by 
tracts passing through the cingulum bundle. To assess this, we repeated our 
original probabilistic tractography analysis of connectivity between the striatum 
and the vmPFC cluster and used the cingulum bundle as an inclusion mask. This 
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analysis discards all the tracts do not pass through the cingulum bundle. We found 
that the strength of tracts between vmPFC and a dorsomedial striatal region, 
passing through the cingulum bundle, is significantly associated with the degree 
of model-based control (p<0.05, FWE corrected; Figure 4C; local maximum within 
the left striatum x=-13, y=14, z=-6, local maximum within the right striatum x=8, 
y=8, z=-4). 
Following a reviewer’s comment, we have also performed voxel-based morphometry 
(Ashburner and Friston, 2000) analysis to assess whether individual variability in 
Figure 4 Individual differences in model-based control were predicted by anatomical 
connectivity strength, quantified using fractional anisotropy, in the white matter voxels of the 
cingulum bundle. A) voxels in the cingulum bundle showing a significant positive correlation 
with the degree of model-based control in the task. B) Rank scatter-plot from A, averaged over 
all voxels showing significant correlation.  C) Individual differences in model-based control 
were predicted by anatomical connectivity strength between the vmPFC cluster and the 
striatum, when only tracts passing through the cingulum bundle are included in the analysis. 
These results suggest that the association between the vmPFC and the striatum (Figure 3) is 
mediated, at least partly, by individual differences in the integrity of the cingulum white 
matter bundle. Note that for better visualization in panel A, voxels are dilated (thickened) into 
local tracts and overlaid on the white matter skeleton template.
A
C
B
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model-based control is also associated with individual variability in grey matter 
density in the vmPFC cluster and/or the striatum, using tools implemented in 
SPM8 software (Ashburner and Friston, 2000; Ashburner, 2007). Whole-brain 
analysis revealed no significant association, even at the lenient threshold of 
p<0.001 uncorrected. Further region-of-interest analyses in the vmPFC and the 
striatum revealed no significant correlation either at the voxel-level (family-wise 
error corrected, p<0.05) or at the cluster-level (not even when we used p<0.01 as 
uncorrected p-value for cluster-level inference). These analyses suggest that the 
correlation between model-based control and vmPFC-striatum tract strength is 
not accompanied by a similar correlation with grey matter density. 
Discussion
In this study, we tested the hypothesis that the relative contribution of model-based 
and model-free control systems to decision making depends on the relative 
strength of anatomical connectivity within frontostriatal circuits involved in 
learning and behavioral control. We exploited the presence of large and systematic 
inter-individual differences in the use of model-based control during instrumental 
actions (Figure 1, (Daw et al., 2011)). This study shows that the use of model-based 
control is predicted by neuroanatomical differences in the structural coherence of 
white-matter tracts from the vmPFC to the medial striatum. The finding indicates 
that individuals with more coherent afferences from vmPFC to medial striatum 
are more likely to rely on a model-based system to control their instrumental 
actions. Furthermore, an analysis based on making out of bottom-up tracts 
suggests that this effect is driven by top-down influences from vmPFC to medial 
striatum. These findings extend and qualify previous knowledge on how the 
control of goal-directed behaviour is neuronally implemented through the 
vmPFC-striatal circuitry (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Corbit and Balleine, 2003; 
Yin et al., 2005; Valentin et al., 2007; Tanaka et al., 2008; Gläscher et al., 2009). 
Ventromedial prefrontal and striatal contributions to goal-directed 
behavior
Previous work has suggested that, when goal-directed and habit-based control 
compete, model-based and model-free strategies are computed in the caudate 
nucleus and in the posterior putamen, respectively, while the vmPFC integrates 
those computations (Wunderlich et al., 2012a). The pattern of behavioral and 
cerebral inter-individual differences observed in the present study suggests a 
different neurocognitive architecture. The present findings show that the vmPFC 
biases the balance between model-free and model-based control. The bias is 
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implemented by modulating participants’ reliance on model-based control 
through cortico-striatal projections from the vmPFC to the caudate nucleus. This 
architecture fits well with a recent hierarchical model of action control, in which 
shifting from model-free to model-based control is itself a goal-directed decision 
controlled by a model-based system (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013; Daw and Dayan, 
2014). For instance, the pattern of vmPFC activity reported in Wunderlich et al. 
(2012a) could reflect the implementation of goal-directed choices between 
performing overtrained stimulus-response associations (presumably model-free) 
and navigating a complex decision-tree (presumably model-based). The present 
findings also fit with the notion that vmPFC contributes to decision making by 
encoding an abstract, cognitive map of task space (Wilson et al., 2014). The 
multi-step decision task used here is designed to make participants choose between 
options followed by unobservable probabilistic transitions between states (Daw et 
al., 2011). By providing an explicit computational account on how those choices are 
biased towards model-free or model-based control systems, the present study 
extends previous reports linking vmPFC-caudate nucleus connectivity to flexible 
goal-directed control (de Wit et al., 2012). In that study, “slips of actions” were used 
to quantify habitual responses, but this behavioral outcome does not precisely 
capture the relative balance between model-based and model-free control (Dolan 
and Dayan, 2013). Here, we show that the vmPFC biases the relative contribution of 
model-based and model-free systems, as implemented in the caudate nucleus, on 
the basis of a cognitive map of task-space.
Model-based control has previously been shown to vary with state factors, such as 
stress (Otto et al., 2013b), working memory capacity (Otto et al., 2013a) and 
dopamine synthesis capacity in the striatum (Deserno et al., 2015). In prior work, 
we have shown that fronto-striatal tract strength can predict dopamine’s effect on 
cognitive control and frontostriatal functioning (van Schouwenburg et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, it is possible that the correlation between model-based control and 
individual differences in the strength of the vmPFC-striatum tract, observed here, 
reflects differential sensitivity to dopamine-related states, such as stress and 
working memory. Another indirect evidence comes from studies showing that 
vmPFC response to reward is related to state stress levels (Treadway et al., 2013), 
and studies showing that prefrontal-dorsomedial striatal structural connectivity, 
measured using DTI, predicts individual differences in reward dependence (Cohen 
et al., 2009). This hypothesis can be tested in future studies, combining DTI with 
an interventional (psychopharmacological or stress-induction) approach. 
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Implications for psychiatric disorders
Disruption of the balance between goal-directed and habitual modes of behavioral 
control might account for several impulsive/compulsive psychiatric disorders, 
such as impulse control disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, obesity, and 
drug addiction (Brewer and Potenza, 2008; Belin et al., 2013; Smith and Robbins, 
2013; Gillan and Robbins, 2014). For instance, it has been recently shown that 
compulsive disorders are associated with a bias towards model-free control, at the 
expenses of reduced model-based control (Voon et al., 2014). The present findings 
raise the possibility that this pathological bias might be mechanistically 
implemented through altered anatomical connectivity between vmPFC and the 
caudate nucleus. 
Interpretational issues
In this study, we exploited the presence of large individual differences in 
model-based control and investigated whether these differences could be predicted 
by neuroanatomical differences in fronto-striatal circuitry. This approach builds 
on previous reports showing that subjects’ behavior is stable across repetitions of 
this task (Wunderlich et al., 2012b; Smittenaar et al., 2013). For example, 
Wunderlich and colleagues conducted a within-subject study in which subjects 
received levodopa and placebo in two sessions and were tested in the same 
paradigm used in this study (Wunderlich et al., 2012b). They found no evidence in 
favor of different performance, either in stay probability or parameter fits, across 
sessions. Similar observations have been reported in other within-subject studies 
that used the same multistep decision paradigm (Smittenaar et al., 2013). 
The multistep decision task used in this study manipulated the value of actions, 
while the transition probabilities of the task were fixed. Therefore, it was not 
possible to dissociate two important aspects of model-based control, namely 
learning the value of the task actions and learning a model of the task environment. 
In the present study, a post-hoc analysis revealed that structural connectivity 
between the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the right caudate nucleus is 
negatively correlated with reliance on model-free control. Accordingly, it has been 
shown that interference with the same portion of the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex shifts the balance of the two systems towards model-based control 
(Smittenaar et al., 2013). Future studies challenging participants to learn multiple 
models of the task environment might be able to expand on the notion that the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with learning probabilities of state 
transitions (Gläscher et al., 2010), and show how this region interacts with the 
vmPFC-caudate circuit when goal-directed model-based actions are generated.
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It might be argued that this study failed to isolate a structural counterpart to 
participants’ reliance on habits, despite evidence linking structural connectivity 
between posterior putamen and premotor cortex to habitual responses (de Wit et al., 
2012). In fact, there are important differences between the habitual responses 
considered by de Wit et al. (2012), and the model-free actions elicited by the current 
multistep decision task. In contrast to habitual “slips of actions”, the current 
model-free actions remain sensitive to reinforcements, but are blind to architecture 
of states in the environment. Furthermore, the responses performed in the multistep 
decision task had no consistent spatial mapping, as choices were randomized 
across trials. It remains to be seen whether other forms of model-free learning, 
such as action-sequence learning directly linking stimuli to sequences of actions 
(Dezfouli et al., 2014), might be suitable for capturing habitual responses.
There are important anatomical and functional differences between lateral and 
medial portions of each of the five frontal clusters considered in this study 
(Rushworth et al., 2011, 2012). Future studies might be able to test whether and 
how those differences, largely determined on the basis of cytoarchitectonic features 
and cortico-cortical connectivity, are also relevant for understanding the relation 
between fronto-striatal connectivity and model-based control. 
Conclusion
This study investigated neural sources of individual differences in the computational 
bases of human choice by linking parameters of a normative learning model to 
structural cerebral features. The evidence indicates that a circuit connecting 
vmPFC to the medial striatum predicts inter-individual differences in participants’ 
reliance on model-based control. Individuals with stronger afferences from vmPFC 
to medial striatum are more likely to rely on a model-based system when 
controlling their instrumental actions. Explaining inter-individual variability 
in model-based decisions open the way to provide a mechanistic understanding 
of pathological computational processes associated with deficits in the balance 
between the goal-directed and habitual action control (Belin et al., 2013; Voon 
et al., 2014).
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Abstract
Optimal decision-making weights information on the outcome of a choice according 
to its uncertainty, which is a function of environmental volatility. Here we test 
whether emotional cues influence experienced volatility in the environment. 
Human participants learned contingencies between visual cues, responses, and 
financial outcomes, while the emotional content of the cues and the rate of change 
of the contingencies were independently manipulated. Participants learned the task 
contingencies and distinguished between stochastic and systematic changes in the 
environment, as quantified with a Bayesian hierarchical learning model. Participants’ 
learning rates and estimated volatility are lower when actions are cued by an 
angry face than by a happy face. At the neural level, emotions bias associative 
learning by modulating activity within anterior cingulate cortex and its 
connectivity with the dorsomedial striatum. Volatility learning signals, encoded 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, are disrupted after seeing angry face cues. 
These findings characterize the computations and neural circuits influenced by 
emotion during associative learning.
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Introduction
Statistical regularities in the causal structure of the environment influence 
associative learning and choice (Yu and Dayan, 2005; Courville et al., 2006; Behrens 
et al., 2007b, 2008; Nassar et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013). To date, 
most formal learning models have focused on learning cue-action-outcome 
contingencies. For instance, the Pearce-Hall model (Pearce and Hall, 1980) proposes 
that an agent tracks associability, a time-varying metric of the degree to which a 
cue has previously resulted in a surprising outcome. The Pearce-Hall model can 
account for a number of biases, as those induced by emotions, by changing cue 
associability. However, accurate predictions and outcome maximization often 
require learning higher order statistics of the environment, such as volatility, a 
time-varying metric of systematic changes in outcome probability (Behrens et al., 
2007b). Hierarchical Bayesian theories provide formal learning models that are 
able to dissociate between stochastic and systematic changes in the environment, 
but it remains unclear whether, and at which level, emotional biases influence 
those hierarchical structures. This human functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study uses a hierarchical Bayesian learning model to understand 
which computations and which neuronal mechanisms are influenced by emotion 
during associative learning.
According to hierarchical Bayesian learning theories (Behrens et al., 2007b; Iglesias 
et al., 2013), our decisions are guided not only by the outcomes of similar decisions 
made in the past, but also by the degree to which we perceive the world as stable 
or volatile. In these models (Behrens et al., 2007b; Mathys et al., 2011), the causal 
structure of the world is inferred by constructing and updating a hierarchical 
model of its sensory inputs, and action values are updated by the product of two 
constructs: i) prediction error, representing the difference between observed 
outcome feedbacks, such as reward or punishment, and current estimate of the 
likelihood to receive such feedbacks; ii) learning rate, representing uncertainty 
about current estimation of choice value. In a stable environment, outcome feedback 
is relevant and valuable for decision making when the agent is not certain about 
estimated action value, e.g. on first exposure to that environment. As observations 
accumulate and action value estimation improves, outcome feedback becomes less 
valuable. However, if the environment changes, e.g. an action-outcome contingency 
is reversed, outcome feedback becomes valuable again, as previous action value 
estimates do not hold anymore. Hierarchical Bayesian learning keeps track of 
environment volatility, and estimates it according to estimated uncertainty and 
noise in the environment. It has been shown that, in these accounts, updating 
action values depend on estimated volatility, and that activity in the anterior 
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cingulate cortex correlates with estimated volatility (Behrens et al., 2007b, 2008). 
However, it remains unclear how emotions modulate associative learning, namely 
whether emotions influence action-value learning directly or by biasing volatility 
estimation. 
This study assesses the behavioral and cerebral effects of emotions on volatility 
tracking. We test whether emotions influence action value learning by modulating 
brain regions known to compute volatility (e.g. the anterior cingulate cortex 
(Behrens et al., 2007b, 2008)), or regions known to compute action value learning 
(e.g. the striatum (Delgado et al., 2000; Samejima et al., 2005; Schönberg et al., 
2007)). We experimentally manipulate environmental volatility and we employ a 
hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach to quantify participants’ volatility 
estimates (Behrens et al., 2007b; Mathys et al., 2011). As reinforcement learning 
theories suggest that neural substrates of learning might depend on outcome 
valence (Daw et al., 2002; Cools et al., 2011), we consider both appetitive and 
aversive emotional cues (happy/angry faces) and outcomes (monetary gains/losses), 
in a 2x2 factorial design that distinguish the effects of emotion valence and 
outcome valence.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty-five female volunteers gave written informed consent approved by the local 
ethical committee (“Comissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek” Arnhem-Nijmegen) and 
participated in the study. Exclusion criteria were claustrophobia, neurological, 
cardiovascular or psychiatric disorders, regular use of medication or psychotropic 
drugs, heavy smoking and metal parts in the body. One participant did not finish 
the experiment due to headache. Data from all other forty-four participants were 
analyzed (all right-handed, mean age of 20.7).
Experimental design
We used data from a previously published (Ly et al., 2014) probabilistic learning 
task focused on the association between emotional choice biases and individual 
differences in social avoidance. Each participant completed 480 trials of a 
probabilistic learning task in the scanner. Each trial started with a face cue (happy 
or angry) presented on a color frame indicating the type of outcome valence 
(reward or punishment) at the end of the trial. Thus, there were four trial-types in 
a 2x2 factorial design with factors emotion (happy or angry) and valence (reward 
or punishment). There were 120 trials per trial-type. Participants were instructed 
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that the combination of emotional content of the face cue and color frame 
distinguished the four trial-types and that they had to learn the optimal response 
for each of the four cue-types separately. The response-outcome contingency was 
probabilistic and independent for each trial-type. The response-outcome 
contingency was reversed several times for each trial type, resulting in different 
degree of volatility in the course of experiment, while remaining counterbalanced 
across trial types. Specifically, each participant completed three sessions, with a 
1-min break in between the sessions. Each session consisted of 160 trials, with 40 
trials per trial-type. For each trial-type within a session, the probability of a 
positive outcome given a go-response could take one of the following combinations 
in two consecutive blocks: (i) 0.5, 0.2, 0.5, 0.2; (ii) 0.5, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8; (iii) 0.5, 0.8, 0.5, 
0.8, where each session was associated with one of these combinations. The blocks 
with probability of 0.5 were short blocks with average length of 5 trials, and other 
blocks were long blocks with average length of 15 trials. 
Emotional stimuli were adult Caucasian faces from 36 models (18 men) taken from 
several databases (Ekman and Friesen, 1976; Matsumoto and Ekman, 1988; 
Lundqvist et al., 1998; Martinez, and Benavente, 1998). Model faces were trimmed 
to exclude influence from hair and non-facial contours (van Peer et al., 2007; 
Roelofs et al., 2009). Model identity was counterbalanced, such that the model 
occurred equally often for each trial-type. The color frame (yellow or grey) 
indicating the possibility of reward or punishment was also counterbalanced 
across participants. On each trial, one of the face cues was presented centrally. 
Participants were then allowed to make a response 100 ms after cue onset, where 
they were required to make either a go- or a no-go-response within 1000 ms. If no 
response was made within 1000 ms, then a no-go-response was recorded. After a 
response-outcome delay of maximally 2000 ms (depending on the response time), 
the outcome was presented for 1000 ms (+10 cents for reward, -10 cents for 
punishment, and 0 cents for omitted reward or avoided punishment). The 
inter-trial interval was jittered (2500 to 4500 ms). 
The relatively long time window for responding (1000 ms) ensured that no-go 
responses are not due to failure in making a go response. To illustrate this point, 
we tested each participant response-time separately for go-responses in every 
trial-type. This test revealed that for all participants and all trial types, 
response-time are significantly lower than 1000ms window (t-test, all P-values<10-10). 
Computational models
In this section, we describe the three computational learning models compared in 
this study. A common choice model was then used in combination with each of 
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these learning models to predict the probability of each subject’s choice on trial t, 
ct , which will be presented later. All three models estimate expected outcome, xt 
on trial t according to outcomes received, ot , and some free parameters. Without 
loss of generality, the outcome is coded as one in win trials (receiving reward 
or avoiding punishment) and zero in loss trials (losing reward or receiving 
punishment). Each of these three models formalizes learning according to a 
 prediction-error rule: 
where xt is the expected value of outcome on trial t; δt is the prediction error on 
trial t and αt is the learning rate representing the degree to which the prediction 
error influences the current expected outcome. 
Rescorla-Wagner model. This model (Rescorla et al., 1972) is the simplest model 
among these three models, containing only one free parameter as constant 
learning rate, ρ, bounded in the unit range, [0 1]. The Rescorla-Wagner model 
learns the expected outcome separately for the two actions, therefore xt (ct) will be 
updated on trial t:
Therefore. for this model, αt = ρ in all trials.
Pearce-Hall model. This model estimates a dynamic learning rate using the 
absolute value of prediction error (surprise). Here, we use a variant of the Pearce- 
Hall model proposed by Li et al. (Li et al., 2011), which replaces the constant learning 
rate of the Rescorla-Wagner model with Pearce-Hall associability. The resulting 
learning rate is: 
where at is the associability on trial t. μ and ρ are constant parameters (bounded 
in the unit range) determining the step-size for updating associability and the 
scale of learning rate, respectively. Larger values of μ result in faster updating of 
associability. It is clear that the Rescorla-Wagner model is a special case of the 
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Pearce-Hall model for μ = 0. Given that in the Pearce-Hall model the learning rate 
on trial t depends on the prediction error on trial t-1, learning rate can be seen as 
a proxy of the information expected to be gained before observing outcome on 
trial t (i.e. ot), having access to the prediction error on this trial, δt. Accordingly, 
the regression analysis presented in the Results resembles a Pearce-Hall model 
when μ = 1. The initial value of associability was assumed to be one. 
Hierarchical Bayesian learning model. We employed the hierarchical Gaussian 
filter proposed by Mathys et al. (Mathys et al., 2011), which applies variational 
approximations to learn the hierarchical Bayesian learning model proposed by 
Behrens et al. (Behrens et al., 2007). A graphical illustration of this model is 
presented in Figure 1. This model tracks both volatility in addition to value and 
assumes that volatility determines the variance of value signal. More specifically, 
volatility has a Gaussian distribution given by
where η is assumed to be constant (with respect to time). The volatility modulates 
the probability of value, which is also given by a Gaussian distribution
where κ and ω are two constant parameters (with respect to time). Note that 
instead of learning reward or punishment, this model learns probabilities in the 
contingency space. We assumed only one contingency trajectory, as the outcome of 
one action (e.g. go) always predicts the potential outcome of the other action. 
Subjects were aware of this dependency as they were instructed that in each trial, 
only one action leads to win and the other to loss. Here, without loss of generality, 
we assumed that the go-feedback contingency is tracked. Thus, the feedback, ft on 
trial t, is equal to ot if the choice on trial t was go, and ft = 1– ot for trials in which 
a no-go response is made. Therefore, xt for this model is the expected value of the 
go response in the contingency space. The prediction error for learning xt is:
in which pt is the probability predicting that go response results in a win outcome 
and is given by the sigmoid function, pt = (1+exp(–xt))–1. Thus, higher value of xt 
lead to higher probability of go-win contingency, pt. 
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Mathys et al. (Mathys et al., 2011) have proved that the learning rate, αt, in this 
model is equal to value uncertainty, σt. Moreover, a nice feature of this model is 
that two sources of uncertainty impact the value uncertainty (and thereby learning 
rate) in different ways. The estimated volatility on the previous trial increases 
the learning rate, while noise in action-outcome contingency, πt, decreases the 
learning rate:
in which πt = pt (1–pt) is the variance of outcome prediction at the lower level 
(a binomial distributed random variable) and Vt is the volatility-related component 
of learning rate defined as
where ω and κ are constant parameters controlling the general scale of value 
variance and the extent to which value variance is affected by volatility, 
respectively. Therefore the learning rate on trial t is an exponential function of 
estimated volatility on the previous trial t-1. Since this quantity is the volatility- 
related part of learning rate, we have used it for all behavioral and fMRI analyses 
and we referred to as volatility or experienced volatility in the Results section. 
The volatility in this model, vt, is also assumed to be normally distributed with 
a mean centered at the volatility of the previous trial, vt–1, and a constant variance 
defined by another free parameter, η.
Furthermore, Mathys et al. (2011) have shown that volatility is also updated 
according to a volatility prediction error signaling the log-difference between 
sample uncertainty and predicted uncertainty. More precisely,
where εt is the volatility prediction error signal on trial t. It can be seen that εt is 
inversely proportional to total uncertainty on trial t-1, i.e. the sum of outcome 
uncertainty, σt–1, and volatility on trial t-1, and is directly proportional to total 
uncertainty on trial t, i.e. the sum of outcome uncertainty and the updating term 
(xt – xt–1)2. The latter represents the square of the deviation of the new sample xt 
from the distribution mean, which is equal to the previous sample xt–1 given 
the Markov assumption. The volatility prediction error is more than zero when 
uncertainty on the current trial is more than uncertainty on the previous trial. 
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Here, we present those equations that are crucial for understanding and interpreting 
the behavioral and fMRI results of this study. For the complete list of equations, 
see Mathys et al. (2011). This model contains three free parameters, κ, η and ω, 
which are assumed to lie within the unit range (Mathys et al., 2014).  We have 
assumed that the initial value of expected outcome and volatility is zero. The 
initial variance of these variables, σ0, is assumed to be large (σ0 = 10). We further 
constrained the variance of value to lower values than the initial variance (σt < σ0). 
The intuition behind the latter assumption is that observing any outcome 
feedback could not make participant less certain about their initial estimation 
(before any observation) of expected value. 
Choice Model. Each of the three learning models was combined with a choice 
model to generate probabilistic predictions of choice. The expected outcome values 
were used to calculate the probability of a go-response according to a sigmoid 
(softmax) function:
where yt = xt (go) – xt (no–go) for Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall model and 
yt = xt for the Bayesian learning model, as the latter learns probabilities in the 
contingency space. b is the decision noise parameter, which is a constant positive 
parameter encoding the extent to which learned contingencies affect choice. φi is 
a constant parameter representing the Pavlovian tendency to choose or avoid the 
go-response regardless of learned values given emotional and valence content of 
the cue, indexed by i = 1,2,3,4 for the four trial-types. Finally, the probability of 
choice, Pt (ct), is equal to qt if ct is a go and it is equal to 1– qt if ct is a no-go 
response.
Model fitting
We fitted parameters in the infinite real-space and transformed them to obtain 
actual parameters fed to the models. Appropriate transform functions were used 
for this purpose: the sigmoid function to transform parameters bounded in the 
unit range (the learning parameters in all models) and the exponential function to 
transform the decision noise parameter in the choice model. No transformation 
was needed for the four constant parameters, φi, of the choice model as they were 
not bounded. 
Free parameters of each model were estimated in two stages. In the first stage, a set 
of parameters, θnMAP, maximizing log-likelihood of data plus log-prior (maximum 
a posteriori, MAP) was estimated for every participant separately (n is the index of 
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participant). A wide (uninformative) Gaussian prior was assumed for all parameters 
(with zero mean and a variance of 100). Given the large variance of this prior, the 
prior probability of free parameters is flat in a wide range (free parameters 
bounded in the unit range could vary between 0.01 and 0.99 with almost equal 
prior probability, and the free parameters bounded in the positive space could 
vary between 0.01 and 148 with almost equal prior probability). Therefore, the free 
parameters could be estimated without prior bias. A non-linear derivative-based 
optimization algorithm (as implemented in the fminunc routine in MATLAB, 
©Mathwork) was used for fitting. To overcome bias of the optimization algorithm 
to the initial point, the optimization was repeated 40 times and the best set of 
parameters was selected. In the second stage, a hierarchical fitting procedure 
was used to fit the models to participants’ choices. An expectation-maximization 
algorithm was used for optimizing group- and individual- parameters in an 
iterative fashion, with Laplace approximation for approximating the posterior 
distribution (Huys et al., 2011). This method estimates the mean and the variance 
of parameters across all participants (group parameters) in the first step. In a sub- 
sequent step, that mean and variance is used to define a normal prior distribution 
of parameters and to estimate parameters of each individual participant using 
Laplace approximation. This procedure is then continued iteratively to reach 
convergence. Group parameters was initialized according to the mean and variance 
of the individual parameters, θnMAP, fitted in the first stage. This procedure regularizes 
individual fitted parameters according to group parameters, thereby decreases 
fitting noise and protects against outliers. The final estimated values for the group 
parameters, Θ, were used to generate the regressors used in the fMRI analyses, as 
they are less biased by fitting noise. For details of the hierarchical fitting procedure, 
see Huys et al. (Huys et al., 2011).
Model selection
We employed a Bayesian model comparison approach to assess which model better 
captures participants’ choices. This approach selects the most parsimonious model 
by balancing between model fits and different levels of complexity of the models 
(MacKay, 2003). Notably, this procedure penalizes complexity by marginalizing 
over both group and individual parameters using Laplace approximation and 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), respectively. Accordingly, the negative log- 
mode evidence (NLME) could be computed as:
where D n is the set of choice data for the nth participant, θ n is the fitted individual 
parameter for nth participant, Θ and Σ is the mean and variance for the group 
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distribution, respectively, m is number of free parameters of the model, N is the 
number of participants and | H n  | is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the 
log-posterior function at θ n. The log-likelihood function is the predicted probability of 
choice data given the model and parameters defined as log P(Dn | θ n ) = Σ log Pt (ct), 
where the sum is over all trials. Therefore, the first term on the right hand side of 
the NLME equation is how well the model predicts data. The sum of the next three 
terms together is the penalty due to individual parameters. The last term represents 
the penalty approximated for 2m (mean and variance together) group parameters 
using BIC. See Piray et al. (2014) for further details. 
Analysis of mean learning rate and volatility
The means (expected values) of i) learning rate and ii) volatility component of 
learning rate were used for the behavioral analyses (presented in Figure 2). The 
mean learning rate is defined as
where α–i
n is the mean learning rate for the nth participant and trial-type i = 1,2,3,4 
and αt (0) is the learning rate at trial t calculated by the hierarchical Bayesian 
learning model parameters given the parameters vector, θ = [η, κ, ω]'. Note that 
the sum is over all trials belonging to trial-type i and T is the number of trials per 
trial-type (T=120). Dn is the set of choice data for the nth participant. Finally, 
p( θ | D n ) is the posterior after observing choice data. Similarly, the mean volatility 
is defined as
where Vt is the volatility component of learning rate. The integral in these 
equations could be seen as a way to weight signals computed using a set of 
parameters with the posterior probability that those parameters have generated 
data. Since these integrals are intractable, they were approximated using the 
importance sampling technique (Bishop, 2006). This technique is a well-known 
method for approximating expectations when: 1) the posterior probability is 
known up to a normalization constant; and 2) a sampling distribution, e.g. an 
approximation of the true posterior, is available. Here, we have the product of the 
likelihood and prior as the true, non-normalized, posterior function,
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where Pt (ct) is the probability of choice on trial t, ct, estimated by the hierarchical 
Bayesian learning model and N (θ) is the assumed Gaussian prior (with zero mean 
and diagonal isotropic variance of 100). The fitted, maximum a-posteriori Gaussian 
distribution serves as the sampling distribution
where HnMAP is the Hessian matrix of the log-posterior function at θ
n
MAP. Then, 
the importance sampling technique approximates the intractable expectation 
integral as
where θ l represents sample l drawn from the sampling distribution p� 
n  (θ) and λ ln 
is the importance weight of this sample defined by
Therefore, the expected learning rate at trial t is approximated by a weighted sum 
of learning rates at trial t across samples drawn from the maximum a-posteriori 
fitted distribution. The importance weights depend on the likelihood of choice on 
trial t as predicted by the hierarchical Bayesian model given the corresponding 
sample parameters.
Similarly, the integral regarding the expectation of volatility could be approximated as
These quantities are approximated by drawing 5000 sample and used to calculate 
α–i
n and v–i
n. Note that the individual parameters estimated using the hierarchical 
fitting procedure are regularized based on behavioral data from the other subjects. 
Therefore it is not valid to use them as the sampling distribution (and actually for 
any statistical inference on behavioral effects).
fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing
Whole-brain imaging was performed on a 3T MR scanner (Magnetom Trio Tim; 
Siemens Medical Systems) equipped with a 32-channel head coil using a multi-echo 
GRAPPA sequence (Poser et al., 2006) [repetition time (TR): 2.32 ms, echo times 
(TEs, 4): 9.0/19.3/30/40 ms, 38 axial oblique slices, ascending acquisition, distance 
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factor: 17%, voxel size 3.3_3.3_2.5 mm, field of view (FoV): 211 mm; flip angle, 908]. 
At the end of the experimental session, high-resolution anatomical images were 
acquired using a magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo sequence (TR: 2300 
ms, TE: 3.03 ms, 192 sagittal slices, voxel size 1.0_1.0_1.0 mm, FoV: 256 mm).
Given the multiecho GRAPPA MR sequence (Poser et al., 2006), the head motion 
parameters were estimated on the MR images with the shortest TE (9.0 ms), because 
these images are the least affected by BOLD signals. These motion-correction 
parameters, estimated using a least-squares approach with six rigid body 
transformation parameters (translations, rotations), were then applied to the four 
echo images collected for each excitation. After spatial realignment, the four echo 
images were combined into a single MR volume using an optimized echo weighting 
method (Poser et al., 2006). Noise effects in data were removed using FMRIB’s 
ICA-based Xnoiseifier tool (FIX), which uses independent component analysis (ICA) 
and classification techniques to identify noise components in data (Salimi-Khor-
shidi et al., 2014). Other preprocessing steps were carried out in SPM12. The 
T1-weighted image was spatially coregistered to the mean of the functional 
images. The fMRI time series were transformed and resampled at an isotropic 
voxel size of 2mm into the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space 
using both linear and nonlinear transformation parameters as determined in a 
probabilistic generative model that combines image registration, tissue 
classification, and bias correction (i.e. unified segmentation and normalization) of 
the coregistered T1-weighted image (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). The normalized 
functional images were spatially smoothed using an isotropic 6mm full-width at 
half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analysis of imaging data
General linear model (GLM) was used to model effects at the single-subject level 
(first-level analysis). We performed two GLM analyses. The first GLM looked for 
effects related to learning value, the second GLM looked for effects related to 
learning volatility. 
In the first GLM, we considered four sets of four regressors each (i.e. in each set, 
there was one regressor for each of the four trial-types): one set was time-locked to 
the visual presentation of cues; one set was time-locked to the visual presentation 
of outcomes; one set was parametrically modulated by outcome prediction error 
(OPE) and time-locked to the presentation of the trial outcome; one set was 
parametrically modulated by experienced volatility (i.e. volatility-related 
component of learning rate, Vt) and time-locked to the presentation of the trial 
outcome. Outcome prediction error is defined as ot – yt (ct) in which yt (ct) = pt if ct 
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is a go-response and otherwise yt (ct) = 1– pt. Note that pt is the probability that the 
go-response is associated with a win outcome predicted by the hierarchical 
Bayesian model. Group parameters obtained through the hierarchical fitting 
procedure, Θ, were used to generate these signals. Twelve motion regressors 
representing six motion parameters obtained from the brain-realignment 
procedure and their first derivative were also included. 
In the second GLM, we considered the same four sets as in the first GLM, replacing 
the four volatility parametric regressors with four volatility prediction-error 
parametric regressors, εt, time-locked to the presentation of trial outcome. 
Contrasts isolating main effects of the parametric regressors and interaction 
effects of parametric regressors with emotion and valence were estimated at the 
subject-level. These contrast images were then used in a second-level GLM to make 
inference at the group level (t-test). Two region-of-interest analyses were performed 
in anatomically defined masks of the striatum and the rostral cingulate motor 
area. The striatum mask was created based on the probabilistic Harvard-Oxford 
subcortical atlas by adding accumbens, caudate and putamen masks together 
(thresholded at p<0.5). The rostral cingulate motor area mask was created based 
on a diffusion-parcellation atlas of human medial and ventral frontal cortex 
(thresholded at p<0.5) (Neubert et al., 2015). The ventral striatum mask used for 
analysis presented in the Results was created based on a connectivity-based 
parcellation atlas of human striatum (Piray et al., 2015).
A control analysis, including an additional regressor time-locked to the occurrence 
of the go-response, was implemented for each of the two subject-level GLMs. No sub- 
stantial change in results was observed.
Psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis
A PPI analysis was performed using the generalized PPI toolbox (McLaren et al., 
2012). We considered twelve separate interaction terms, generated by multiplying 
the first eigenvariate from the seed region (dorsomedial caudate) with the three 
sets of four regressors each time-locked on outcome used in the subject-specific 
GLMs. Those interaction terms and the seed-region signal were added as separate 
regressors to each subject-specific GLM. Contrasts isolating interaction effects 
between the volatility-related PPI regressors and emotion were estimated at the 
subject-level, and then used for group-level inference at the second level. The 
dorsomedial striatal mask used in this analysis was created based on the same 
atlas of human striatum (Piray et al., 2015) by adding a medial cluster and a dorsal 
cluster identified in the caudate.
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Results
Forty-four female volunteers carried out a probabilistic learning task. We only 
recruited women to have a relatively homogeneous sample in terms of emotional 
reactivity (Koch et al., 2007; Domes et al., 2010). We used data from a previously 
published (Ly et al., 2014) probabilistic learning task focused on the association 
between emotional choice biases and individual differences in social avoidance. In 
the course of the experiment (Figure 1A), participants were presented with 
validated images of faces (happy or angry) and were asked to make a go- or a 
no-go-response (i.e. press a button, or withhold a button press, respectively) in 
order to obtain monetary reward or avoid monetary punishment (see Materials 
and Methods). Each participant was also informed about outcome valence at the 
start of each trial by presenting the face overlaid by a color (yellow or white) 
indicating whether, at the end of a trial, a win-outcome consisted of obtaining a 
reward or avoiding a punishment. In sum, the four trial-types differed in emotional 
face content (happy, angry) and in outcome valence (reward, punishment). 
Crucially, the response-outcome contingency was probabilistic and independent 
for each trial type, and reversed between blocks of 5 to 15 trials several times in 
the course of experiment, evoking different degrees of volatility. Within each 
block, the probability of a win was fixed. There were matched numbers of 
action-outcome contingency reversals across trial types, with 120 trials in each of 
the four trial types (see Materials and Methods for details). Participants learned 
the task effectively: performance across the group was significantly higher than 
chance (t(43)=2.20, p=0.03). The emotional cues did not influence overall task 
performance (t(43)=-0.38, p=0.71), nor participants’ bias towards go responses 
(t(43)=-0.40, p=0.69 – see Table 1 for additional details). However, participants 
processed the emotional content of those cues, as indicated by longer latencies of 
go-responses following the presentation of angry face cues relative to happy face 
cues (t(43)= 3.72, p<0.001).  
Humans dissociate different types of uncertainty and track volatility
We compared three learning models to account for the observed behavioral 
choices and considered their ability to predict learning trajectories, namely a 
Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla et al., 1972), a Pearce-Hall model (Pearce and 
Hall, 1980) as implemented by Li et al. (2011), and a hierarchical Bayesian learning 
model (Mathys et al., 2011; Iglesias et al., 2013). Each of these three models 
formalizes learning according to a prediction-error rule:
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where xt is the expected outcome on trial t; δt is the outcome prediction error on 
trial t representing the difference between experienced outcome on trial t and 
expected outcome xt; and αt is the learning rate representing the degree to which 
the prediction error influences the current expected outcome. 
The three models differ in how the learning rate is conceptualized. The Rescorla- 
Wager model assumes a constant learning rate throughout the experiment (Figure 1B). 
Accordingly, this model generates poor predictions in dynamic environments 
where action-outcome contingencies change (Figure 1B). In contrast, both the 
Pearce-Hall and the hierarchical Bayesian models update learning rate on every 
trial, but according to different mechanisms. The Pearce-Hall model updates 
learning rate according to surprise, i.e. the absolute value of the prediction error. 
This means that learning rate increases regardless of whether errors occurred due 
to contingency reversal (i.e. systematic changes in the environment) or to noise 
(Figure 1B). The hierarchical Bayesian model increases learning rate when a 
contingency reversal is detected, and otherwise decreases the learning rate 
gradually to protect decisions against noise (Figure 1B). In short, the hierarchical 
Bayesian model tracks both a model of environmental volatility, and a model of 
action-outcome contingency (Figure 1C, Materials and Methods). Over time, the 
former modulates the latter by changing learning rate. Therefore, learning rate in 
this model is a function of both environmental noise and environmental volatility, 
in which the volatility signal reflects estimated changes in the environment. 
Table 1   Logistic regression analysis of performance.
Regression coefficients Mean SEM P-value
Optimal response 0.231 0.105 0.033
Optimal response x Valence -0.282 0.069 0.000
Optimal response x Emotion -0.020 0.054 0.707
Optimal response x Valence x Emotion 0.046 0.047 0.328
Valence 0.038 0.032 0.247
Emotion -0.010 0.026 0.693
Valence x Emotion -0.002 0.024 0.941
Intercept 0.704 0.071 0.000
The effects of optimal response defined as a binary vector (one if the go response is the optimal response 
in the current block) and three non-learning factors, emotion, outcome valence and valence-by-emotion 
as well as their interaction on the choice are analyzed. The dependent variable encodes choices (one for 
go response). Therefore the coefficient corresponding to the optimal response regressor quantifies 
performance and its interaction with other factors quantifies modulation of performance by these 
factors (related to Figure 1 & 4).
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Figure 1 Task timeline and computational models. A) Timeline of the probabilistic learning 
task. Participants had to respond (either go or no-go) after a face cue was presented. 
A probabilistic outcome was presented following a delay. B) The Rescorla-Wagner model, 
Pearce-Hall model and hierarchical Bayesian learning model conceptualize learning rate 
differently (upper plot). The Rescorla-Wagner model assumes that the environment is 
deterministic and adopts a constant learning rate. The Pearce-Hall model fails to dissociate 
systematic changes in the environment from noise. The hierarchical Bayesian learning model 
detects changes in the environment and adjusts the learning rate accordingly. The lower plots 
illustrates Bayesian model comparison results. The negative log-model evidence indicates 
how well each of the three models predicted the empirical behavioral data, controlling for 
each model complexity. The hierarchical Bayesian learning model outperforms the other two 
models (lower values indicate better fit). C) Structure of the hierarchical Bayesian learning 
model. This model assumes that learners adopt expectations of both value and volatility. The 
model also assumes that value, xt, and volatility, vt, have Gaussian distributions centered on 
their previous estimation, xt–1 and vt–1, respectively. Over trials, expected volatility modulates 
expected value by influencing its variance, which serves as the learning rate in this model. 
The probability of win given a go response, pt, is a logistic function of expected value. The 
variance of value is a function of the volatility parameterized by two free parameters, ω and 
κ, controlling the general scale of value variance and the extent to which value variance 
is affected by volatility, respectively. The variance of the expected volatility is assumed to 
be determined by another free parameter, η. On every trial, estimation of both value and 
volatility are updated by an error-updating rule according to an outcome prediction error 
(OPE) and a volatility prediction error (VPE) signal, respectively. D) True probability sequence of 
win given a go response (in black) for one of the four trial-types, and the predicted probability 
by the Bayesian learning model. Black dots indicate actual feedback of the go response drawn 
from the true sequence. The lower plot illustrates volatility estimated by the Bayesian learning 
model. The volatility signal reflects estimated changes in the environment. It can be seen 
that the volatility signal is generally higher in the grey phase, when there are more changes 
in the response-outcome mappings. The trend in volatility reflects systematic changes in the 
environment, but its local changes reflects local changes in the environment. Simulations in 
panels b and d are based on η = 0.4, κ = 0.9 and ω = 0.4.
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We compared the relative ability of the Rescorla-Wagner, Pearce-Hall, and hierar-
chical-Bayesian models to predict participants’ choice data in the probabilistic 
learning task by using hierarchical fitting (Huys et al., 2011) in conjunction with 
a Bayesian model comparison procedure (Piray et al., 2014) (see Materials and 
Methods and Table 2). For each model, this procedure calculates its evidence, 
a measure of goodness of fit of the model penalized by the complexity of the model 
(MacKay, 2003). This analysis revealed that the hierarchical Bayesian learning 
model outperforms the other models across participants (Figure 1B, lower plot). 
This finding indicates that the participants differentiated distinct types of 
uncertainty by tracking volatility and adjusted their learning rate accordingly.
Volatility-tracking is impaired by seeing an angry face 
The previous analysis showed that participants tracked volatility. The next 
question is whether the presence of emotional cues influence value learning by 
dynamically biasing learning rate through a modulation of volatility tracking, or 
by introducing a tonic bias in tracking outcome prediction error, similar to the 
bias hypothesized to be introduced by outcome valence (reward/punishment) 
during learning (Daw et al., 2002; Cools, 2011). At the start of each trial, participants 
were emotionally cued (with happy or angry faces) and informed about outcome 
Figure 1 Continued.
B D
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valence (reward/punishment), according to a two-by-two factorial design with four 
trial-types that differed in emotional face content and in outcome valence (Figure 2A). 
We employed two different approaches to quantify effects of emotion, outcome 
valence, and their interaction on learning. 
First, we employed a relatively theory-neutral approach to test effects of emotion 
and outcome valence on learning, under minimal assumptions. Namely, we 
considered two learning events (on trial t) that could potentially influence choice 
on trial t+1. The first event, a reinforcement effect, is a categorical variable 
indicating whether feedback corresponding to the go response on trial t was a win 
or loss (feedback of the two responses was inversely co-linear). The second event, 
an information gain effect, indicates whether new information is expected to 
be gained by observing the feedback on trial t. This event is a categorical variable 
indicating whether feedback of the go response on the two trials preceding trial t 
was matched or not. Specifically, if the feedback on trials t-1 and t-2 were both loss 
or both win, then information gain on trial t was one, otherwise it was zero. 
Therefore, the reinforcement and information gain events are closely related to 
prediction error and learning rate in the context of reinforcement learning 
models, respectively. We then performed a logistic regression with choice made on 
trial t+1 as dependent variable (coded as one for go response) and the reinforcement 
and information gain factors as two learning-dependent predictors. Emotion (happy/ 
angry), outcome valence (reward/punishment), and their interaction constituted 
three additional learning-independent predictors. Crossing these three learning- 
independent effects with the two learning-related effects (reinforcement, information 
Table 2   Fitted parameters of the Bayesian learning model individually  
using maximum a posteriori (MAP) and using the hierarchical fitting 
procedure (HFP) (related to Figure 1).
MAP  
25th percentile
MAP  
median
MAP  
75th percentile
HFP group  
mean ( )
HFP group  
variance ( )
η -2.621 -0.663 0.890 -1.410 8.149
κ -0.255 0.624 2.225 0.762 3.055
ω -1.546 -0.636 1.476 -0.322 3.430
b -0.500 -0.116 0.079 -0.195 0.237
φ1 -0.105 0.263 0.755 0.317 0.323
φ2 -0.307 0.051 0.299 0.140 0.357
φ3 -0.575 -0.175 0.100 -0.151 0.252
φ4 -0.455 -0.147 0.103 -0.115 0.182
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gain) led to six additional predictors, resulting in 11 regressors in the logistic 
regression. See Table 3 for further details. 
This analysis indicated that outcome valence modulated the reinforcement effect, 
whereas emotion modulated the information gain effect. Specifically, a main 
effect of reinforcement on trial t was found on the choice made on trial t+1 
(t(43)=16.11, p<0.001), as well as a significant interaction between reinforcement 
and outcome valence (t(43)=2.57, p=0.014), but no significant interaction between 
reinforcement and emotion (t(43)=0.63, p=0.53). The interaction between 
reinforcement and outcome valence occurred because the effect of reinforcement 
on choice was higher for rewarding trials than for punishment trials, suggesting 
that reward might be more easily processed as a reinforce in this task than 
punishment (Dayan and Huys, 2009). There was also a significant interaction 
between information gain and emotion on choice made on trial t+1 (Figure 2B, 
t(43)=2.07, p=0.045), with information gain being higher in happy trials than in 
angry trials. There was no significant main effect of outcome valence or a 
significant interaction between outcome valence and emotion on information 
gain (Figure 2B, t(43)=1.29, p=0.20 and t(43)=0.43, p=0.67, respectively; see Table 3 
for additional statistics on this analysis). 
Table 3   Logistic regression analysis of the effects of learning components 
(Reinforcement and Information gain) on choice (related to Figure 2).
Regression coefficients Mean SEM P-value
Reinforcement 1.573 0.098 0.000
Reinforcement x Valence -0.084 0.033 0.014
Reinforcement x Emotion -0.023 0.037 0.530
Reinforcement x Valence x Emotion 0.058 0.033 0.083
Information gain -0.015 0.032 0.637
Information gain x Valence -0.050 0.038 0.204
Information gain x Emotion -0.071 0.034 0.045
Information gain x Valence x Emotion 0.015 0.035 0.671
Valence -0.107 0.036 0.005
Emotion -0.005 0.033 0.874
Valence x Emotion 0.031 0.032 0.336
Intercept -0.743 0.089 0.000
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This analysis suggests that emotion modulates information gain. However, this 
theory-neutral approach only considers outcome effect and information-gain 
effects limited to the immediately preceding trial. This analysis also suffers from 
the fact that the effect of information gain defined above conflates information 
gain from trials on which the outcome was surprising due to the probabilistic 
nature of feedback, and information gain from trials on which changes in outcome 
signaled a contingency reversal. The hierarchical Bayesian learning model allows 
us to disentangle these features of information gain by separately estimating 
learning rate, which is a function of both estimated environmental volatility 
and environmental noise, and the volatility component of the learning rate. 
Accordingly, we considered a more refined analysis to understand how emotions 
influence subject-specific learning rate and volatility, as estimated within the 
hierarchical Bayesian learning model. We employed importance sampling (Bishop, 
2006), together with an approximate subject-specific distribution estimated for 
parameters of the Bayesian learning model, to quantify mean learning and mean 
experienced volatility for each trial-type (see Materials and Methods for details). 
Main effects of emotion and valence, as well as their interaction, were assessed on 
subject-specific mean learning rates. The effects were assessed with Wilcoxon 
non-parametric statistics given the non-normal distribution of mean learning rate 
across participants. There was a strong main effect of emotion on learning rate 
(p=0.002; Figure 2C), with no significant effect of valence (p=0.60) and no emo-
tion-by-valence interaction (p=0.67). Participants’ learning rates were significantly 
higher for happy-face trials than for angry-face trials (Table 4). As the learning rate 
is a function of both estimated environmental volatility and environmental noise, 
we asked whether these learning-rate biases are accompanied by a similar effect of 
emotion on the volatility component of learning rate. We found that this is the 
case: there was a main effect of emotion on experienced volatility (Figure 2D; 
p=0.024), but no effect of valence (p=0.37) and no interaction (p=0.45; Table 4). 
As can be seen in figure 2D, despite a significant group-level statistical reliability, 
there was large between-subject variability in emotional modulation of experienced 
volatility, possibly reflecting variance in trait factors such as trait anxiety, known 
to influence experienced volatility (Browning et al., 2015).  Here we show that, 
despite those between-subjects sources of variation and despite matched volatility 
across trial types, participants reliably perceived the environment as less volatile 
during trials involving an angry face than a happy face.
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Seeing an angry face enhances volatility-tracking in  
the rostral cingulate motor area, and volatility-related connectivity 
with the dorsomedial striatum
Following a trial outcome, a hierarchical Bayesian learning model updates 
estimated outcome by combining outcome prediction error (i.e. the difference 
between observed and predicted outcome) and a learning rate that in turns 
depends on current estimate of volatility. In this section, we employ regression 
analysis to isolate fMRI signals that correlate with these learning signals given 
participants’ choice, and assess the presence of modulatory effects of emotion on 
cerebral regions tracking prediction error and volatility. 
Trial-by-trial estimates of outcome prediction error and volatility (more precisely 
the volatility component of learning rate, see Materials and Methods for details), 
were calculated for each participant based on participant’s observations and 
choices. The fMRI regression analysis also considered outcome prediction error at 
the time of outcome observation. Those two model-derived parameters (prediction 
error, volatility) were considered as parametric regressors, separately for each of 
the four trial-types, leading to 8 regressors. Eight regressors of no-interest were 
added to account for trial-type specific effects at the time of cue presentation 
(4 regressors) and of outcome presentation (4 regressors). 
Volatility
Previous studies have found that the rostral cingulate motor area, an area within 
the anterior cingulate cortex, encodes volatility and is activated during updating 
Table 4  Summary statistics of experienced volatility and learning rate.
R & H R & A P & H P & A Emotion Valence E x V
Learning rate summary statistics
25th percentile 0.743 0.739 0.742 0.754 -0.086 -0.045 -0.041
Median 1.226 1.158 1.178 1.196 -0.022 -0.001 0.008
75th percentile 2.187 2.159 2.146 2.072 0.002 0.024 0.038
Experienced volatility summary statistics
25th percentile 0.113 0.114 0.113 0.114 -0.032 -0.010 -0.012
Median 0.377 0.318 0.323 0.317 -0.001 0.000 0.000
75th percentile 1.066 1.073 1.073 1.035 0.000 0.002 0.003
Shown as median and quartiles as a function of valence (R: reward, P: punishment) and emotion (H: happy, 
A: angry). The within-subject effects of Emotion (angry minus happy) and Valence (punishment minus 
reward) and their interaction (E x V) are also shown (related to Figure 2). 
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of subjective models of the environment (Behrens et al., 2007, 2008; O’Reilly et al., 
2013). Therefore, we tested whether the rostral cingulate motor area, anatomically 
defined by using a connectivity-based parcellation atlas of medial frontal cortex 
(Neubert et al., 2015), is involved in volatility tracking under the current 
experimental conditions. 
Figure 2 Computational findings. Seeing an angry face reduces information gain, learning 
rate, and experienced volatility. A) There were four different trial-types in the task. The cue 
of each trial could vary in emotional content (an angry or happy face) and in color (grey, 
yellow). The color indicated the valence (punishment/reward) of the outcome. Task volatility 
was manipulated by changing the outcome probabilities of each trial-type independently, 
while the mean environmental volatility was matched across the four trial-types. B) Plot of the 
effects of emotion (trials with angry cues minus trials with happy cues), valence (punishment 
trials minus reward trials), and their interaction on information gain. Information gain is 
defined as new information expected to be gained by observing the outcome on a given trial. 
C, D) Plot of the effects of emotion, valence, and their interaction on participants’ mean 
learning rates (c) and experienced volatility (d) as estimated by the hierarchical Bayesian 
learning model. Red lines indicate first and third quartiles with the black mark indicating 
the median. Asterisks indicate significance at P<0.05.
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In line with previous work on volatility encoding (Behrens et al., 2007, 2008), fMRI 
signals in the rostral cingulate motor area correlated with volatility (Figure 3A, 
p<0.05, small-volume FWE-corrected for the rostral cingulate motor area mask 
(Neubert et al., 2015)). The main novel finding of this study qualifies how the 
rostral cingulate motor area tracks volatility depending on the affective state of 
the subject. This region shows a stronger volatility-related signal during angry 
trials than during happy trials (Figure 3A, p<0.05, small-volume FWE-corrected 
for the rostral cingulate motor area mask). Therefore, there are opposite effects of 
emotion on volatility-tracking in the rostral cingulate motor area and on behavior 
(Figure 2D). The variation across participants was also consistent with these 
opposing effects. Namely, greater anger-induced reduction in experienced volatility 
correlated with greater anger-induced increases in the cingulate motor area 
 volatility-tracking across participants (Figure 3C). Group-wise analysis, based on 
median-splitting of participants over emotion effects on experienced volatility to 
account for the non-normal distribution of mean experienced volatility, indicated 
that increases in rostral cingulate motor area volatility-tracking by perception of 
anger was stronger in those participants experiencing a less volatile environment 
when exposed to an angry face (t(42)=2.16, p=0.037; Figure 3C). This finding 
suggests that the rostral cingulate motor area compensates for anger-induced 
reduction in experienced volatility by increasing the gain on the relatively noisy 
volatility estimation, in line with the general notion that the ACC integrates 
neural processing of negative affect with cognitive control (Shackman et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, these findings suggest that emotion effects on the cingulate motor 
area cannot cause the overall reduction in experienced volatility. Rather, the latter 
effect of emotion is likely a consequence of disrupted volatility-related computations 
in other brain areas.
Additional whole-brain analyses confirmed the presence of robust effects of 
volatility- tracking in the rostral cingulate motor area (P<0.05, FWE corrected, 
Table 5), as well as in the pre-supplementary motor area, and bilateral lateral 
prefrontal cortex, but no additional significant effects of emotion on volatility- 
tracking. We also performed additional region-of-interest analyses in the amygdala 
and on the striatum. We focused on the amygdala given its important role in 
emotional processing (Weiskrantz, 1956; Ledoux, 1996; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005), 
and previous reports on amygdala sensitivity to learning rate (Li et al., 2011). 
Despite the presence of clear emotion-related main effects of cue in the amygdala 
(bilaterally, P<0.05, small-volume FWE corrected for the amygdala mask, local 
maximum at -14, -8, -16), with stronger signal following presentation of the angry 
faces, there were no significant effects of volatility, nor interactions between 
emotion and volatility (p<0.001 uncorrected) in the amygdala. We also considered 
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the striatum, given its known role in reinforcement learning and outcome 
valuation (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2006; Valentin and O’Doherty, 2009), 
anatomically defined with an independent probabilistic atlas (Harvard-Oxford 
subcortical areas atlas). The dorsomedial striatum consistently tracked volatility 
(Figure 3D, p<0.05 FWE-corrected for the striatum mask), but there was no reliable 
effect of emotion on volatility in this region. 
Outcome Prediction error
In contrast to the volatility-tracking effect found in the dorsomedial striatum, 
outcome prediction error was significantly correlated with the ventral striatum, 
extending into the dorsal putamen (Figure 3D, p<0.05, small-volume FWE corrected 
for the striatum mask), in line with previous work (O’Doherty et al., 2003). However, 
no significant effect of emotion was found on processing prediction error in the 
striatum (Figure 3E, p<0.001 uncorrected), suggesting that emotion does not 
modulate prediction error computations. A differential effect of emotion on the 
ventral striatum, defined using an independent connectivity-based parcellation of 
the human striatum (Piray et al., 2015), and on the rostral cingulate motor area is 
substantiated by an anatomical double-dissociation in the effects of emotion on 
outcome prediction error and volatility-tracking in those two brain regions. Across 
participants, emotion-related modulation of prediction error in the ventral striatum 
was significantly weaker than emotion-related modulation of volatility-tracking 
in the rostral cingulate motor area, as reflected in a significant interaction between 
region-specific computations (cingulate volatility signal versus ventral striatal 
prediction error signal after variance normalization) and emotion (t(43)=2.15, 
p=0.037). A post-hoc test revealed that this interaction is driven by significantly 
higher volatility signal in the rostral cingulate motor area during angry trials 
(t(43)=2.19, p=0.034) and no significant effect of emotion on outcome prediction 
error signal in the ventral striatum (t(43)=-0.78, p=0.44).
Additional whole brain analyses confirmed the presence of robust effects of 
prediction error encoding in the ventral striatum (P<0.05, FWE-corrected, Table 5) 
extending to dorsal putamen, amygdala and hippocampus, as well as in the ventral 
orbitofrontal cortex. These prediction error effects were significantly modulated 
by outcome valence (p<0.05, FWE-corrected), but not by emotion (no significant 
voxel at p<0.001 uncorrected). Specifically, outcome prediction error signal was 
more strongly correlated with activity in the ventral striatum and ventral 
orbitofrontal cortex during reward trials than punishment trials. This finding is 
consistent with the suggestion that reward might be more readily processed as an 
instrumental reinforce than punishment (Dayan and Huys, 2009). 
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Figure 3 Neuroimaging findings: Emotion modulates neural correlates of volatility tracking, 
but not neural correlates of prediction error. A) A portion of the ACC (rostral cingulate motor 
area) tracked participants’ experienced volatility (in green, local maximum at -8, 24, 38), 
more accurately during trials with an angry face (in red, -2, 18, 38). B) Regression coefficients 
of experienced volatility averaged across the anatomically-defined rostral cingulate motor 
area. C) The emotional modulation of volatility-tracking in this region is inversely related to 
participants’ experienced volatility. Those participants reducing their experienced volatility 
when seeing angry faces showed increased volatility-tracking in the rostral cingulate 
motor area. D) The dorsomedial striatum (in green, local maximum at -10, 14, 2) and the 
ventral striatum (in blue, 16, 10, -8) tracked experienced volatility and outcome prediction 
error, respectively. The analysis is performed in a priori anatomical mask of the striatum. 
E) Regression coefficients of outcome prediction error averaged across an anatomically-
defined mask of ventral striatum. The lack of emotion-related effects on the neural correlates 
of outcome prediction error was statistically qualified by a significant difference between the 
effects of emotion on the neural correlates of volatility tracking  (panel b) and the effects of 
emotion on the neural correlates of outcome prediction error (panel e). F) The anatomical 
sections illustrate the rostral cingulate motor area (in red) showing increased volatility-related 
connectivity with a dorsomedial striatal seed region (in grey) in those trials involving angry 
faces (left maximum at -10, 22, 34; right maximum 10, 30, 30). In panels a, d, and f, statistical 
maps have been thresholded at P<0.01 uncorrected for display purposes. Error bars indicate 
standard error of mean. Coordinates are in MNI space.
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The neural systems tracking learning rate and prediction error need to interact, 
eventually, as the integration of both computational elements is necessary for 
learning action-outcome contingencies. We tested how emotions modulate this 
integration. We reasoned that the dorsomedial striatum is anatomically well-placed 
to play this integrative role. It has dense dopamine-dependent connections with 
the ventral portion of the striatum that tracks prediction error (Haber et al., 2000; 
Piray et al., 2015), its activity correlates with volatility (Figure 3D), and it has direct 
connections with the rostral cingulate motor area (Draganski et al., 2008) that 
tracks volatility as a function of affective state (Figure 3A). We used the human 
striatum atlas (Piray et al., 2015) as in the above analyses to define a dorsomedial 
Figure 3 Continued.
C
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striatum seed region (Figure 3F) and the same rostral cingulate motor area mask 
(Neubert et al., 2015) used in above analyses as the target region. Modulatory 
effects of emotion on the volatility-driven connectivity between the dorsomedial 
striatum and the rostral cingulate motor area were tested with a psychophysiological 
interaction analysis (Friston et al., 1997). The analysis revealed stronger volatility- 
driven connectivity between dorsomedial striatum and cingulate motor area 
during angry trials than during happy trials (Figure 3F, p<0.05 small-volume FWE 
corrected for the rostral cingulate motor area mask).
Seeing an angry face impairs volatility-learning in the right lateral 
prefrontal cortex
Following a trial outcome, a hierarchical Bayesian learning model updates not 
only its estimated action values, but also its estimation of volatility. As in the case 
of the update rule of estimated values, volatility updates depend on volatility 
Table 5  Whole brain analysis of main effects of experienced volatility and 
outcome prediction error (related to Figure 3).
Contrast Peak (mm) T(43)
Experienced  
Volatility
-14 4 68 5.73
36 48 22 5.64
12 18 46 5.35
Outcome 
prediction  
error
16 10 -8 10.35
-12 6 -12 10.29
-10 40 -12 8.2
-32 38 -10 7.6
28 -12 2 6.15
-20 30 52 6.1
-54 -50 -8 6.06
8 26 10 5.61
22 -14 28 5.52
20 38 2 5.46
18 0 28 5.43
-22 -6 28 5.41
18 -80 -8 5.39
-28 -14 4 5.29
-8 30 0 5.22
14 54 6 5.17
-26 -16 12 5.16
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prediction errors, which in turn represent the difference between environmental 
uncertainty (as sampled by witnessing new outcomes) and predicted uncertainty. 
Given that emotion modulated experienced volatility across subjects (Figure 2D), 
emotion should modulate neural processes related to learning volatility. In this 
section, we employ regression analysis to isolate fMRI signals that correlate with 
volatility prediction error, and assess the presence of modulatory effects of emotion 
on this signal.  
Cerebral responses tracking volatility prediction error, over and above tracking of 
outcome prediction error, were isolated with a multiple regression analysis of 
fMRI data. Those two model-derived parameters (volatility prediction error, 
outcome prediction error) were considered as parametric regressors at the time of 
outcome, when it is expected that predicted volatility gets updated, separately for 
each of the four trial-types, leading to 8 regressors. As in the previous regression 
model, regressors of no-interest accounting for general effects of trial types, 
regardless of learning signals, were also included. 
Volatility prediction error correlated with activity in the right lateral prefrontal 
cortex (LPFC), along the inferior frontal sulcus and lateral orbital gyrus (Figure 4A, 
p<0.05 FWE-corrected, Table 6), corresponding to area 45 and 47 in the parcellation 
of Neubert et al. (Neubert et al., 2014), the connectivity patterns of which resemble 
macaque Brodmann areas 45A and 47, respectively. Significant effects of emotion 
on volatility prediction error were found in the lateral prefrontal region (Figure 
4A, p<0.05 FWE-corrected, Table 6). LPFC activity related to volatility prediction 
error was significantly disrupted after seeing angry faces (Figure 4B). Furthermore, 
between-subjects variation in emotion-related modulation of volatility prediction 
error-related signal in the LPFC was significantly related to how experienced 
volatility was influenced by emotions. Individuals in whom angry cues led to 
larger disruption of volatility prediction error in the LPFC exhibited stronger 
reduction in performance (the degree to which subjects chose the optimal 
response, see Table 1) on trials involving angry cues (Figure 4C, t(42)=2.24, r=0.33, 
p=0.03). Importantly, this pattern was opposite to that observed in the rostral 
cingulate motor area, consistent with a putative role of this region in compensating 
for emotional alterations in volatility tracking. Those individuals with greater 
effects of angry cues on volatility-tracking signal in the rostral cingulate motor 
area showed weaker reduction in performance following presentation of angry 
faces (Figure 4D, t(42)=-2.02, r= -0.30, p=0.05). This double dissociation (reflected in 
a three-way interaction between area (ACC versus LPFC), emotion and performance, 
t(41)=2.90, p=0.006) suggests that these two regions play complementary roles in 
integrating affective states with volatility estimation. 
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Figure 4 Neuroimaging findings: Emotion modulates neural correlates of volatility learning. 
A) A portion of the right lateral prefrontal cortex (in green, local maximum at 44, 42, -12) 
tracked volatility prediction error, less accurately during trials with an angry face (in red, 
54, 26, 4). B) Regression coefficients of volatility prediction error (at 44, 42, -12) as a function 
of emotional content of cue, showing less accurate tracking of volatility prediction error 
after seeing angry faces. C) Emotional modulation of volatility prediction error in the lateral 
prefrontal cortex (44, 42, -12) is inversely related to behavioral performance across participants. 
D) This plot illustrates the complementary effect that emotion evokes on volatility-tracking in 
the rostral cingulate motor area (main effect of volatility tracking at -8, 24, 38) as a function 
of behavioral performance across participants. The complementary roles of LPFC and ACC 
in volatility processing are reflected in a significant three-way interaction between those 
two regions, emotion, and performance. In panel a, clusters around significant voxel (FWE 
corrected at P<0.05) with the uncorrected threshold of P<0.001 were displayed. Insets in panels 
c and d: mean and errorbars of the same data shown in two groups of participants median-
splitted according to the degree of reduction in performance. Errorbars indicate standard 
error of mean. Coordinates are in MNI space.
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Note that the region in LPFC showing significant effects of emotion on volatility 
prediction error signal is overlapping only slightly with the LPFC region showing 
significant correlation with volatility prediction error (Figure 4A). However, 
representation of volatility prediction error in LPFC is indeed robustly disrupted 
in angry trials as indicated by a significant interaction between emotion and 
volatility prediction error signal at the peak of the LPFC main effect (t(43)=2.34, 
p=0.024).
Discussion
This study uses a hierarchical Bayesian learning model to understand how humans 
learn higher order statistics of a simple environment, and how emotions influence 
that learning process. There are two main findings. First, emotions influence 
action-outcome learning by biasing estimation of environmental volatility, 
thereby affecting learning of action-outcome contingencies. Second, this study 
defines a neural circuit in which emotional processing interacts with volatility 
processing. Specifically, we show that an aversive emotional context compromises 
volatility learning in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, while boosting 
representation of current volatility in the anterior cingulate cortex. These findings 
qualify the computations and the mechanisms mediating emotional influences on 
associative learning.
Behavioral effects of emotion on associative learning
We showed that formalizing human decisions requires models that consider 
higher order statistical regularities in the environment. Specifically, humans 
adjust learning rate to the estimated volatility of the environment (Behrens et al., 
2007b, 2008; Nassar et al., 2010; Iglesias et al., 2013; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013). 
Importantly, we found that emotions modulate estimated learning rates and 
experienced volatility. Specifically, participants experience the environment less 
Table 6   Whole brain analysis of main effects of volatility prediction error and its 
interaction by emotion (related to Figure 4).
Contrast Peak (mm) T(43)
Volatility prediction error 44 42 -12 5.39
50 20 36 5.25
Volatility prediction error x 
Emotion (Happy>Angry)
54 26 4 5.23
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volatile in the angry trials compared to happy trials, suggesting that emotionally 
aversive contexts disrupts volatility tracking.
The Bayesian hierarchical approach used in this study captures human choice 
behavior with a principled but relatively complex model, involving three levels of 
abstraction from the empirical data and three free parameters modulating these 
levels. This approach provides a deeper understanding of hierarchical information 
processing, but it relies on a fitted parameters that might not be robustly estimated 
in each and every participant. Therefore, we also performed a simpler and 
relatively theory-neutral analysis using logistic regression, confirming the 
observation that emotions modulate information gain in participants. 
Corticostriatal circuits for updating action-outcome predictions
Theories of associative learning suggest that emotions modulate behavioral and 
neural processes of learning and choice, but it remains unclear how. At the neural 
level, emotions could modulate structures encoding volatility or areas implementing 
action-outcome associations. Here, we provide empirical evidence that emotional 
context strongly influences volatility representation in the brain. Specifically, 
different components of the frontostriatal circuits implicated in learning and de-
cision-making were found to be correlated with volatility. These components 
include the anterior cingulate cortex, a region previously shown to encode 
predicted volatility (Behrens et al., 2007b, 2008), and the striatum, a region known 
to implement action value learning (Delgado et al., 2000; Samejima et al., 2005; 
Schönberg et al., 2007). Emotional context induces differential modulations 
within that circuit. Emotional context modulated volatility signals in the anterior 
cingulate, with a stronger volatility signal during emotionally aversive contexts. 
We could not find evidence of this happening in the striatum. Furthermore, 
emotional context also modulated the connectivity between the anterior cingulate 
and the dorsomedial striatum, with stronger connectivity during exposure to an 
angry face. Given the dense connectivity of the dorsomedial striatum with portions 
of the striatum processing outcome prediction error, this finding fits with the 
notion that the dorsomedial striatum can generate trial-by-trial updates of action 
outcomes according to emotionally modulated learning rates and prediction 
errors. Future follow-up investigations will need to define a connectivity structure 
between this circuit and the right dorsolateral prefrontal region computing 
volatility prediction error.
Volatility-learning depends on volatility prediction errors, namely the difference 
between uncertainty (as sampled by witnessing new outcomes) and predicted 
uncertainty. A portion of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was found to 
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correlate with volatility prediction errors, but only during trials involving happy 
faces. This interaction between emotional context and volatility-learning could be 
interpreted in two ways. One possibility is that the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
region is primarily involved in computing volatility prediction errors. Aversive 
emotions might disrupt these computations in this region. Alternatively, the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal region is primarily involved in regulating emotions on the 
basis of an internal model of the environment [“model-based” emotion regulation, 
(Etkin et al., 2015)], an instance of the known contribution of this region to 
model-based decision-making (Smittenaar et al., 2013). Model-based emotional 
regulation would be particularly taxed when the internal model of the environment 
is changing rapidly. The combined demands of a highly volatile environment and 
the presence of aversive emotions might disrupt emotional regulation in this 
region. Future studies manipulating a broader range of emotional contexts and 
volatility might distinguish between those possibilities. 
Interpretational issues
The manipulation of outcome valence enabled us to test its influence on emotional 
biases of learning. For instance, some scholars have suggested separated reinforcement 
learning systems for appetitive and aversive learning, involving dopamine and 
serotonin, respectively (Daw et al., 2002; Cools et al., 2011). At the neural level, 
different reinforcement learning mechanisms for reward and punishment 
learning could result in different systems for encoding prediction error, or 
different systems for encoding dynamic learning rate, or both. Here, we found that 
outcome valence strongly modulate correlates of prediction error in the brain. 
However, there were neither behavioral nor neural effects of outcome valence on 
predicted volatility suggesting that emotional biases on predicted volatility are 
independent of outcome valence. 
Conclusion
In this study, we have investigated the effects of emotion on associative learning 
and its influences on the neural circuitry implementing encoding and learning of 
changes statistical regularities in the environmental. These findings open the way 
to capture physiological and pathological variability during associative learning 
in terms of computationally well-defined parameters, and to test their neuro-
biological plausibility.
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Computational neuroscience provides quantitative tools for understanding brain 
disorders associated with deficits in learning and decision making. The mesostriatal 
and corticostriatal circuitry form the neural substrates of these cognitive 
functions. Dysfunction of elements of these circuits is associated with brain 
disorders such as drug and behavioral addictions, obesity, Parkinson’s disease and 
depression. 
In this thesis, we attempted to shed light on neural circuitry implementing 
computations underlying reward learning and choice. We employed pharmacological 
manipulation, cognitive tasks and neuroimaging techniques together with state 
of the art computational models of brain and behavior. 
Summary
Here, I summarize the main findings:
In chapter 2, we focused on functional architecture of the human striatum and its 
modulation by dopamine. We found a hierarchical organization along the 
ventrodorsal axis modulated by dopamine. Furthermore, trait impulsivity was 
associated with a specific component of this circuitry, namely the dopaminergic 
modulation of the input from the ventral to the dorsomedial striatum. 
In chapter 3, we studied Pavlovian and instrumental learning in Parkinson’s disease 
patients diagnosed with impulse control disorders triggered by dopaminergic 
medications. Using a reinforcement learning actor-critic model of the striatum 
(Barto, 1995), we found that impulse control disorders are associated with model 
parameters related to stimulus valuation (Pavlovian learning). Specifically, 
Parkinson’s disease patients with impulse control disorders exhibited lower 
learning rate from negative prediction errors in the critic. 
In chapter 4, we focused on neuroanatomical traits corresponding to individual 
differences in exhibiting goal-directed and habitual forms of decision making 
quantified using model-based and model-free reinforcement learning accounts 
(Daw et al., 2011). Using diffusion-based structural connectivity, we found that 
individual differences in the degree of model-based control are predicted by neu-
roanatomical projections from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex to the medial 
striatum. Individuals with stronger ventromedial prefrontal afferences to the 
medial striatum are more likely to employ a model-based strategy in decision 
making.
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In chapter 5, we focused on emotional modulation of learning in volatile 
environments. We employed a hierarchical Bayesian learning model (Behrens et 
al., 2007b; Mathys et al., 2011) and found that emotions modulate subjective 
experiences of environmental volatility. Specifically, experienced volatility was 
lower in emotionally aversive contexts resulting in lower learning rates in these 
contexts. Negative emotions suppressed signals vital for volatility tracking in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and biased the neural circuitry implementing 
action-outcome contingency learning by modulating the volatility encoding in 
the anterior cingulate region and its volatility-dependent interaction with the 
dorsomedial striatum. 
Contributions to computational psychiatry
In the first chapter, I noted three levels within the computational psychiatry 
program to identify pathological computational processes in patients with disorders 
related to learning and choice, such as addiction and impulse control disorders. 
These levels are concerned with 1) computational modeling of healthy brain; 
2) mapping potential endophenotypes of diseases into priors (or parameters) of 
the computational models; 3) modeling brain disorders as the pathological state of 
maladaptive interactions between priors and risky environment in which priors 
are suboptimal. 
A long-term perspective that this thesis is based upon was to shed light on candidate 
cognitive and neural mechanisms and associated computations that might 
predispose individuals to compulsive disorders. Therefore, in this thesis, I focused 
on computational modeling of some neurocognitive traits that are among 
candidates of addiction endophenotypes. In chapters 2, 3 and 4, we aimed to 
identify priors biasing computations implemented within the corticostriatal 
circuitry that are related to these endophenotypes (Dalley et al., 2011; Robbins 
et al., 2012). Specifically, in chapter 2, we focused on the striatal architecture, 
its dopaminergic modulations and its interaction with impulsivity. In chapter 3, 
we studied maladaptive computational processes and their modulations with 
dopamine in Parkinson’s disease patients with impulse control disorders. In 
chapter 4, we studied components of corticostriatal circuitry predicting individual 
differences in exerting model-based and model-free control on actions. 
In chapter 5, we studied computational modeling of emotional biases of learning 
and choice. Here, we aimed to fill the gap in computational modeling of emotion. 
Therefore, this chapter lies within the level one. It is necessary to fill this gap as 
individual differences in emotional traits might be related to different aspects of 
drug addiction, for example initiation of drug use and relapse (Khantzian, 1997). 
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Putting together, findings of this thesis shed light on candidate computational 
processes in neural circuitry implementing learning and choice in patients with 
impulsive/compulsive disorders.
Future directions
In this section, I wish to mention some future directions arisen by this thesis with 
a focus on computational modeling research on psychiatric disorders.
In chapter 2, we found that a specific element of mesostriatal circuitry predicts 
individual differences in trait impulsivity in healthy volunteers. Specifically, we 
found that the degree of D2-dependent dopaminergic modulation of ventral to 
dorsomedial striatal connectivity predicts trait impulsivity. Given previous studies 
showing a link between impulsivity and propensity to compulsive drug abuse 
(Everitt et al., 2008), our results suggest that high sensitivity of coupling between 
ventral striatum and dorsomedial striatum (caudate nucleus) to dopaminergic 
challenges might be a predisposing neurobiological trait of addiction. This is 
particularly interesting given recent evidence that the dorsomedial striatum plays 
a critical role in drug seeking behavior during early phases of drug exposure, 
when behavior is still goal-directed and sensitive to outcome devaluation. For 
example, Corbit et al. (2012) have shown that in early phases of alcohol exposure, 
drug seeking behavior in rats is dependent on dorsomedial-, but not dorsolateral-, 
striatum. In humans, consistent with these findings, an aberrant intrinsic 
connectivity between ventral striatum and caudate in abstinent heroin users has 
been found (Xie et al., 2014), although it is not clear from this study that this is a 
predisposing neurobiological trait or only a consequence of drug exposure. Our 
findings suggest that one possible mechanism through which drugs could 
modulate goal-directed drug taking actions during early phases of drug intake in 
highly impulsive individuals is the dopamine-dependent modulation of the 
dorsomedial striatum by the ventral striatum. Future works should address this 
question in individuals at risk of impulsive and compulsive disorders. 
In chapter 3, we found that Parkinson’s disease patients with impulse control 
disorders exhibit deficits in learning states values from negative prediction errors. 
This finding is generally consistent with the notion of compulsivity, which is the 
pathological state of ignoring harmful consequences of a strong habitual response. 
However, consistent with recent theories emphasizing the interactions between 
Pavlovian and instrumental learning in developing addiction, here we found that 
deficit in these patients is specific to Pavlovian learning of state values. As only a 
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small subset of Parkinson’s disease patients medicated with dopaminergic 
medications develop impulse control disorders (Dagher and Robbins, 2009), it is 
important to identify risk factors in these individuals making them vulnerable to 
dopaminergic medication. Given our results, a question for future studies is 
whether this specific deficit in Pavlovian learning is also present in these patients 
before onset of Parkinson’s and dopaminergic medication, and whether 
dopaminergic medication exacerbate this deficit.
There is an increasing interest to describe brain disorders as a pathological state of 
the balance between goal-directed and habitual instrumental control. Compulsive 
disorders such as drug addiction, binge eating and obsessive-compulsive disorders 
are conceptualized as a progressive pathological transition from goal-directed 
action control to habitual stimulus-driven habits (Everitt et al., 2008; Smith and 
Robbins, 2013; Gillan and Robbins, 2014). Some manifestations of Parkinson’s 
disease and Tourette syndrome have also been hypothesized to be due to the 
imbalance between goal-directed and habitual control (Redgrave et al., 2010; 
Jahanshahi et al., 2015). Therefore, computational modeling of these modes of 
action control as different reinforcement learning systems is a step forward for 
quantifying the balance between the two systems (Voon et al., 2014). However, one 
important question is how, neurobiologically and computationally, the balance 
goes awry in these disorders. Importantly, the main focus of original works on 
computational modeling of goal-directed and habitual control was on normative 
computational mechanisms underlying the balance between the two systems 
(Daw et al., 2005; Keramati et al., 2011). Future works should address the 
pathological computations causing the imbalance between the two systems in 
patients with these brain disorders and its neurobiological correlates. Our finding 
indicate that the top-down connectivity from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
to the medial striatum through cingulum white matter might be the neurobiolog-
ical substrate of passing information necessary for these computations. This 
possibility should be also addressed in future research.
Modern research in cognitive neuroscience of emotion describes it as a modulating 
and interacting system with learning and decision making (Phelps et al., 2014; 
Etkin et al., 2015). A wide range of psychiatric disorders also manifests as 
simultaneous pathological state of emotional processing, learning and choice. In 
chapter 5, we showed that emotions modulate the neural circuitry implementing 
learning uncertainties and causal structures in the environment. An important 
question is what elements of this circuit are particularly related to emotional 
traits, such as anxiety and social avoidance, which might predispose psychiatric 
disorders such as addiction and depression (Belin et al., 2015). In addition, future 
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works should investigate the role of different neuromodulatory systems, such as 
noradrenergic and acetylcholine (Yu and Dayan, 2005), in learning uncertainties 
and their interaction with emotional processing within this circuit. 
In this thesis, we emphasized on mappings of cognitive and neuronal traits into 
parameters and priors of computational models, which could help to construct 
“computational traits” with potential diagnostic value. This perspective heavily 
depends not only on our ability to define such models, but also on statistical 
methods making inference about validity and robustness of estimated parameters 
across individuals and patient groups, as well as making inference on generaliz-
ability of computational models. Currently, there is a lack of such robust statistical 
tools. Future works in computational psychiatry should address this issue by 
providing appropriate tools for the academic psychiatry community.
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De computationele neurowetenschap biedt kwantitatieve instrumenten waarmee 
men hersenstoornissen kan bestuderen die gepaard gaan met aandoeningen van 
cognitieve functies zoals leren en besluitvorming. Deze cognitieve functies worden 
ondersteund door de meso-striatale and cortico-striatale netwerken in de hersenen. 
Dysfunctie van onderdelen van deze netwerken worden geassocieerd met hersen-
aandoeningen, zoals verslaving, obesitas, de ziekte van Parkinson, en depressie. In 
dit proefschrift hebben we getracht om de hersen-netwerken in kaart te brengen 
die de berekeningen uitvoeren die ten grondslag liggen aan beloning-gestuurd 
leren en besluitvorming. We hebben hiertoe een verscheidenheid aan technieken 
ingezet, waaronder farmacologische manipulatie, cognitieve taken, en beeldvormende 
technieken, in combinatie met computermodellen van hersenfunctie en gedrag. 
Hieronder geef ik een samenvatting van de belangrijste bevindingen:
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we ons gericht op de functionele organisatie van het 
striatum en hoe deze wordt beïnvloedt door dopamine. Met zogenaamde resting 
state scans hebben onderzocht hoe verschillende onderdelen van het striatum met 
elkaar in verbinding staan. Onze resultaten ondersteunden een hiërarchische 
organisatie van het striatum, waarbij informatie wordt uitgewisseld tussen 
ventrale en dorsale striatum, via het dorsomediale striatum. Met farmacologische 
manipulaties konden we aantonen dat dopamine deze verbindingen moduleert. 
Daarnaast vonden we dat de karaktereigenschap impulsiviteit samenhing met een 
specifiek onderdeel van dit circuit, namelijk de dopaminerge invloed op de input 
van het ventrale naar het dorsomediale striatum. Deze resultaten helpen ons 
begrijpen waarom hoog impulsieve mensen gevoeliger zijn voor verslaving  
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we Pavloviaans en instrumenteel leren onderzocht bij 
Parkinson patiënten die gediagnosticeerd waren met impuls controle stoornissen 
geïnduceerd door dopaminerge medicatie. Door middel van een reinforcement 
“actor-critic” leer model van het striatum, toonden we aan dat impuls controle 
stoornissen geassocieerd zijn met parameters van het model welke gerelateerd 
zijn aan stimulus waardering (Pavloviaans leren). Om precies te zijn, Parkinson 
patiënten met impuls controle stoornissen lieten een lager leertempo zien bij 
foutieve negatieve voorspellingen in de “critic”.
In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we onderzocht welke neuro-anatomische kenmerken 
correleren met de verschillende manieren waarop proefpersonen keuzes maken. 
We maakten gebruik van diffusion-based structurele connectiviteit en vonden dat 
de neuroanatomische projecties van de ventromediale prefrontale cortex en het 
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mediale striatum voorspellen in welke mate proefpersonen gebruik maken van 
model-based controle. Bij individuen met sterkere verbindingen van de ventromediale 
prefrontale cortex naar het mediale striatum is het waarschijnlijker dat ze gebruik 
maken van een model-based strategie bij het maken van keuzes.
In hoofdstuk 5 hebben we onderzocht hoe aversieve versus appetitieve emoties het 
leren beïnvloedt in een onzekere context. We gebruikten een zogenaamde hierarc
hische Bayesian leermodel als computationele methode en vonden dat emoties de 
subjectieve ervaring van contextuele volatiliteit beïnvloedt. Om precies te zijn, we 
vonden dat de ervaren volatiliteit lager was in een aversieve context, waardoor de 
leersnelheid in deze context ook lager was. Dit effect hing samen met de neurale 
bevindingen. Aversieve emoties onderdrukten de signalen in de rechter laterale 
prefrontale cortex, die cruciaal zijn voor het leren over volatiliteit. Dit beïnvloedde 
het neurale circuit dat een rol speelt bij het leren van doelgericht gedrag door het 
coderen van volatiliteit in de anterieure cingulate cortex en de interactie hiervan 
met de dorsaal-mediale striatum te moduleren.   
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